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Abstract
Recent technological advancements have enabled the collection of large amounts of
personal data of individuals at an ever-increasing rate. Service providers, organisations
and governments can collect or otherwise acquire rich information about individuals’
everyday lives and habits from big data-silos, enabling profiling and micro-targeting
such as in political elections. Therefore, it is important to analyse systems that allow
the collection and information sharing between users and to design secure and privacy
enhancing solutions.
This thesis contains two parts. The aim of the first part is to investigate in detail the
effects of the collateral information collection of third-party applications on Facebook.
The aim of the second part is to analyse in detail the security and privacy issues of car
sharing systems and to design a secure and privacy-preserving solution.
In the first part, we present a detailed multi-faceted study on the collateral information
collection privacy issues of Facebook applications; providers of third-party applications
on Facebook exploit the interdependency between users and their friends. The goal
is to (i) study the existence of the problem, (ii) investigate whether Facebook users
are concerned about the issue, quantify its (iii) likelihood and (iv) impact of collateral
information collection affecting users, (v) identify whether collateral information
collection is an issue for the protection of the personal data of Facebook users under
the legal framework, and (vi) we propose solutions that aim to solve the problem of
collateral information collection. In order to investigate the views of the users, we
designed a questionnaire and collected the responses of participants. Employing real
data from the Facebook third-party applications ecosystem, we compute the likelihood
of collateral information collection affecting users and quantify its significance
evaluating the amount of attributes collected by such applications. To investigate
whether collateral information collection is an issue in terms of users’ privacy we
analysed the legal framework in light of the General Data Protection Regulation. To
provide countermeasures, we propose a privacy dashboard extension that implements
privacy scoring computations to enhance transparency towards collateral information
collection.
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In the second part, we investigate physical-keyless car sharing systems that allow
users to share their cars with other users without the need to exchange physical keys.
The goal is to (i) elicit the security and privacy requirements, and (ii) design a secure
and privacy-enhancing protocol for car access provision. First, we propose a novel
physical-keyless car sharing system. We then provide comprehensive security and
privacy analysis and elicit the requirements for a secure and privacy-enhancing system.
Finally, we design a secure and privacy-enhancing protocol for car access provision,
named SePCAR. The protocol is fully decentralised and allows users to share their
cars conveniently without sacrificing their security and privacy. It provides generation,
update, revocation, and distribution mechanisms for access tokens to shared cars, as
well as procedures to solve disputes and to deal with law enforcement requests, for
instance in the case of car incidents.
Owing to the massive amounts of personal information handled by social networks such
as Facebook and by car sharing systems, privacy plays a central role to the users of such
systems. In this thesis, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the privacy issues for
these applications and provide solutions based on transparency and privacy-enhancing
technologies.
Beknopte samenvatting
Recente technologische ontwikkelingen hebben het verzamelen van grote hoeveelheden
persoonlijke informatie zeer sterk doen toenemen. Dienstverleners, organisaties en
overheden verzamelen massale hoeveelheden informatie en delen deze via databanken;
dit stelt hen in staat om op grote schaal mensen en hun gedrag te karakteriseren en
zelfs te beïnvloeden. Zo kent iedereen het voorbeeld waarin micro-targetting gebruikt
werd om verkiezingen te beïnvloeden. Het is dus belangrijk om systemen, die het
verzamelen en het delen van deze informatie mogelijk maken, grondig te analyseren;
daarnaast is het belangrijk om nieuwe systemen te ontwikkelen die de veiligheid van
de data en privacy van de gebruikers waarborgen.
Deze thesis bestaat uit twee delen. Het eerste deel bevat een diepgaande analyse van de
effecten van het doorgeven van gegevens aan externe toepassingen op Facebook. Het
tweede deel focust op systemen voor autodelen; het maakt een diepgaande analyse van
de risico’s op vlak van beveiliging en privacy en biedt ook een oplossing voor deze
problemen in de vorm van een cryptografisch protocol.
In het eerste deel bestuderen we in detail de privacy implicaties die ontstaan uit het
verzamelen van informatie door toepassingen gelinkt aan Facebook, de zogenaamde
derden (“third-party”) toepassingen op Facebook die de afhankelijkheidsrelatie
exploiteren tussen gebruikers en hun vrienden. Dit onderzoek bestudeert de volgende
aspecten: (i) onderzoek naar het bestaan van het probleem, (ii) onderzoeken of
Facebook gebruikers bezorgd zijn over het feit dat hun persoonlijke gegevens
beschikbaar kunnen zijn voor externe applicaties en hoe dit mogelijk gemaakt wordt,
(iii) bepalen hoe waarschijnlijk het is dat hun data wordt doorgegeven, (iv) bepalen
welke invloed het doorgeven van persoonlijke gegevens heeft op de gebruikers, (v)
nagaan of het verzamelen van informatie door derden legaal gezien valt onder de
bescherming van persoonlijke data van Facebook gebruikers en tot slot (vi) bieden we
oplossingen voor dit probleem. Om de mening van de gebruikers te achterhalen hebben
we een enquête afgenomen. Steunend op het ecosysteem van externe applicaties
van Facebook hebben we berekend hoe waarschijnlijk het is dat de gegevens van
gebruikers via Facebook beschikbaar worden voor externe applicaties en bepalen
ix
x BEKNOPTE SAMENVATTING
we het belang van de informatie waar deze toepassingen toegang tot krijgen. Om te
onderzoeken of het verzamelen van informatie door externe applicaties op Facebook een
aantasting vormt van het recht op privacy van de gebruikers, bekijken we het juridisch
kader gecreëerd door de Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming (General Data
Protection Regulation). Om deze transfer van informatie in kaart te brengen, stellen we
een systeem voor dat een privacy score berekend zodat er meer transparantie ontstaat
rond welke informatie beschikbaar wordt.
In het tweede deel onderzoeken we systemen om auto’s te delen zonder fysieke sleutels
zodat gebruikers hun auto kunnen delen met anderen zonder dat ze de sleutel aan elkaar
moeten doorgeven. We starten met een analyse die de veiligheidsvoorschriften en
privacy noden aan het licht brengt. Daarna ontwikkelen we een veilig protocol dat een
gebruiker zelfs zonder sleutel toegang kan geven tot een auto en bovendien de privacy
van de gebruikers beschermt. Ten eerste stellen we een nieuw systeem voor autodelen
zonder fysieke sleutels voor. Daarna voorzien we een diepgaande veiligheids- en
privacy analyse en stellen we de vereisten voor een veilig, privacy-vriendelijk systeem
op onder de naam SePCAR. Tot slot modelleren we het SePCAR protocol. Dit protocol
is volledig gedecentraliseerd en maakt het mogelijk voor gebruikers om hun auto
op een comfortabele manier te delen zonder hun privacy in het gedrang te brengen.
Het systeem voorziet een mechanisme om tokens voor het autodelen te genereren, te
updaten, te herroepen en te verdelen, alsook een procedure om geschillen op te lossen
en om te gaan met situaties waarbij de politie betrokken is, bijvoorbeeld in het geval
van een ongeval.
Omdat zowel sociale netwerken zoals Facebook en toepassingen voor autodelen over
een enorme hoeveelheid persoonlijke informatie bezitten, speelt privacy een belangrijke
rol voor de gebruikers van deze systemen. Deze thesis biedt een uitgebreide analyse
van de mogelijke privacy problemen in deze toepassingen en stelt oplossingen voor die
de gebruikers meer transparantie bieden en hun privacy beter beschermen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Arguing that you don’t care about
the right to privacy because you have
nothing to hide is no different than
saying you don’t care about free
speech because you have nothing to
say.
EDWARD SNOWDEN, Computer
professional, former Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee
and whistle blower
1.1 Motivation
The advancement of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) has eased
the exchange of information between individuals, while enabling the collection of
large amounts of their personal data at an ever-increasing rate [302]. Individuals are
extensively using ICTs such as the Internet, mobile networks, wireless networks
and online platforms for several purposes: from searching the web, throughout
engaging in online communities and performing online transactions. Service providers,
organisations and governments can collect individuals’ browsing information, monitor
their daily activities in online communities and fuse massive amounts of information for
transactions and payments. The former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee
Edward Snowden showed the extensive capabilities of the U.S. and U.K. intelligence
services on tracking individuals’ everyday activities [301]. They can monitor web
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searches, collect posts in online communities and wiretap file transfers of cloud
infrastructure [275, 299, 304]. Moreover, data analytic companies such as Cambridge
Analytica (CA) [49] and Palantir [238] can acquire and collect rich information about
individuals’ everyday lives and habits from big data-silos, enabling profiling and
micro-targeting of individuals such as in political elections [221, 302].
In line with the vast impact of the ICTs and the implications of information sharing,
online communities such as online social networks and systems for sharing physical
assets have populated the world while threatening the privacy of individuals [302].
For example, individuals can express their opinions using Twitter [3], update their
professional profiles using LinkedIn [2], share their photos with their friends using
Facebook [117] and book their accommodation for their next trip using Airbnb [9].
While individuals perform such online activities, the collection and storage of their
personal information is enabled. Thus, privacy threats emerge with service providers
that can compile their activities into detailed dossiers often without their permission
or even knowledge. Personal information can encompass not only data that identifies
individuals such as their identity, birthday and home address but it can also reveal their
interests, behaviours [101], political and religious beliefs [255] and even their health
status [137].
All is not lost. While ICTs bring danger of diminishing the privacy of individuals,
the research community is actively identifying, extensively analysing and thoroughly
mitigating privacy problems from different perspectives. For identifying and analysing
privacy issues there are multiple tools including network simulations (which measure
the impact of information dissemination), questionnaires (which study the opinion of
individuals) and mathematical models (which quantify the amount of disseminated
information). Moreover, there is an extensive literature on privacy and transparency
enhancing technologies for designing and implementing a wide range of solutions
such as technologies for preserving anonymity, unlinkability, and confidentiality
properties. We refer the interested reader to the taxonomy of privacy by Solove [274],
the terminology and definitions of privacy properties by Pfitzmann and Hansen [245]
and to the methodology for applying these properties by Deng et al. [84].
In this thesis, we focus on ICTs and systems that allow the collection and information
sharing between users and more specifically on Online Social Networks (OSNs) and
on physical assets sharing systems. In short, OSNs offer a global platform enabling a
wide range of human activities and social interactions resulting in an extensive amount
of users. In the U.S., 65 percent of the Internet-using adults in 2010 are members of
OSNs such as Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook [14] while more than 2 Billion users per
month are actively using Facebook (in 2018) [277]. We focus on Facebook, a key OSN,
and the privacy issue of interdependent privacy; providers of third-party applications
on Facebook exploit the interdependency between users and their friends. Moreover,
we examine systems that enable individuals to share physical assets – Uber, a flagship
company for peer-to-peer car sharing is used by more than 200 Million users. Owing
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to the massive amounts of personal information handled by OSNs and car sharing
systems, privacy plays a central role to the users of such systems.
1.2 Problem statement
This thesis deals with two main privacy problems related to information sharing. First,
we detail the privacy implications of interdependent privacy, an issue enabled by third-
party applications affecting Facebook users. Second, we highlight the privacy threats
that online platforms and systems that utilise ICTs enable for sharing physical assets,
with an example car sharing systems.
As a concept, privacy is widely used, and it is dependent on social, academic and legal
contexts, as pointed out by Gürses [147]. Thus, we initially provide the definitions of
privacy and data protection that we will use throughout this thesis.
1.2.1 Definition of privacy and data protection
Historically, privacy was defined as the “right to be left alone” by Warren and
Brandeis [327]. In an interconnected world of online platforms and systems that
utilise ICTs, privacy is often referred as the ability of individuals to control the
dissemination of their personal information. In other words, privacy is defined by
Westin and Ruebhausen [332], as:
Definition. The right of the individual to decide what information about himself should
be communicated to others and under what circumstances.
Note that if a system respects the privacy of their users, that does not necessarily mean
that their personal information are never disclosed to anyone. It rather means that a
system allows their users to control what information is revealed, to whom and under
which conditions. Personal information has a very broad meaning and includes photos,
likes, location, IP addresses, behavioural information, and of course identity.
There are scenarios where the privacy of individuals is bound to be affected by the
decisions of others [35]. For example, the genome of an individual contains sensitive
information about a person but also correlated information about the person’s family
members such as ethnicity, kinship, and tendency to diseases [167]. In OSNs such
as on Facebook, individuals are connected with others with friendship relationships,
enabling privacy interdependence on data sharing.
Definition. We define interdependent privacy as the scenario when the privacy of
individuals is affected by decisions taken and actions initiated by anyone but the
individuals themselves.
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Note that, in scenarios where privacy interdependence is enabled, individuals are not
able to control the dissemination of their personal information.
Definition. We define collateral information collection as the acquisition of users’
personal data through any means or tool initiated by anyone but the users themselves.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right and defined in Article 7 – “Respect for
private and family life” of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(the ‘Charter’) [114] as:
Definition. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life,
home and communications.
The right for the protection of personal data of individuals is also a fundamental right,
defined in Article 8(1) – “Protection of personal data” of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’) [114]:
Definition. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him
or her.
Safeguarding the privacy of individuals is related to the protection of their electronic
communications [112] and of their personal data while stored and processed by online
providers [113]. Considering the data protection of individuals, it is dependent on the
legal framework defined by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [113]: 1
Definition. The principles of and rules on the protection of natural persons about
the processing of their personal data should, whatever their nationality or residence,
respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, in particular, their right to the protection
of personal data.
In a nutshell, the GDPR regulates the protection of personal data of individuals
while being processed (e.g., collected, recorded and stored) by online providers
(i.e., data controllers and processors) against automated-decision making, profiling
and discriminatory practices. Compliance should be transparent and monitored by
organisations and regulatory authorities; the lack of it will invoke heavy fines (Article 83
– “General conditions for imposing administrative fines” of GDPR [113]). Hence, OSNs
and car sharing providers should manage the personal data of individuals rightfully and
be compliant with the data protection principles of the GDPR.
To safeguard the aforementioned rights, online platforms and systems that utilise ICTs
should by design and default protect the personal data of individuals, as it is stated in
Article 25 (1) and Article 25 (2) of the GDPR respectively.
1The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) becomes applicable as of May 25, 2018.
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1.2.2 Facebook third-party application providers and privacy
interdependence
From a private network of students at Harvard University, Facebook became the
most dominant OSN with more than 2 Billion users in 2018 [277]. By design and
popularity, Facebook has morphed into an immense information repository, storing
individuals’ personal information; logging interactions between users and their friends,
groups, events and pages. Users are willing to provide large amounts of their personal
information on Facebook taking no action to limit their information visibility, as pointed
out by Gross and Acquisti [145].
Facebook also offers third-party applications (apps) developed by other vendors, i.e.,
third-party application providers (app providers). While installing an app on Facebook,
it enables access to the profile information of a user. Accepting the permissions, the
app collects personal and often sensitive information of the user, such as profile images,
dating preferences and political interests [145, 42, 99] (see Chapter 2). Interestingly,
Golbeck and Mauriello [139] identified that a large percentage of users on Facebook
were under-informed and did not believe that apps could access their data, having an
incorrect perception on the Facebook data app access capabilities [139].
Beside such information collection, the profile information of a user can also be
acquired when a friend of a user installs an app [291] entailing privacy interdependence
issues on Facebook [35, 290]. A user who shares personal information with his/her
friends on Facebook has no idea whether a friend has installed an app that also accesses
the shared content. In a nutshell, when a friend of a user install an app, the app can
request and grant access to the profile information of a user such as the birthday, current
location, and history [291]. Such access takes place outside the Facebook ecosystem
with the user not being aware whether a friend has installed an app collecting his/her
information; this collateral information collection is enabled only with the friends’
consent and not with consent of the user. On Facebook, apps privacy settings allow by
default the profile information of a user to be accessed by their friends’ apps, unless
they manually uncheck the relevant boxes “Apps other use”. Note that, in some cases,
one or more app providers may cluster several apps and thus gain access to a collection
of personal information.
Such collateral information collection goes far beyond the legitimate expectations of
users and their friends, as there is lack of transparency and consent. In the U.S., the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) stressed that such apps cannot imply consent, which
should be affirmatively expressed by users [125, 126]. In other words, consent should
be provided only by the user, whose data will be collected by the apps, and not by his
or her friend.
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1.2.3 Security and privacy threats of online platforms: the
case of car sharing
Car sharing services have shown considerable growth [34, 276, 276]. As a byproduct,
an immense amount of data, generated by its users, is transferred to these systems and
stored in their online platforms [272]. Although car sharing systems provide users with
an essential functionality, a platform that helps them to share cars conveniently and on
demand, they also introduce several issues concerning security and privacy.
First, in scenarios where users share their cars, cyber-physical security is of utmost
importance. Car sharing systems utilise online platforms to facilitate services, and the
platform itself should have secure mechanisms. Most platforms run on a public cloud
infrastructure, inheriting its security issues. Also, if the platform handles payments,
it usually utilises a third-party financial provider to process transactions hence it is
vulnerable to attacks on the financial provider. For example, in a breach of security, the
information of 57 million customers and drivers was compromised at Uber [222]. In
another incident, several users found their accounts illegally accessed, used and charged
for rides performed by fraudulent activities [303]. In short, an adversary can try to
eavesdrop and collect information exchanged within a car sharing system, tamper with
the car sharing details, extract the key of a car stored in un-trusted devices, generate a
rogue access token to access a car or deny having accessed it maliciously.
Another major concern is the amount of personal and potentially sensitive data collected
by these systems [272]. For instance, Uber allegedly used a program called “Hell” to
spy on their rival company drivers [137, 300]. In another case, a program called “God
view” or “Heaven” was used to track always the location of their users [78, 97]. In
short, an adversary can try to correlate and link two car sharing requests of the same
user or the car, identify car usage patterns and deduce the sharing preferences of users.
These preferences can be established by collecting information about sharing patterns
such as rental time, duration, pickup location, when, where and with whom someone is
sharing a car [101].
Owing to the massive amounts of personal data handled, compliance with data
protection law plays a central role for car sharing systems. The GDPR [113] establishes
stringent requirements on online providers, and more specifically it imposes the
obligation to implement organisational and technical measures to process personal data
legally and further safeguard data subjects’ rights, i.e., users.
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1.3 Research challenges
1.3.1 Collateral information collection of Facebook third-
party application providers
Collateral information collection is the manifestation of interdependent privacy; the
scenario where the privacy of an individual user is affected by the decisions of other
users [35]. Prior research in the domain of Facebook apps is mainly focused on the
topics of information collection [15, 165], tracking [5, 4, 165], discrepancy between
the amount of permissions and the nature of apps [133, 59, 323] and game theory [35,
249, 250]. However, there is currently no prior work that extensively analyses how the
friends of a user in the Facebook ecosystem directly or indirectly affect their privacy
through third-party app and app providers.
To investigate in detail the effects of the interdependent privacy of the third-party apps
and app providers on Facebook and the collateral information collection that entails to
users, the following challenges need to be addressed:
• Users’ opinion on and concern about the collateral information collection of
third-party apps on Facebook. Interdependent privacy has been identified to be
a privacy issue for Facebook users by both the research community [326, 35, 250]
and organisations, i.e., the FTC [125, 126]. Complementary to that, in our
research, we want to investigate the opinion of Facebook users, and whether they
are concerned about the collateral information collection.
• The likelihood of the collateral information collection to occur. Assuming
that users are concerned, in our research, we want to identify whether such an
issue is highly likely to happen and from what it is dependent on. For instance,
what about popular apps such as TripAdvisor [310]?
• The significance of the collateral information collection. Assuming that
popular apps have a high probability to enable the collateral information
collection, our research intends to identify the amount of personal information
collected by third-party apps and app providers (i.e., data fusion of multiple apps
by an app provider).
• The issues of collateral information collection of Facebook third-party app
providers under the prism of the data protection regulation. Our research
intends to investigate the issues of collateral information collection under the
prism of the GDPR [113] for the third-party app providers of Facebook.
• Solutions to collateral information collection on Facebook. Implementing
privacy enhancing solutions on Facebook such as cryptographic countermeasures
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can be interesting but challenging to maintain [3, 2, 1] as they are frequently
detected and blocked [196, 26, 68]. It is challenging to propose solutions aiming
to help users making informed decisions and enhance transparency [130].
1.3.2 Secure and privacy-enhancing car sharing systems
Prior research in the domain of car sharing is mainly focused on topics of
relocation strategies [330, 341], economic models [271, 270, 270, 128, 129], secure
authentication [88], PKI infrastructure [254, 182], tamper-proof devices [312, 259],
location privacy [311, 21, 21] and data mining [205, 239]. However, none of the prior
work provides an analysis of the security and privacy threats of car sharing systems,
elicits the security and privacy requirements and designs fully-fledged solutions for
secure and privacy-enhancing car sharing systems.
In order to investigate in detail the security and privacy issues for car sharing systems
and design solutions, the following challenges need to be addressed:
• Security and privacy threats of car sharing systems and the elicitation of
requirements. No prior work describes systems for sharing cars using ICTs such
as mobile phones, wireless communication and online platforms. Our research
intends to design a high-level system model, specify the entities and operations
of such a system, the security and privacy threats and the requirements for a
secure and privacy preserving system design.
• Design and develop a full-fledged secure and privacy-enhancing car access
provision protocol. Unlike other researchers assuming centralised and fully
trusted car sharing systems [88], our research intends at designing solutions for
secure and privacy-enhancing car access provision. Note that forensic evidence
also needs to be provided when an unlawful action occurs as users have physical
access to the shared car.
1.4 Aim of this thesis
This thesis is organised into two parts and it has the following objectives.
Collateral information collection. The aim of the first part (see Part II) is to
investigate in detail the effects of the interdependent privacy of the third-party apps
and app providers and the collateral information collection on Facebook users. The
following objectives support the aim of this part:
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• To collect the opinion of individuals; whether they are concerned about the
collateral information collection of Facebook third-party apps.
• To formulate, compute and evaluate the probability that an installed app enables
the collateral information collection.
• To evaluate the significance of the collateral information collection by apps and
app providers.
• To analyse and clarify who the data controllers and data processors are, whether
collateral information collection is an adequate practice from a data protection
point of view and to identify who is accountable.
• To propose transparency enhancing solutions for raising user awareness and
helping them to make informed decisions. Moreover, to analyse other alternatives
to provide transparency.
Physical keyless car sharing systems. The aim of the second part (see Part III)
is to analyse in detail the security and privacy issues of car sharing systems, to elicit
the requirements and design a secure and privacy-preserving solution. The following
objectives support the aim of this part:
• To design a high-level system model, specify its main entities and the necessary
functional requirements.
• To perform a threat analysis identifying the security and privacy threats for car
sharing systems in a systematic way.
• To elicit the requirements for a secure and privacy-preserving solution design of
car sharing systems.
• To design and implement a secure and privacy-enhancing car access provision
protocol considering forensic evidence provision when an unlawful action occurs.
• To prove that the protocol fulfils the desired security and privacy requirements.
• To evaluate the theoretical complexity and practical efficiency of the designed
protocol.
1.5 Research methodology
In this section, we describe our research methodology. For the analysis and the solution
design, we use the system engineering approach.
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Analysis
Specification of 
Requirements
Design
Implementation
Evaluation
Figure 1.1: Secure-System Design Life Cycle (S-SDLC).
System engineering aims at finding solutions to a problem in a methodological and
structural way [148], using the Secure-System Development Life Cycle (S-SDLC)
methodology [214]. It focuses on the design and management of complex systems
as a whole and from its components, meaning that distinct elements together can
produce results not obtainable by the elements alone. Using a holistic life-cycle
approach, system engineering aims to capture and describe the problems (i.e., analysis),
transform them into a description of requirements (i.e., elicitation of requirements),
provide a solution design (i.e., design), develop a proof of the design or a full fledged
implementation (i.e., implementation) and evaluate as well as identify probable failures
that can occur (i.e., verification). S-SDLC inherits its logic and structure from the
waterfall model [261, 79], enabling a top-down synthesis and iterative processes of
life-cycle stages (see Fig. 1.1) [37, 20, 261, 190].
I. Analysis
• We analysed the privacy issues of the collateral information collection of
Facebook apps examining the app permissions system, the users’ privacy settings
and a real-world snapshot of the apps on Facebook [15]. It resulted in four
parts for our collateral information collection study: (i) whether individuals are
concerned, (ii) what is the probability of such information collection to happen,
(iii) whether it is significant, and finally (iv) which are the legal implications and
whether it represents a risk for the privacy of users.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 11
• We analysed the security and privacy issues for car sharing systems. This analysis
resulted in four parts for our study: to identify (i) the system model such as the
functionalities, entities and operations involved, (ii) the security and finally (iii)
the privacy issues that such a system should be able to deal with.
II. Specification of requirements
• We specified the functional requirements for a privacy dashboard extension
aiming at enhancing transparency towards collateral information collection.
• We specified three main directions that should be considered for car sharing
systems: (i) the functional issues such as forensic evidence provision, (ii) the
security classification of threats and the corresponding requirements, and (iii)
the privacy classification of threats and the corresponding requirements
III. Design
• We designed a questionnaire to investigate the individuals’ opinion on, and their
concerns about: i) the collateral information collection, ii) the attributes of their
profile information they are more concerned about, and iii) whether they want to
be notified and which actions they prefer to take in such cases.
• We developed a mathematical formula to estimate the likelihood of (i) a uniform
app adoption model, which takes into account the popularity of an app and
the Facebook users, and (ii) a non-uniform app adoption model, that takes into
account different network topologies and app adoption models tailored to the
Facebook ecosystem.
• We developed a mathematical formula to measure the number of the user’s
attributes (i.e., significance) when collected (i) by apps and (ii) by app providers
as an effect of data fusion. Moreover, we developed different cases of data
acquisition: (i) direct collection from the users themselves, (ii) indirect collection
through the friends of a user, and (iii) exclusive indirect collection through the
only friends of a user.
• We proposed a privacy dashboard extension that implements privacy scoring
computations for enhancing transparency, as a solution-design for the collateral
information collection of Facebook third-party apps and app providers. Moreover,
we developed a privacy scoring formula for evaluating the collateral information
collection over the apps and app providers.
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• We designed a novel high-level system model for a car sharing system to
demonstrate the necessary functionalities, entities involved and operations
performed.
• We designed a decentralised secure and privacy-enhancing protocol for car access
provision, named SePCAR, based on the security and privacy requirements
identified in the requirements elicitation phase.
V. Implementation
• We implemented and distributed a questionnaire using online web forms.
• We implemented our computations to measure the significance using the PHP:
Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP), JavaScript and Structured Query Language (SQL)
programming languages.
• We implemented our simulations for using various network topologies [11, 329,
102] and app adoption models [283] tailored to the Facebook ecosystem using
Python libraries.
• We reviewed the literature to design our system model for car sharing and to
identify the security and privacy threats.
• We implemented a protocol for car access provision namely SePCAR as a proof-
of-concept in C and evaluated its theoretical complexity and practical efficiency.
IV. Evaluation
• We investigated the views of individuals by collecting responses from 114
participants.
• We performed simulations to evaluate the likelihood that an installed app enables
collateral information collection for networks with a size of one million nodes.
• We measured the significance of collateral information collection based on a
real-world snapshot of 16,808 apps on Facebook [15].
• We clarified through the prism of GDPR the legal implications and the risks to
users’ privacy for the collateral information collection.
• We compiled the list of security and privacy classes of threats and their
corresponding requirements using the STRIDE framework [163] and the
LINDDUN framework [84] respectively.
• We proved that SePCAR satisfies the security and privacy requirements, provided
that its underlying cryptographic primitives are sufficiently secure.
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1.6 Summary of contributions and thesis outline
In this section, we outline the structure of this thesis. For each chapter, we also provide
the summary of contributions, list the co-authors and mention the related publications.
Our goal is to facilitate the evaluation of all contributions in this thesis.
PART I: PRELIMINARIES
Chapter 2 – Background and related work. In this chapter, we provide the
necessary background, and we give an overview of the related work.
Chapter 3 – Tools for analysis, specification of requirements and design
of privacy-enhancing systems. In this chapter, we provide the necessary tools
we use throughout this thesis for analysis, elicitation of requirements and design of
privacy-enhancing systems.
PART II: COLLATERAL INFORMATION COLLECTION OF THIRD-PARTY APPLICA-
TIONS
Chapter 4 – A comprehensive analysis of Facebook third-party applications
(apps): Friends, providers, and privacy interdependence. Third-party apps
on Facebook can collect personal data of the users when their friends install them. That
raises serious privacy concerns as the users are not notified by the apps nor by Facebook,
and they have not given their consent. In this chapter we present a detailed multi-faceted
study on the collateral information collection of the apps on Facebook. To investigate
the views of the users, we designed a questionnaire and collected the responses of
114 participants. The results show that participants are concerned about the collateral
information collection and in particular about the lack of notification and of mechanisms
to control the data collection. Based on real data, we compute the likelihood of collateral
information collection affecting users: we show that the probability is significant and
greater than 80% for popular apps such as TripAdvisor. We also demonstrate that
a substantial amount of profile data can be collected by apps, which enables third-
party application providers (app providers) to profile users. To investigate whether
collateral information collection is an issue of the users’ privacy we analysed the
legal framework in light of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). We
provide a detailed analysis of the entities involved and investigate which entity is
accountable for the collateral information collection. To provide countermeasures, we
propose a privacy dashboard extension that implements privacy scoring computations to
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enhance transparency towards such collateral information collection. Furthermore, we
discuss alternative solutions, highlighting other countermeasures such as notification
mechanisms, access control solutions, cryptographic systems and app auditing. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work that provides a detailed multi-faceted study
of this problem and that analyses the threat of user profiling by app providers. It can
serve as a guide for future third-party apps and app providers aiming at identifying
interdependent aspects of privacy and helping design apps considering privacy [149,
76].
This is a joint work with Gergely Biczók, Fatemeh Shirazi, Cristina Pérez-Solà, Jessica
Schroers, Pagona Tsormpatzoudi and Bart Preneel and published in [290, 291] and
at Computers & Security Journal [287]. I am the main author except for the network
topologies and application adoption simulations, and the legal analysis.
PART III: PHYSICAL-KEYLESS CAR SHARING SYSTEMS
Chapter 5 – A security and privacy analysis and elicitation of requirements of
physical-keyless car sharing systems. In this chapter we propose a novel physical-
keyless car sharing system, we provide a systematic security and privacy analysis and
elicit the requirements for a secure and privacy-enhancing system. We first present a
high-level model describing its main entities and specifying the necessary functional
requirements, allowing users to share their cars (with other users) without the need to
exchange physical keys. Based on the proposed model and functional requirements,
we present a detailed threat analysis of the system. We focus on the threats that affect
the system and its users regarding security and privacy threats. The analysis results in a
specification of an extensive set of security and privacy requirements for the system.
This work can be used as a guide for a future keyless car sharing system designs and as
a mean to assess the security and privacy risks imposed on users by such systems.
It is joint work with Mustafa A. Mustafa, and Bart Preneel and published in [288]. I
am the main author of this work.
Chapter 6 – SePCAR: A secure and privacy-enhancing protocol for car
access provision. In this chapter, we present an efficient secure and privacy-
enhancing protocol for car access provision, named SePCAR. The protocol is fully
decentralised and allows users to share their cars conveniently without sacrificing
their security and privacy. It provides generation, update, revocation, and distribution
mechanisms for access tokens to shared cars, as well as procedures to solve disputes
and to deal with law enforcement requests, for instance in the case of car incidents. We
prove that SePCAR meets its appropriate security and privacy requirements and that it
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is efficient: our practical efficiency analysis through a proof-of-concept implementation
shows that SePCAR takes only 1.55 seconds for a car access provision.
It is joint work with Abdelrahaman Aly, Mustafa A. Mustafa, Bart Mennink, Siemen
Dhooghe and Bart Preneel and published in [285]. I am the main author except for the
security proofs and the performance evaluation.
Chapter 7 – Conclusions and future work. In this chapter, we conclude this
dissertation, and we present open questions pointing to the future directions of our
work.
1.7 Further contributions
In this section, we shortly summarise other findings that played an important role in
developing the results presented in this thesis, in one way or another. Therefore, we
summarise the additional contributions, presenting them in inverse chronological order.
Security analysis of the drone communication protocol: Fuzzing the
MAVLink protocol. The MAVLink protocol, used for bidirectional communication
between a drone and a ground control station, will soon become a worldwide standard.
The protocol has been the subject of research many times before. Through this work,
we introduce the method of fuzzing as a complementing technique to the other research,
aiming to find vulnerabilities that have not been found until now. The goal is to identify
possible vulnerabilities in the protocol implementation aiming to make it more secure.
It is joint work with Karel Domin (main author) and Eduard Marin and published
in [91]. I helped on the security analysis of the MAVlink protocol.
A literature survey and classifications on data deanonymisation. The
problem of disclosing private anonymous data has become increasingly serious
particularly with the possibility of carrying out deanonymisation attacks on publishing
data. The related work available in the literature is inadequate regarding the number of
techniques analysed and is limited to certain contexts such as Online Social Networks.
We survey a large number of state-of-the-art techniques of deanonymisation achieved
in various methods and on different types of data. We aim to build a comprehensive
understanding of the problem. For this survey, we propose a framework to guide a
thorough analysis and classifications. We are interested in classifying deanonymisation
approaches based on type and source of auxiliary information and the structure of
the target datasets. Moreover, potential attacks, threats and some suggested assistive
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techniques are identified. This work can help the research community in gaining an
understanding of the deanonymisation problem and assist in the advancement of privacy
protection.
It is joint work with Dalal Al-Azizy (main author), David Millard, Kieron O’Hara
and Nigel Shadbolt and published in [10]. I helped on the research methodology and
provided feedback for the deanonymisation framework.
Collateral damage of Facebook apps: an enhanced privacy risk scoring
model. Establishing friendship relationships on Facebook often entails information
sharing between users and their friends. In this context, Facebook offers apps developed
by app providers, which may grant access to the personal data of users via apps installed
by their friends. Such access takes place outside of the Facebook ecosystem with the
user not being aware whether a friend has installed an app collecting her data. In some
cases, one or more app providers may cluster several apps and thus gain access to a
collection of personal data. As a consequence privacy risks emerge. Previous research
has mentioned the need to quantify privacy risks in Online Social Networks (OSNs).
Nevertheless, most of the existing work do not focus on the personal data disclosure
via apps. Moreover, the problem of personal data clustering from app providers has
not been studied. In this work, we perform a general analysis of the privacy threats
stemming from the personal data requested by apps installed by the friends of a user
from a technical and legal point of view. To assist users, we propose a privacy risk
scoring formula to calculate the amount of personal data that are exposed to app
providers. Moreover, we propose algorithms that based on clustering, computes the
visibility of each personal data to the app providers.
This is COSIC technical report [286] and is joint work with Pagona Tsormpatzoudi
and Bart Preneel. I am the main author.
SAML Revocation List (SARL): A revocation mechanism for long-lived
assertions on Shibboleth. SARL is the abbreviation of the Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) Revocation List. It provides the revocation functionality
in Single Sign-On (SSO) systems for long-lived assertions, i.e., authentication tokens.
SSO systems use SAML assertions to allow users to log in from different devices
such as mobile, desktop, tablet and laptop to multiple services. Usually, authentication
tokens such as SAML assertions expire in a short period. However, there are cases that a
long-lived SAML assertion is necessary such as when identification and authentication
should be performed when there is a lack of network connectivity. The SARL project
drives a solution for long-lived SAML assertions as a requirement for managing
assertions in cases where these should be revoked, denying access to a user for a
specific service. For instance, an authentication token can have a validation period
of a week, a month or more. Unlikely, a device, for which an authentication process
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occurred, can get stolen allowing anyone holding the authenticated device to have access
to the services. With a proof of concept, we demonstrated that a revocation process
is possible as a solution for denying access to a specific service and (stolen) device.
There are various SSO systems such as Shibboleth, Central Authentication Service
(CAS) and OAuth for which the revocation process for long-lived authentication tokens
can be implemented. Most of them use two main components. A Service Provider
(SP) which provides a service to the users and an Identity Provider (IdP) which is
responsible for authenticating a user and generating the authentication token. Each
authentication token will be sent to the SP each time a user requests to access a service.
The current implementation can be deployed in various SSO systems. However, our
proof of concept was deployed and tested for the Shibboleth SSO system, a well known
open source SSO platform actively used in many real-world authentication services.
For Shibboleth, the authentication token, that the IdP generates and the SP consumes,
is called SAML assertion. The applicability of our current SARL implementation in
various SSO systems is derived by the use of simple and essential tools such as the
Operating System (OS) commands and Web technologies (e.g., PHP, MySQL and
browser cookies). For instance, the collection of the required information in SAML
assertions, i.e., attribute values, is extracted using a parser script while the logout
functionality is implemented using cookies. The parser script uses Linux commands to
extract the necessary information from the Shibboleth log files. Furthermore, when a
revocation process takes place, the SARL application set cookies validation time to
expire and forces the service to deny access to a specific user.
This is COSIC technical report [289] for an iMinds project. I am the main author.
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Chapter 2
Background and related work
Information is power.
PIERS ANTHONY, American author
In this chapter, we give an overview of the background of Online Social Networks
(OSNs) and physical asset sharing systems, and we provide the related work for
the interdependent privacy issue on Facebook and the privacy threats of information
dissemination in car sharing systems.
2.1 The past
The second half of the twentieth-century has played a crucial role in establishing
and advancing the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). The early
development of computer networks is often attributed to the first artificial satellite,
Sputnik, in 1957. In the late 1960s, ARPANET was developed as a computer-mediated
communication network for exchanging of text messages, calculations, accessing
data and, soon afterwards, electronic mail and information exchange [204]. In the
mid-1980s, the computers—ARPANET—based network evolved into the Internet,
an inter-networking of computer networks. The Internet or “network of networks”,
allowed the sharing of resources and information globally. In the early 1990s, the
Internet evolved through the World Wide Web, originally developed as a “Web” of
hyperlinked documents for scientific publishing by Tim Berners-Lee and his colleagues
at the European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN) in Switzerland. The Internet
and the Web allowed the interplay between people, resources, information, services, and
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technologies. It enabled multiple online providers to support many services intended
for various users [150].
ICTs and the Internet became an essential infrastructure across the globe transforming
many aspects of the society for a wide range of human activities and social interactions.
People use the Internet for a variety of purposes in their everyday lives and work to
sharing information and goods; applications include OSNs, blogs, wikis and booking
cars and apartments for their next trip.
OSNs represent the most popular online communities that enable users to discuss, co-
create, modify and share user-generated content. Although online communities of this
nature emerged in the late 1990s, they rose significantly in early 2000, attracting large
amounts of users and becoming integrated into their daily routines. Early chat-rooms
and bulletin boards introduced the notion of the profile, where users could link their
screen name to their personal information. In the UNIX-based operating system, users
could store their profile information in .project and .plan files and display them with the
“finger” command. With the rise of the Web, homepages became an essential site of
profile information where users could store their photos, biography and other personal
information [92].
Early OSNs such as Friendster and the Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link (WELL) were
profile-centric representing individuals within a system resembling typically for online
dating and social events [42]. They were designed explicitly around the profile of
users, enabling them to upload photos and filling fields with self-descriptive text.
Later on, OSNs provided two notable possibilities to users. First, they allowed them
to connect with others such as their friends. Second, they enabled a public space
for user-supplied comments where individuals can navigate through other profiles
such as traverse through the list of their friends (early definition of OSN [42]). Such
possibilities, enabled an enormous growth for OSNs; 65% of the Internet-using adults
in the United States (U.S.) were reported to use OSNs such as Twitter, LinkedIn and
Facebook in 2010 [14].
In late 2010 until now, information sharing between users has been ever more extended
with the use of new information and communication technologies such as personal
computers, mobile devices, wireless networks and online platforms [150]. Online
platforms such as cloud infrastructure allowed users to store information online in
significant volumes and share it on demand with other users. Such advance possibilities
in data storage and network capacity enabled a wide range of applications and services
such as online marketplaces, payment systems, and platforms for the collaborative
economy [152]. Users are storing their photos online using Google Drive, iCloud and
Dropbox, book their trips from their phones using Booking.com and share properties
using AirBnB and DriveNow.
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2.2 The present
2.2.1 Online social networks in a nutshell
Nowadays, OSNs have become a popular online platform for people to express
themselves, interact with each other and get their daily entertainment. OSNs allow users
to generate content, connect with other users and share information [42]. Currently,
there exists a rich and diverse ecosystem of OSNs enabling users to post instant news,
activities and professional achievements such as using Twitter [3], LinkedIn [2] and
Facebook [121]. For instance, LinkedIn is focused on professional networks where
users can post professional achievements. Twitter is an online news OSN site, where
users can post and receive real-time messages, i.e., “tweets”. Facebook, a flagship
OSN, connect users and provide easy–to–use tools for posting updates and sharing
multimedia content.
Following the early definition by Boyd and Elison [42], an OSN is as an online platform
that offers users the possibility to build their online profiles in a bounded system (i.e.,
online platform), connect with others such as friends, i.e., “latent ties” [157], view their
profiles and share information with them. Their profile can contain information about
the age, location, interests and the “about me” of users. Moreover, OSNs allow users
to upload and share multimedia content. Extending the initial definition of OSNs [42],
OSNs provide open Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) allowing other third-
party application providers (app providers) to develop third-party applications (apps)
(see OSN definition 2.0 by Boyd and Elison [99, 94]). That enables third-party apps to
gain access at the OSN social graph allowing information to transfer from the OSNs
into online platforms of third-party app providers. For example, Facebook allows users
to add modules, i.e., third-parties apps, which can be developed by either Facebook
or third-parties app providers, offering games, lifestyle and entertainment possibilities
such as Candy Crush Saga [119], Angry Birds [260] and TripAdvisor [310].
2.2.2 Interdependent privacy and the app-related privacy
issues in online social networks
We describe the related work on privacy issues that can arise from the use of third-
party apps in the Facebook ecosystem. Chaabane et al. [5] showed that apps can
have tracking capabilities and disseminate the collected information to “fourth party”
app provider [4]. Similarly, Huber et al. [165] developed an automated evaluation
tool, AppInspect [15], and demonstrated that personally identifiable information of
Facebook users was leaked by a large set of Facebook third-party apps to analytic
and advertisement companies [165]. To the best of our knowledge, Weng et al. [323]
were the first to report the fact that the Facebook API allows third-party apps to
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collect the profile of users through their friends, and Biczók and Chia [35] were the
first to introduce the notion of interdependent privacy. From their work, Biczók
and Chia modelled the impact of the interdependent privacy problem performing a
game theoretic study (2-player, 1-app). Sharing a user’s information without his/her
direct consent can lead to the emergence of externalities; positive externalities, e.g.,
personalised experience for social-networking apps and negative externalities, e.g.,
exposed profile items. Pu and Grossklags [249] extended the work of Biczók and
Chia [35] and developed a formula to simulate the app adoption behaviour of users
and their friends and the monetary impact of the interdependent privacy problem [250].
Currently, Harkous and Aberer [156] extended the interdependent privacy problem
to cloud services ecosystems such as Dropbox and Google Drive. They studied the
privacy loss of a user when the user and his/her collaborators grant access to a shared
file stored by a cloud vendor.
Adding to these concerns, Thomas et al. [305] examined the lack of privacy controls
over the shared content of friends on Facebook. Alice, Bob’s friend, can share
information and unintentionally violate Bob’s privacy leading to privacy conflicts.
Using a formal representation of the privacy conflict concept, they estimated the
aggregated information of Bob under the presence of privacy conflicts with Alice
which, can lead to uncovering sensitive information about Bob. Frank et al. [133]
showed that low-reputation apps often deviate from the permission request patterns,
while Chia et al. [59] showed that certain apps collect more information than necessary.
Moreover, Wang et al. [323] identified third-party app bad practices for privacy notice
and consent on Facebook, studying 1,800 most popular apps. For instance, using the
Facebook API, an app can overwrite the users’ and their friends’ privacy settings in a
calendar, displaying the birthdays of the user and her friends while the privacy settings
are set to “Only me” on both sides.
2.2.3 Physical asset sharing and ICTs: the case of car sharing
Services for sharing physical assets are many-fold: 17 sectors have been identified
from transport through accommodation rental to utilities [242]. These services can
be defined as peer-to-peer based activities between users for dynamic share, access
and use of goods such as apartments or cars. Sharing possibilities are enabled by
using ICTs such as mobile networks, apps, and online platforms [23, 62]. For instance,
consider the case of car sharing systems. Portable devices, in-vehicle telematics and
online platforms allow users to share cars in a convenient way [215]. There are many
examples of successful and well-regarded physical asset sharing systems such as Uber,
Airbnb, Zipcar, TaskRabbit and eBay. The success of such systems is best demonstrated
by Uber ($69 billion) and Airbnb ($31 billion), the two flagship companies that have
attained astronomic valuations.
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Even though the concept of car ownership may not cease, the idea of car sharing is
gaining popularity. Nowadays, several car companies consider car sharing systems as a
prominent solution and have started investing in them. It includes car manufacturers
and suppliers such as Volvo [320], Daimler [53], BMW [39], Toyota [316] and
Continental [64], rental companies such as Europcar, Hertz, Sixt and railway operators
such as Deutsche Bahn [269], existing car sharing companies such as Zipcar [342]
and Lyft [198] and big technological firms such as Apple [315]. Within Europe, car
sharing is considered by many analysts as an increasing vector alongside with other
connectivity-based sharing systems such as accommodation rental, i.e., Airbnb [6].
Car sharing also offers a high potential for the smart cities concept [61, 226, 160]. It can
allow cities to manage their available resources and assets in a more effective, efficient
and sustainable manner [226]. One of the major challenge in modern cities is managing
efficiently the usage of transportation assets (i.e., Smart Mobility) such as cars, by better
utilising the already available ones [281, 162]. Note that, on average cars are being
used 5% of their time [93]. Their optimal usage can contribute to a decrease in the
number of cars, effectively reducing the need for parking space [226]. Moreover and
unlike traditional car ownership, it can also provide a relatively inexpensive alternative
to users who need a car occasionally and on-demand [83, 333].
2.2.4 Secure and privacy preserving vehicle information shar-
ing protocols
Prior research in the domain of information sharing considering cars is mainly focused
on topics of (i) driving-behaviour monitoring, location-tracking and privacy of data
mining and (ii) security analysis, access control and secure entity authentication. Note
that in the domain of car sharing systems, existing work focuses on the realm of car
relocation strategies [330, 341].
Considering relocation strategies, Weikl and Bogenberger [330] analysed and evaluated
different relocation algorithms for free-floating car sharing systems. They proposed a
model for optimal vehicle positioning and relocation, having an off-line and on-line
demand module. The offline demand module calculates the optimal car pick-up location
based on yearly data, whereas the on-line demand module performs the calculations
several times per day based on real-time data. For the station-based car sharing systems,
Zhu et al. [341] proposed an optimisation approach for determining the depots location
using deep learning.
Considering privacy, Enev et al. [101, 306] demonstrated high identification rates of
individuals (15 drivers), from 87% to 99% accuracy, based on data collected by the
sensors of a car from 15 minutes of open-road driving. Martínez-Ballesté et al. [205]
introduced the concept of citizens’ privacy in smart cities by distinguishing the
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following five dimensions: identity privacy, query privacy, location privacy, footprint
privacy and owner privacy. Li et al. [191] analysed the information collection by mobile
devices of users in smart cities and raised the alarm for data over-collection and the
risks to privacy. Pan et al. [239] proposed an analysis of traces of moving objects in
smart cities such as cars, aiming to depict semantics concerning mobility patterns and
city dynamics.
Mustafa et al. [224] performed a security analysis on smart electric vehicle charging
systems. Troncoso et al. [311] proposed a pay-as-you-drive scheme to enhance the
location privacy of drivers by sending aggregated data to insurance companies. Balasch
et al. [21] proposed an electronic toll pricing protocol where the onboard unit of a car
calculates locally the driver’s annual toll fee while disclosing a minimum amount of
location information. For colluding (dishonest) users [21], Kerschbaum et al. [180]
proposed a privacy-preserving spot checking protocol that allows observations in public
spaces. Mustafa et al. [225] proposed an anonymous electric vehicle charging protocol
with billing support. EVITA [116, 336] and PRESERVE [248, 243] are designated
projects on the analysis and specification of the secure architecture of onboard units.
Raya et al. [254] described the need for a Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI),
and Khodaei et al. [182] proposed a generic pseudonymization approach to preserve
the unlinkability of messages exchange between vehicles and VPKI servers. Our work
is closely related to the protocol proposed by Dmitrienko and Plappert [88]. They
designed a centralised and secure free-floating car sharing system that uses two-factor
authentication including mobile devices and RFID tags, e.g., smart-cards. However,
in contrast to our research, their protocol assumes a fully trusted car sharing provider
who has access to the master key of smart-cards and also collects and stores all the
information exchanged between the car provider and their users for every car access
provision.
2.3 The future
It is hard to predict the future. However, the use online platforms and systems that
utilise ICTs will continue to expand resulting in an ever-increasing rate of information
collection from users. In May 2018 Facebook announced a new dating service that could
result to collect detailed information about partnership preferences of individuals [297].
Moreover, there are reports that car manufacturers are investigating new streams
of revenues aiming to utilise the features that connected cars provide [138, 83]. One
promising direction for car manufacturers is to expand and become car-sharing platform
operators, acquiring information about the car condition, the car settings of the driver
and passengers, and also the infotainment information of what the passengers watch
and listen. Analysing and designing solutions aiming to safeguard the privacy of
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individuals be default and by design will continue to be an essential and necessary
direction for research in the near future.

Chapter 3
Tools for analysis, elicitation
of requirements and design of
privacy-enhancing systems
There are three principal means of
acquiring knowledge. observation of
nature, reflection and experimentation.
Observation collects facts; reflection
combines them; experimentation veri-
fies the result of that combination.
DENIS DIDEROT, French philosopher
In this chapter, we describe the tools we use throughout this thesis. We map these tools
to the specific stages of Secure-System Development Life Cycle (S-SDLC) and, thus,
we structure this chapter (see Sect. 1.5). These stages are: analysis (see Sect. 3.1),
compilation of requirements (see Sect. 3.2) and system design (see Sect. 3.3).
3.1 Analysis tools
In this section, we describe the tools which are necessary for the analysis of this thesis.
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3.1.1 Online questionnaire: a tool for survey studies
An online questionnaire is a tool for collecting information about the opinions of
individuals [317]. Using ICTs and online platforms, online questionnaires provide the
ability of large-scale sampling, large geographical distribution, convenience in time
of answering questions, respondents’ anonymity and low cost of distribution [115].
Questionnaires as a tool can be used for full-fledged survey studies or pilot studies.
A pilot study is a short version of full-scale study that can be used as a pre-testing
instrument [246]. It offers the advantage of testing a research question and it helps
to identify the main directions of the study [80]), providing valuable insights [317].
Pilot studies can be qualitative and used as a primary instrument to collect and analyse
data in a relatively unexplored topic and as a mean to design a subsequent quantitative
full-scale study [294].
In OSNs, studies that utilise questionnaires are extensively used for problem
analysis [145, 326, 7, 44]. On Facebook, Liu and Gummadi [195] studied the
discrepancy between the desired privacy in contrast to reality. Through a Facebook
third-party app, they collected responses of 200 participants and compared them
to the participants’ actual privacy settings. They identified that almost 36% of the
information was shared with the default privacy settings while 37% matched their
actual desired setting; the default privacy settings exposed the participants’ information
to more Facebook users than expected. Wang et al. [325] identified bad practices
of third-party apps for privacy notice and consent, and they proposed enhanced app
authorisation dialogues. To validate their authorisation designs, they performed a
survey study. Interestingly, a small set of participants reported the unfair privacy
practices of Facebook third-party apps that can gather information about one’s friends,
i.e., “user does not own [his or her] friends’ information”. That information collection
is happening without their notice or consent, i.e., “[the user’s] friends never download
or agreed to the application’s term”. Such unfair privacy practise initially investigated
by Bloemendaal et al. [38]; whether users were aware of this problem. They collected
responses of 250 participants and identified that 70% of them were unaware of its
existence, i.e., the interdependent privacy issue. In other words, 70% of the participants
shared all types of information of their friends while installing third-party apps on
Facebook, without being aware of it. However, they did not investigate whether
participants were concerned as a fact of users’ lacking notification and consent of the
interdependent privacy problem.
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3.1.2 Simulation tools: network topologies and application
adoption models
OSNs can be represented as graphs, consisting of nodes as users and edges
demonstrating the connections among them. The characteristics of graphs can be
described by the diameter, the clustering coefficient and the degree distribution. The
diameter of a graph is the maximum distance between any pair of nodes, i.e., the
maximum number of edges along the shortest path connecting an arbitrary pair of
nodes in the graph. For example, William et al. [309] identified that there is “six degrees
of separation” between any two people in the United States, while Lederer et al. [11]
identified that distances are even shorter on Facebook corresponding to a diameter of
four. Clustering in OSNs is related to users and their circles of friends or acquaintances.
The clustering coefficient quantifies how well connected the neighbours of a node in a
graph are [273]. For instance, Mislove et al. [218] found that the periphery of OSNs
consists of strongly clustered, low-degree nodes connected by a core of high-degree
nodes. The degree of a node in a graph is the number of connections it has to other
nodes; the degree distribution is the probability distribution of these degrees over the
whole graph. [329]. For example, Mislove et al. [218] found that the degree distribution
of OSNs follows a power law.
There are several relevant models for generating OSN topologies. The Barabási-Albert
model [11] generates networks with a power-law degree distribution using preferential
attachment; several studies about real-world OSNs confirm the existence of such a
power-law [127, 218]. The Watts-Strogatz model generates small-world networks, i.e.,
networks with high clustering and small diameter, properties that have also been found
in many OSNs [334, 218]. Note that the Watts-Strogatz model can generate graphs
with high clustering without exhibiting a power-law degree distribution, whereas the
Barabási-Albert model creates a power-law degree distribution without high clustering.
The “small-world phenomenon” was also studied by Kleinberg [183]. The main
purpose of the Kleinberg model is to study the search for short paths within graphs
in a decentralised way, a task that is not related to our evaluations. The Erdo˝s-Rényi
model [102] generates a random graph with uniform degree distribution and, therefore,
can be used as a baseline in network simulations.
Considering the adoption models of apps in OSNs, a uniform model can be used for
baseline analysis. In the uniform app adoption model, all users install an app with the
same probability, and each installation is independent of other installations and the
underlying network topology. However, owing to local network effects [283] prevalent
in OSNs, a preferential model is more realistic (see Fig. 3.1). The probability of a
friend of a user installing an app is proportional to the number of friends who have
already installed the app. Even if Alice (node 2) is not directly connected to Bob (node
19), and does not benefit directly from Bob’s application adoption, Alice and Bob may
still affect each other through the local network effect, as a friend of Alice (node 1) may
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Figure 3.1: Local network effect and its effect to application adoption [283].
be a friend of Bob as well. In other words, strongly clustered local networks are often
interconnected to each other, i.e., the whole network, via high-degree nodes (hubs).
3.1.3 Quantification metrics: privacy score in online social
networks
Quantification metrics such as privacy scores can measure the level of information
disclosure of a user towards an entity such as a friend or an app provider [228].
For privacy savvy users, a privacy score can inform and better support decisions
about exposing or hiding their personal information towards a given entity. Tools
for enhancing transparency and awareness, is in line with the requirements of data
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protection by design [85, 108, 209] of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [113], as they can strengthen users’ control on the disclosure of personal
data.
Considering quantification metrics, Maximilien et al. [208] proposed a formula to
estimate the privacy score for a user, evaluating the number of profile items the user has
disclosed to their friends on Facebook. They computed the privacy score as the product
of sensitivity and visibility of personal data. Liu and Terzi [194] extended this work
and proposed a framework for computing the privacy score using a probabilistic model
based on Item Response Theory (IRT). Although IRT presents an interesting approach
for computing the sensitivity of the user’s personal data, visibility is not properly
addressed. Moreover, Sánchez and Viejo [265] developed a formula to assess the
sensitivity of unstructured textual data, such as wall posts in OSNs . Their model aims
to control the dissemination of the user’s data to different recipients in OSNs [319].
Minkus et al. [217] estimated the sensitivity and visibility of the privacy settings based
on a survey of 189 participants. Finally, Nepali and Wang [229] proposed a privacy
index to evaluate the inference attacks as described by Sweeney [284], while Ngoc et
al. [230] introduced a metric to estimate the potential leakage of private information
from public posts in OSNs. To the best of our knowledge, there is no related work
quantifying the collateral information collection of third-party apps and app providers
in OSNs.
3.2 Security and privacy threat analysis: the elici-
tation of requirements
For a systematic compilation of the security and privacy requirements, a threat analysis
approach is required [169, 279, 135]. Threat modelling aims at identifying (all) possible
entities and actions that can harm the system as a whole or its distinct parts [90,
236]. Threats and adversarial actions can be realised by an arsenal of attacks. To
identify the attack surface of a system we refer the reader to two well-known threat
modelling frameworks: STRIDE [163, 213, 235] and LINDDUN [84]. STRIDE mainly
covers security threats while LINDDUN focuses on the privacy threats. Based on the
capabilities of an adversary and the threats identified during the system analysis, the
requirements for system design can be defined aiming at providing security and privacy
guarantees (see Table 3.1).
Aside from the STRIDE framework, there are other security threat analysis frameworks.
Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis [313] is a risk-centric framework,
Trike [264] is a conceptual framework for security auditing, and Visual, Agile, and
Simple Threat modelling [8] is an Agile S-SDLC framework intended to support various
stakeholders of a business life-cycle such as app architects, developers, cybersecurity
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Table 3.1: Security and privacy threats and the corresponding properties.
Threats Properties (i.e., countermeasures)
Security
Spoofing Entity authentication
Tampering with data Data authentication
Repudiation Non-repudiation
Information disclosure Confidentiality
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Availability
Elevation of privilege Authorisation
Privacy
Linkability Unlinkability / Pseudonymity
Identifiability Anonymity
Non-repudiation Plausible deniability
Detectability Undetectability
Disclosure of Information Confidentiality
Unawareness Content awareness
Non-compliance Policy and consent compliance
personnel, and senior executives. STRIDE is the most suitable framework for security
threat analysis, as it emphasises security threats and the specification of requirements
which is in line with the focus of this work. Analogous to STRIDE, LINDDUN
provides a systematic analysis of privacy requirements. For our threat analysis, we
chose STRIDE and LINDDUN as both frameworks are used by both industry [235, 213]
and the research community [84, 318].
3.3 Secure and privacy-preserving technologies in
a nutshell
In this section, we describe the countermeasures we use for our designs of secure and
privacy-enhancing car sharing protocol and the collateral information collection of
Facebook third-party apps and app providers.
3.3.1 Symmetric key cryptosystem
A symmetric key cryptosystem is a cryptosystem that allows two parties, i.e., the sender
and receiver, to confidentially communicate over an insecure channel. They use the
same key to perform cryptographic operations, concealing the content of the messages
exchanged towards any other party that might be observing and listening to the channel.
A party can be any physical entity or a computer terminal. A channel can be any
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communication link between the two parties such as the Internet, wireless LAN and
mobile networks. For instance, Alice wants to send the details of the location and the
access code of her car to Bob without Oscar (i.e., an opponent) to be able to understand
and retrieve the content of the exchanged message [211, 237].
Symmetric key cryptography can provide powerful solutions and can be used to offer
message confidentiality. To transmit a message m confidentially, the sender uses
an encryption function denoted as E() to generate a ciphertext c using as inputs the
message m and a secret key (or symmetric key) K such that:
c← E(K,m) .
The ciphertext is transmitted to the receiver through an insecure communication channel.
The receiver uses a decryption function denoted as D(K,c) to decrypt the message m
using the same secret key as the sender K [223] such that:
m← D(K,c) .
According to Kerckhoffs’ principles on the cryptographic functions of encryption
and decryption utilised in a system should be “if not theoretically unbreakable,
unbreakable in practice”, “compromise of the system details should not inconvenience
the correspondents”, the ”key should be rememberable without notes and easily
changed”, the ”cryptogram should be transmissible”. the “encryption apparatus should
be portable and operable by a single person” and the “system should be easy, requiring
neither the knowledge of a long list of rules nor mental strain” [244, 211]. The benefit
of using a strong symmetric encryption function is that Oscar will learn nothing from
the encrypted message as the ciphertext will be indistinguishable from random data. A
well-known symmetric key cryptosystem is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[95, 71].
3.3.2 Asymmetric key cryptosystems
An asymmetric key cryptosystem or public-key cryptosystem is a cryptosystem which
parties, such as the sender and receiver, can communicate over an insecure channel
securely. They are using a pair of keys which are distinct but mathematically linked to
perform cryptographic operations. One of these keys namely the public key, i.e., known
to everyone, is used to encrypt a message, whereas a matching private key, i.e., only
known to its owner, is used to decrypt a message. In short, any party can generate a
key pair (Pk,Sk) and make public the encryption key Pk, i.e., public key. It allows any
other party to send him/her encrypted messages. As long as the decryption key Sk, i.e.,
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secret key, is kept secret, only its owner can decrypt the encrypted messages. For Alice
to send a message to Bob securely, she uses the public key of Bob, and the message m
as inputs in a function denoted as enc() to encrypt and generate the ciphertext c, i.e.,
c← enc(Pk,m) .
Over any (insecure) communication channel, Alice sends the ciphertext to Bob. Upon
Bob receiving the ciphertext, he applies an inverse transformation function denoted as
dec() using his private key Sk and the ciphertext c as inputs to decrypt and obtain the
original message such that:
m← dec(Sk,c) .
Public-key cryptography is used to offer information security services such as message
confidentiality, provided by the encryption and decryption functions of a message over
an insecure channel. Public-key encryption can be understood as a mail-box which
everyone can place a letter in a box, but only the person who holds the key can unlock
and retrieve the letters. The primary advantage of public-key cryptography is the key
distribution for encryption in comparison to the symmetric counterparts.
However, public-key cryptography is computationally intensive and substantially slower
than symmetric-key encryption algorithms. In practice, public-key encryption is used
to establish symmetric keys, i.e., key establishment, whereas symmetric encryption is
used to encrypt and decrypt messages. Hybrid protocols that incorporate symmetric
and public-key algorithms are used in real-world applications such as the SSL/TLS
protocol for secure Web connections [86] and the IPsec protocol for network layer
security [237]. Well-known asymmetric-key cryptosystems are the RSA [256] and
ElGamal [98]. Moreover, public-key cryptography offers security services such as
message authenticity and non-repudiation using digital signatures and digital certificates
as described below.
3.3.3 Hash functions
A hash function is a function that receives as inputs a bit-string of arbitrary length
and outputs a bit-string of some fixed length, namely hash-value or message digest. A
hash-value, denoted by z, is a unique representation of a message m generated by a
function denoted as hash() such that:
z← hash(m) .
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Unlike other cryptographic functions, hash functions do not need a key. For a hash
function to be secure, the following properties need to be guaranteed [237]:
• Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find, for two distinctive
inputs m and m′, i.e., m 6= m′, the same output, i.e., hash(m) = hash(m′).
• Preimage resistance (“one-wayness”): Given an output z, it is computationally
infeasible to find any input m such that hash(m)← z, i.e., hash() one way.
• Second preimage resistance: For an input m, and thus hash(m), it is
computationally infeasible to find any m 6= m′ such that hash(m) = hash(m′).
Well-known hash functions are RIPEMD-160 [89] and the SHA-2 [77] and SHA-
3 [220] family of functions.
3.3.4 Message authentication code algorithms
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm is a cryptographic check-sum that
combines a shared symmetric-key and a message of arbitrary length as inputs and
outputs a fixed length bit-string. Given a message m and a symmetric secret key K, a
sender generates an authentication tag denoted as mac(K,m) such that:
v←mac(K,m) .
The sender appends the authentication tag v to the message m and sends both to the
receiver through an insecure communication channel. For instance, Alice sends to
Bob the availability period of her car, i.e., the pair (m,v). Upon receiving the pair,
the receiver verifies the authenticity of the message, since only the sender holds an
identical copy of the symmetric secret key. Moreover, the integrity of the message can
also be verified using the authentication tag. Bob recomputes the MAC-value using the
message received such that v′←MAC(m) and compares it for equality to the original
MAC-value, i.e., v′ ?= v. If the equality holds then the message has not been altered
during transit. The receiver can verify that the originator of the message was Alice, and
can detect whether the message was altered in transit; Oscar cannot forge the message
and compute a valid MAC since he lacks knowledge of the symmetric secret key.
As a keyed-dependent function, MAC provides data origin authentication and data
integrity of a message. Data origin authentication guarantees that the source of the
message is the claimed sender, whereas data integrity guarantees that the message
has not been altered during transmission. There are several well-known MAC
algorithms such as CBC-MAC based on a block cipher [30] and Hashed-based Message
Authentication Code (HMAC) such as HMAC-SHA-2 family of functions [179, 186].
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3.3.5 Pseudo-random Functions
A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) is a function that generates unpredictable random
bit-strings [96]. A PRF should offer strong statistical guarantees: an adversary cannot
tell whether the output is produced by the PRF or a truly random function for any
given input [211]. Given an input K and a seed s, the PRF function generates output
indistinguishable from randomness, i.e., z, such that:
z← prf(K,s) .
For instance, computing the n-bit output for an arbitrary input, the probability to
guess the result is extremely small and is equal to 1/2n [237]. PRF functions can be
implemented using AES in CounTeR mode (CTR) if 2n/2 outputs are considered.
3.3.6 Digital signatures
A digital signature of a message is a cryptographic primitive that provides means for an
entity, i.e., sender, to bind its identity into a message such that it allows another entity,
i.e., receiver, to verify the authenticity of the message. A digital signature uses a pair
of keys, according to the principles of asymmetric-key cryptography. A private key,
which is known only to the signer, is used for signing a message and a matching public
key, which is known to everyone, is used for verifying that message. Digital signatures
can be used to resolve disputes between parties because they can be verified by a third
party without access to the private key.
Digital signatures can be considered as the digital counterpart to handwritten signatures.
In detail, the use of digital signature schemes requires three functions: key generation,
signature generation and signature verification. The key generation produces a
public/private key pair for an entity, i.e., (Pk,Sk). To digitally sign a message, an
entity (signer) can create an authentication tag for that message by utilising a signature
function denoted as sign() and provide as inputs the message m and the generated
private key Sk. Essentially, it hashes the message z← hash(m) and digitally signs it
using his/her private key Sk, such that:
σ← sign(Sk,z) .
After signing, the signature is appended to the message and the pair (m,σ) is transmitted
to the receiver over an insecure communication channel. The receiver can verify the
signature σ of a message m, by obtaining the public key of the sender and utilising the
verification function, denoted by verify(), i.e.,
true/ f alse← verify(Pk,z′,σ) .
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The receiver (verifier) accepts the signature if the signature verification is successful,
i.e., the algorithm outputs “true”. The verification fails otherwise (i.e., outputs false).
The private key Sk is known only to its owner, and it should be computationally
infeasible for any entity other than the owner of the private key to find m such that
verify(Pk′,z,σ) holds.
Until now we assumed that an adversary, Oscar, can be an external entity. However,
Alice and Bob may attempt to cheat each other. Digital signatures can prove to a
mutually agreed Trusted Third Party (TTP) that one of two parties generated the
message. For instance, if Alice (signer) denies she signed the message m held by Bob
(receiver), then Bob can present the signature σ for m to a TTP along with m. The TTP
can rule in favour of Bob if true← verify(Pk,z,σ) or in favour of Alice otherwise.
Digital signatures have many applications in information security such as message
authentication meaning that the sender of a message is authentic, message integrity
that a message was not modified in transit and non-repudiation of origin (receipt) that
the sender (recipient) of a message cannot deny the creation (receipt) of the message.
Well-known digital signature schemes are RSA [256] and Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) [51].
3.3.7 Public-key certificates
A public-key certificate is a means to bind a public key to an identity or to one or more
attributes of an entity. It consists of the data part and signature part. The data part
contains the name and attributes of an identity, the public key corresponding to that
identity, the validity period of the certificate and other relevant information such as the
certificate generation statement and the revocation information. The digital signature
part consists of the signature of the data part and protects the public-key certificate
against manipulation [66].
The public-key certificate can be self-signed when two parties have an authenticated
certificate of the other’s party’s public key or signed by an intermediary and mutually
TTP namely a certification authority or trusted authority. If Alice and Bob are unknown
to each other and do not trust each others’ public keys directly, they can trust a
certification authority and establish a chain of trust. They need an authentic certificate
of the public key of the certification authority. Then, the certification authority can
generate and issue certificates for all entities in a system establishing trust between
entities unknown to each other.
Upon verification of the identity of an entity, the certification authority issues a
certificate containing the entity’s information and public key while the generated
certificate is digitally signed by the private key of the certification authority. Any entity
including Bob can verify the authenticity of the certificate and the corresponding public
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key of Alice. Using the public key of the certification authority, Bob can verify the
authority’s signature on Alice’s certificate. If this signature verifies correctly, then
Bob can accept the certificate and the attached public key in the certificate of Alice as
authentic.
3.3.8 Secure multiparty computation: a brief introduction
A Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) is an interactive protocol, that allows a set of
n parties to jointly and correctly evaluate a function f from a given set of private inputs
{x1, . . . ,xn} such that,
y1, . . . ,yn = f (x1, . . . ,xn) .
The i-th party learns yi and nothing else. MPC is useful when evaluations have to be
performed by a set of untrusted parties. Let’s assume that Alice needs to give her secret
value x to a set of n parties such that, none of n parties will learn x. A simple way of
doing so, is to split up x into n random “shares” {x1, . . . ,xn} such that, x= x1+ · · ·+xn.
If the i-th party receives only the xi share, it cannot learn anything about x individually
and Alice can secretly share x. To the contrary, if n parties collaborate they can
reconstruct x. MPC protocols can evaluate any computable function [18] based on
secret sharing, providing ways of evaluating on secret shared values [178]. In practice,
MPC protocols can be applied in several apps such as auctions [40], voting [68],
authorisation [16] and access provision protocols [285].
For instance, in sugar beet auctions in Denmark, buyers and sellers (i.e., farmers)
submit their bids to an auctioneer. The auctioneer aims to find the market clearing price.
Both the buyers and sellers want to pay and being paid an optimal price respectively,
meaning that a buyer aims to spend less than a maximum price and a seller to get paid
more than a minimum bid. If an auctioneer knows such true minimums and maximums,
it can collaborate with a bidder and abuse the process. Since the auctioneer receives a
percentage of the selling price, it has the incentive to increase the amount of a selling
item. Such a problem, introduced by a single auctioneer party, can be solved using a
set of multiple parties. Both buyers and sellers can submit their true maximums and
minimums to several parties without any of the external parties learn anything but the
output of the bidding process, thus keeping the input-bids private.
The security of an MPC protocol can be specified in terms of the number of corrupted
parties that it can tolerate and how the corrupted parties may behave. Considering
the number of corrupted parties, there is a threshold parameter t: an MPC protocol
remains secure as long as no more than t out of n parties are corrupted or collude with
each other [178]. An adversary can have corruption capabilities over multiple parties
such that cheating parties can work together to learn information or violate the MPC
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protocol logic and specifications. An adversary may aim to corrupt the majority of
parties, i.e., dishonest majority, or less than half of the parties, i.e., honest majority. In
short, an MPC protocol can be secure towards an honest majority of malicious parties,
i.e., t < n/2, or a dishonest majority that can be even t < n−1 number of malicious
parties. For instance, Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson (BGW) [33] and Araki et
al. [16] protocols are secure over honest majority of malicious parties while Goldreich,
Micali and Wigderson (GMW) [141], SPDZ [75] and MASCOT [178] are capable of
dealing with n−1 malicious parties.
There are a number of ways to model the adversarial behaviour of corrupted parties.
Corrupted parties are usually modelled considering a central adversary with a cheating
strategy that aims to corrupt a set of parties [207]. In its simplest form, a passive
security (or “honest-but-curious” or semi-honest”), an adversary aims to determine
information on honest parties’ secret input by analysing protocol messages while
executing the protocol honestly. For instance, in an election protocol, an adversary
wants to discover who voted for whom yet without corrupting the tally. A more realistic,
and much stronger adversarial model is active security (or malicious security), where
an adversary can send arbitrary messages to other parties aiming to make the protocol
deviate arbitrarily and thus, force parties to reveal their inputs unintentionally [178].
The security guarantees of an MPC protocol can be further categorised into information-
theoretic (or unconditionally) secure or computationally (or simulation-based) secure.
Information-theoretic guarantees “perfect” security and is obtained unconditionally.
An adversary can have unrestricted power and capabilities yet having zero or negligible
probability to violate the security of the protocol successfully. Computational security is
obtained in the presence of an adversary whose computational power is restricted [178]
and on the cryptographic hardness assumptions of computation problems such as
factoring of products of large prime numbers [256]. In practice, any computable
function can be evaluated securely with information-theoretic security for both, passive
security with no more than t < n/2 corruptions and active security with t < n/3
corrupted parties. Examples of information-theoretic MPC protocols are by Chaum et
al. [57] and BGW [33] and computationally secure are by Yao [339] and GMW [141].
An implementation of any algorithm in MPC can be specified as a Boolean or arithmetic
circuit using multiplications and additions over the (shared) private inputs. For the
special case of Boolean circuits, such operations can be realised by XOR gates for
additions and AND gates for multiplications. In practice, there are two main approaches
for MPC protocols: secret sharing [27, 57, 141] and Garbled-Circuits [27, 339]. For
secret sharing, parties interact for every multiplicative gate of the circuit (addition is
free) while for Garbled-Circuits parties construct a garbled version of the circuit and
send it at once. Secret-sharing sends small messages per (multiplication) gate, and can
perform better for low-bandwidth networks achieving high-throughput comparing to
garbled-circuit which are large and costly in bandwidth. For low-latency networks and
high-depth circuits, Garbled-Circuits outperform secret sharing most of the time due to
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constant-round of communications as secret sharing circuits grow linearly in depth of
the circuit that is computed.
3.4 Transparency enhancing technologies and pri-
vacy dashboards
A wide selection of technologies enhancing transparency are listed in the surveys of
Hedbom [158] and Janic et al. [175]. Along with privacy icons [161] and privacy
nudges [325], privacy dashboards [293, 46] are a well-studied concept for notification
and enhancing awareness of users [130]. A privacy dashboard as a transparency-
enhancing tool provides summaries of the personal data of users that can be collected
by other entities such as friends, apps and app providers. In short, a dashboard aims
to raise users’ awareness and answer the common user question: “how much does
an entity know about me?”, and it does so in a way the user can understand and take
appropriate actions if necessary. A dashboard uses visualisations and quantification
metrics in a unified, structured and declarative manner that aims to inform users better
about the type and amount of disseminated data. Being declarative, dashboard designs
should present information in a fair and comprehensive way, and should ensure they not
mislead users [76, 189, 108]. For instance, the Data Track privacy dashboard [328] is a
design of the successful European projects PRIME (FP6) and PrimeLife (FP7) [131].
Concerning privacy dashboards, several designs have been proposed to enhance
transparency in OSNs [326, 59]. Bier et al. [36] proposed and implemented
PrivacyInsight, which was designed under legal and usability requirements defined by
the GDPR [113] and the ISO standard 9241-11 [170]. Talukder et al. [293] proposed
Privometer, merely aiming at measuring the amount of sensitive information that can
be leaked from a single profile of a user on Facebook. However, the authors do not
investigate a scenario with either joint control of personal data or multi-app data fusion.
(see Sect. 4.5). Buchmann et al. [46] designed the Personal Information Dashboard
(PID), aiming to provide transparency representing the information that users disclose
across multiple OSN domains. Although neither one of the solutions treats the analysed
problem directly, their designs can be extended to implement an enhanced privacy
dashboard, and include the collateral information collection case coupled with multi-
app data fusion. Such an information collection of apps can be given by the users
or through their friends, while a dashboard can foster better notification and consent
by both the users and their friends; a friend might be willing to uninstall an app if it
enables collateral information collection (see Sect. 4.2).
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3.4.1 Alternative countermeasures to privacy dashboards
Wang et al. [325] proposed techniques to nudge users helping them to avoid online
disclosure on Facebook that they may regret later. To investigate the efficiency of
privacy nudges, they developed a Facebook app and complemented the study with a
survey questionnaire of 21 participants. They identified that “Stop and Think” nudges
are better at helping the participants to avoid regrettable postings. The “Pay attention
to the audience” nudge helped them to identify the audience and be more cautious
about their posts. Whereas, the “Content feedback” nudge was perceived as needless
and not a very positive nudge as participants were feeling being judged by the tool.
Paul et al. [241] studied an enhanced interface for the Facebook privacy settings. They
proposed a coloured representation of the privacy settings (C4PS - Colours for Privacy
Settings), to demonstrate the visibility of the profile items of users, such as photos.
To verify their assumptions about the effectiveness of such a design, they created a
mock-up of the Facebook privacy settings and performed a survey were they gathered
responses of 40 participants (students). They identified that such an enhancement can
help users to better employ the desired privacy settings.
Moreover, FSEO [25], FaceCloak [197] and NOYB [146] are privacy schemes focused
on OSNs and particularly on Facebook. Their main goal is to achieve privacy by
providing fake information, considering both the app provider and the OSN user as
adversaries. Scramble! [26] proposes an access control mechanism over a user’s data,
making the use of encryption techniques. According to this model, authorised users
have partial access to the data, depending on the access control lists. flyByNight [196]
is another privacy solution for OSNs, that makes use of symmetric-key cryptosystems.
This approach tries to overcome the limitations of Facebook by introducing a privacy
platform through a proxy server. FaceVPSN [63] introduces a distributed platform
for storing information, providing fake information to the OSN. Furthermore, there
exist other solutions that propose privacy-friendly architectures such as Safebook [70],
EASiER [172] and more [173, 321, 69].
3.5 Summary
In this part, we provide the necessary background, and we give an overview of the
related work of this thesis. Moreover, we describe the necessary tools that we use
throughout this thesis. In the following chapters, we utilise these tools to analyse the
problem of 1) collateral information collection on Facebook and car sharing systems
and 2) to design solutions for them.

Part II
Collateral information
collection of third-party
applications
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Chapter 4
A comprehensive analysis of
Facebook third-party
applications: Friends,
providers, and privacy
interdependence
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4.1 Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become a dominant platform for people to express
themselves, share information and interact with each other. By design and popularity,
Facebook has morphed into an immense information repository [277], storing users’
personal data and logging their interactions with friends, groups, events and pages [302].
The sheer amount and potentially sensitive nature of such data have raised a plethora
of privacy issues for the Facebook users including the lack of awareness from users [7],
the cumbersome privacy controls [195], the accidental information disclosure [326]
and the reconstruction of the identity of users [323]. In this chapter we focus on
the interdependent information collection [35, 290]: third-party applications (apps)
installed by users collect data about users but also about their friends, which brings
significant privacy implications.
Due to Facebook’s popularity, third-party application providers (app providers) use
the Facebook’s Developers Platform [122] to launch their apps, benefiting from the
existing massive user base [277]. Currently, Facebook offers a set of more than 25 K
apps [15], such as Criminal Case [120], Candy Crush Saga [119], Angry Birds [260]
and TripAdvisor [310]. When a user installs an app from the Facebook app store,
the app may collect their information on Facebook. For instance, Candy Crush Saga
collects the name, profile picture, country, friend list and email address of a user. Other
apps may collect other types of information.
When a friend of a user installs an app on Facebook, this app not only can collect the
friend’s information but, it may also collect information about the user herself. For
instance, if a friend of a user installs travelling apps such as TripAdvisor, these may
collect the user’s current location, hometown, work location and likes. That allows for
sharing travel preferences [202] aiming to notify both the user and their friends whether
they have visited the same point of interest. If a friend of a user installs a horoscope
app such as Horoscopes, the app may collect the friend’s and the user’s birthday.
App installation and information flow. From a technical standpoint, Facebook
relies on permission-based platform security and applies the least privilege principle to
third-party apps [122]. For installation and operation, each app requests from the user a
set of permissions, granting the app the right to access and collect information such as
the profile name (steps 1 to 3 in Fig. 4.1). After the user’s and Facebook approval, apps
can collect the profile information of the user (i.e., personal data). Hence, they can
store it on servers outside Facebook’s ecosystem and out of the user’s control (steps 7
in Fig. 4.1) [118, 155].
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Figure 4.1: Facebook Developers app architecture.
Facebook API and friend permissions. The API v1.x of Facebook (April 2010
– April 2015) provided a set of permissions to the apps, i.e., friends_xxx, such as
friends_birthday and friends_location [122, 291]. These permissions gave the apps
the right to access and collect personal data of users via their friends, such as their
birthdays and locations. Facebook, updated the API to version v2.x (April 2014),
and replaced the friends_xxx permissions with the single user_friends permission,
stating that since 2015 (API v2.0) this problem has been mitigated; it required mutual
consent and mandated app reviews [123]. Interestingly, in our previous work we
identified that by default the user_friends permission could retrieve information of
up to fourteen user profile attributes via the apps installed by the friends of a user up
until the v2.3 of the API (April 2014 – July 2017) [292]. To analyse the number of
friend permission requests among popular apps [290], we used the publicly available
AppInspect dataset [15] provided by Huber et al. [165] (2012 – 2014) and identified a
proportion of more than 10% of such collateral permission requests.
The Cambridge Analytica case. Data analytics companies such as Cambridge
Analytica (CA) can collect rich information about individuals’ everyday lives and
habits from big data-silos, enabling profiling and micro-targeting such as in the case
of political elections [221]. As it has been reported at several major news outlets, in
2015 approximately 87 million profiles of users on Facebook have been harvested by
Aleksandr Kogan’s app “thisisyourdigitallife” in collaboration with CA [302, 298, 227].
They exploited the collateral information collection mechanism of third-party apps
on Facebook, where the “thisisyourdigitallife” app was installed by 270,000 users
reaching tens of millions of friends [210, 335]. The collected data have been used
to draw a detailed psychological profile for every person affected [314], which in
turn enabled CA to target them with personalised political advertisement potentially
50 FACEBOOK THIRD-PARTY APPLICATIONS
affecting the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential elections [221, 262, 185]. Both
Kogan and CA have denied allegations and said they have complied with regulations
and acted in good faith [48, 47].
Privacy interdependence and collateral information collection. The sub-
optimal privacy controls and the server-to-server (and potentially offline) commu-
nication between Facebook and app providers make any privacy protection mechanism
hard to apply [100]. As a result, the user’s profile attributes can be arbitrarily retrieved
by an app provider without automatic notification or on-demand approval by the user
through their friends.
Collateral information collection may inflict a privacy loss due to the lack of
transparency and consent given by the users for the case of Facebook third-party
apps. Fundamentally speaking, collateral information collection is the manifestation of
interdependent privacy; the scenario when the privacy of an individual user is affected
by the decisions of other users [35]. From an economic point of view, sharing a user’s
information without their direct consent can lead to the emergence of externalities, i.e.,
unwanted side-effects. While sharing someone else’s information may yield benefits
for them (positive externalities, such as personalised experience in apps), it is also
almost certain to cause a decrease in their utility (negative externality, e.g., exposed
profile items). Existing research is limited to pointing out the existence of and risks
stemming from such negative externalities on the Facebook app ecosystem [35], and
its potential impact on app adoption [249, 251].
App providers, data fusion and profiling. Third-party app providers can be
owners of several apps (see Fig. 4.2): the app provider1 offers the apps A1, A2, A3 and
A4. For instance, the app providers Vipo Komunikacijos and Telaxo offer 163 and 130
Facebook ecosystem
User
f
Friends
friend2
!1
friend1
{Likes}
 {Photos, Location}
{Birthday}
App A3
App provider1
App A2
App A4
App A1
Figure 4.2: Collateral information collection scheme on Facebook.
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apps; among those, 99 and 118 have more than 10 K monthly active users, respectively
(extracted from the AppInspect dataset [15]). As a consequence, an app provider may
cluster several apps and thus may collect more personal data from the profile of the
users. Moreover, every app retrieves the Facebook user’s ID, which uniquely identifies
a user over apps. Hence, the app provider could utilise a type of data fusion over all
apps offered [151], and construct a relatively complete representation of the profiles
of the users. Such data fusion partly constitutes and enables profiling as defined in
Article 4 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [113]. Note that this
definition is analogous to its common meaning in marketing in the context of consumer
behaviour [176].
Table 4.1 illustrates the mutually amplifying interaction between collateral information
collection and multi-app data fusion. It is clear that collateral information collection
allows an increasing amount of data collection through vertical coupling for example,
by adding {a5} to the directly collected {a1, a2}. On the other hand, data fusion over
multiple apps alone allows for horizontal coupling such that combining {a1,a2} and
{a3, a4} into a consistent {a1, a2, a3, a4}. With both mechanisms in full effect, the
app provider is able to compile an extended attribute set of {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6}.
Therefore, with the help of multiple apps installed by the friends of a user, an app
provider could profile a user partly or entirely without her consent, which constitutes a
privacy breach and has legal implications [113].
Contribution. In this thesis, we investigate the collateral information collection
through Facebook third-party apps installed by one or more friends of a user, taking
into account the fact that an app provider may own multiple apps. Specifically, we
identified five research questions to advance our understanding of indirect and collateral
information collection in the case of Facebook apps.
Table 4.1: The mutually amplifying effect of collateral information collection and
multi-app data fusion
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• Are users concerned that apps installed by their friends can collect their
profile data on Facebook? To identify whether users were concerned, we
designed a questionnaire and distributed it among 114 participants. We aimed
at identifying their concerns on collateral information collection, lack of
transparency (notification) and not being asked for their approval (consent).
Our user opinion study serves as evidence that the majority of participants are
indeed concerned. On top of that, their concern is bidirectional: they would like
to both notify their friends and be notified by their friends when installing apps
enabling collateral information collection. They would also like to be able to
restrict which attributes are shared that way.
• What is the likelihood that an installed app enables collateral information
collection? To answer this question, we estimated the probability of that event
to occur in the Facebook ecosystem. We show that the likelihood of collateral
information collection for a user depends on the number of friends a user has
and the popularity of apps (number of active users). We run simulations with a
network size of 1 million users and investigated various network topologies and
app adoption models tailored to the Facebook ecosystem. Based on the results
obtained, we demonstrate that for an average user (≈ 200 friends) this likelihood
is greater than 80% for popular apps such as TripAdvisor.
• How significant is the collateral information collection? To answer how much
information is collected, we quantified the amount of attributes collected by
apps that enable collateral information collection. The quantification depends
on popular apps available on the Facebook ecosystem, and we estimated the
number of attributes that each app is collecting. We also considered that several
apps belong to the same app providers. To investigate that, we developed a
mathematical model that also takes into account the access control mechanisms
that Facebook provides to its users. For our calculations, we used the Appinspect
dataset [15] which is a real world snapshot of the apps on Facebook.
• Under the data protection legislation, is collateral information collection
considered a risk for the protection of the personal data of Facebook users? We
investigated this research question under the prism of the GDPR [113]. First, our
analysis clarifies who the data controllers and data processors are. Second, it
scrutinises whether collateral information collection is an adequate practice from
a data protection point of view. Finally, it identifies who is merely accountable.
• How can we mitigate collateral information collection? For this end, we analysed
various countermeasures as follows. First, we propose the use of Transparency
Enhancing Technologies (TETs) aiming at raising user awareness and helping
the users make informed decisions. For this purpose, we outline a privacy
dashboard extension that implements privacy scoring computations for enhancing
transparency towards collateral information collection. Furthermore, we discuss
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alternative solutions highlighting other countermeasures such as notification and
access control solutions, cryptographic tools and a legal application assessment
framework.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows (see Fig. 4.3). Sect. 4.2 characterises
collateral information collection and presents our user opinion study. Sect. 4.3
constructs a mathematical model of collateral information collection and estimates
the likelihood of a user being affected. Sect. 4.4 extends the model and quantifies the
significance of collateral information collection illustrated by a case study of popular
apps. Sect. 4.5 conducts a legal analysis focusing on the GDPR. Sect. 4.6 outlines
potential solutions to mitigate collateral information collection including the high-level
design for a customised privacy dashboard. Finally, Sect. 4.7 provides the summary of
this chapter.
4.2 Relevance of collateral information collection
on Facebook: evidence of user concerns
In this section we investigate the research question: are users concerned that apps
installed by their friends can collect their profile data on Facebook? To answer this
question, we designed a questionnaire and distributed it to 114 participants. We first
characterise collateral information collection with three shortcomings, which we refer
to as the three pillars of collateral information collection. These three pillars establish
the relevance of collateral information collection as a key challenge on Facebook
privacy. Next we present the users’ concerns that serve as evidence of the relevance
of collateral information collection. Malhotra et al. [203] identified three essential
dimensions of concern: “inappropriate collection of personal information”, “lack of
awareness of privacy practices” and “lack of control over personal information”. As a
followup, our questionnaire covers concerns about the collateral information collection,
lack of transparency (notification) and not being asked for their approval (consent).
!1
Collateral information 
collection
Is it a problem?
1. Are users concerned?
2. How probable?
3. How significant?
4. Is it legal?
5. Possible solutions?
Transparency Dashboard enhancement
Other (brief description)
Access Control ListsConfidentiality Legal (DPIA)
Figure 4.3: Paper contribution to collateral information collection on Facebook.
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4.2.1 The three pillars of collateral information collection on
Facebook
Lack of transparency, false sense of privacy and over-sharing. The primary
problem of collateral information collection is that users are not aware of that their data
is being collected [290, 38]. Awareness has been reported as a key issue for Facebook
users [35, 290, 251, 125, 45]. If a friend of a user installs an application, it is unclear
whether the friend is aware of the data collection by this application. This lack of
transparency makes it impossible for the user and the friends to give informed consent
or to influence the decision of use of the personal data of users in any way.
Due to the lack of transparency, users may assume that their data are only visible to their
friends. In such cases, users might be less restrictive with information sharing [184].
Hence, in an environment where apps installed by the user’s friends and can collect
information from the user themselves, the average user may experience a false sense of
privacy. Such a gap between a Facebook user’s general privacy expectation and reality
has been well-investigated by Liu et al. [195] and Madejsk et al. [200]. The added
potential collateral information collection stemming from interdependent privacy can
further widen this gap.
Lack of control by Facebook users: (un)informed consent and its
(in)transitivity. The lack of control is one of the fundamental privacy problems in
OSNs [7, 326, 290, 45, 322]. However, in the case of collateral information collection
the lack of transparency and the inability to prevent such information collection without
un-friending the Facebook friend, who has installed the app, limits the user even further
in having control. For some users, the price for protecting their privacy might become
too high.
In particular, the lack of informed consent is often an integral part of privacy loss on the
web, the OSNs [187] and on Facebook considering the collateral information collection.
Due to lack of transparency, informed consent cannot be given by a user when one
of their friends installs an app that can collect information about the user themselves.
One can argue that the friends that installed the app might be informed about such
data collection. Hence they can decide for the user. In this case, even assuming
that the friend is aware and privacy savvy, the question arises whether consent is
transitive? Transitivity of consent and preferences has been the subject of debate in the
literature [232]. One can assume that the user is giving indirect consent to their friends
to share their data by making their personal profile attributes accessible to them. This
stance can be criticised on (at least) two grounds. First, the user does not know whether
their friend installed an app collecting such data. Hence, their assumed indirect consent
cannot be informed. Second, the default settings on Facebook are clearly pro-sharing
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when it comes to the collateral information collection; also, Facebook users often leave
the default settings unchanged [195, 43].
Facebook friends are not (always) real friends. Even if we assume that privacy
decision-making can be transitive in some cases among friends, there have been reports
in the literature that the relationship between Facebook friends cannot be equated to
real-life friendships, i.e., “latent ties” [157, 81]. Therefore, it is debatable whether the
user trusts their Facebook friends to make the right (privacy) decision on their behalf.
4.2.2 User opinion study
To investigate the research question: “are users concerned about collateral information
collection?”, we conducted an online questionnaire. We explored the users’ concerns
about the disclosure of personal data by Facebook apps installed by the friends of a user,
and we investigated the users’ concerns about un-consented information collection
on Facebook. We observed that the participants’ opinion about collateral information
collection, can be characterised as remarkably concerned in general and in particular
when the information collection is un-consented. Furthermore, the majority of users
prefer to take action to prevent the collateral information collection.
Methodology. After an introduction, our questionnaire consisted of four main
parts (see A.1). First, we asked users about their concerns on collateral information
collection. We assessed users’ standpoints and concerns about default privacy settings
and the lack of notification for indirect and un-consented information collection. This
assessment is necessary to be able to differentiate users who are concerned independent
of their intentions to take actions against such practices. The second part explores
which attributes users were more concerned about. We investigated the type of personal
data on Facebook users find most sensitive. The third part is twofold: 1) whether users
want to be notified when their friends’ apps can collect their personal data or when
their installed apps can collect personal data from their friends; 2) which actions users
prefer to take in such cases. Users replied the questions by marking their responses on
a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 stands for “not concerned at” all and 5 stands for “extremely
concerned” [217, 206]; we also provided a text field where necessary. The fourth part
of the questionnaire collects demographics and information regarding the participants’
and the use of Facebook apps.
Participants. Our response pool consisted of 114 participants. Participants were
recruited from the authors’ direct and extended friend circles (including mostly, but not
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only, Facebook friends). A large proportion of participants are aged between 20 and 35
and are well educated.
Survey design limitations. Our response pool is a convenience sample of the
Facebook users. As such a sample is usually limited in size and diversity, we do not
extrapolate our findings to the general population of Facebook and do not lean on
quantitative results from the user opinion study. While a full-scale quantitative survey
might constitute important future work (see Sect. 7.1), we would like to point out
that notable previous research works on Facebook users have been limited to student
populations. Acquisti and Grossklags [7] used a sample of 294 were more than 89%
were undergraduate and graduate college students; whereas the 89 respondents of Boyd
and Hargittai [43] were fist-year university students.
4.2.3 Results
For the first part, we observe that for all four statements users show concern (see
Fig. 4.4). For instance, 66% (i.e., 37+ 38/114 ≈ 0.66) of users are at least very
concerned about the default privacy setting of Facebook that allows the collateral
information collection. Similarly, 77% (i.e., 38+49/114≈ 0.77) of users are at least
very concerned about not being notified when their friends enable collateral information
collection and 67% (i.e., 43+33/114≈ 0.67) for not being notified when one of the
user’s own apps can collect their friends’ information. Finally, 81% (i.e., 32+60/114≈
0.81) of users are at least very concerned about the collateral information collection
and the lack of their approval. Note that Golbeck and Mauriello [139] have investigated
how informed users are regarding the privacy risks of using Facebook apps. Their
findings show that users do not always comprehend what type of data is collected by
apps even when they have installed the app themselves. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume an incomplete understanding of apps installed by their friends, which is in line
with our results.
For the second part of our questionnaire (see Fig. 4.5), we found that although users
are concerned about a number of attributes, their concern is relatively subjective and
differs between users. However, it is noteworthy that certain attributes clearly stand out
and have been marked as more concerned about than others by a large proportion of
the participants. For example, most of the users identify photos (84% are at least very
concerned), videos (79%), their current location (76%), and family and relationships
(54%) as profile attributes that participants are concerned the most about. The profile
attributes that participants are least concerned about are proved to be birthday and
relationship status. Note that the level of concern about the attributes is likely to depend
on the context. For example, although a birthday attribute might seem harmless on
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Figure 4.4: Results for the first part of the questionnaire where we asked participants
about their opinions on four statements regarding default settings, lack of notification
(for friends and for the user themselves), and lack of consent for the Collateral
Information Collection (CIC).
its own, participants might feel different if a weather app would be collecting this
information, or when a flashlight app requests the location of users [124].
For the third part of our questionnaire, we asked participants whether they want to
be notified and also take action for the collateral information collection. Concerning
notification (see Fig. 4.6), we identify that 77% of users always want to be notified
when friends’ apps can collect their personal data, 22% only want to be notified in
particular cases, while only about 1% do not want to be notified at all. Moreover, 69%
of users always want to be notified when their apps are collecting information from their
friends, 27% in particular cases and only about 1% not at all. We observe that users are
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also seriously concerned about harming their friends’ privacy. This corroborates the
finding on attested shreds of evidence concerning other-regarding preferences [252, 65].
Concerning notification, there exist tools that can be very useful to enhance privacy
awareness for un-consented data collection. Note that Golbeck et al. [139] have shown
that the privacy awareness of users can be changed significantly through educational
methods.
When participants were asked which actions (see Fig. 4.7) they would take if they are
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Figure 4.6: Number of participants who want to a) be notified by their friends b) notify
their friends when installing apps enabling CIC.
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Figure 4.7: Number of participants preferring to take a given action when a) their
friends install an app, b) they install an app enabling CIC.
RELEVANCE OF COLLATERAL INFORMATION COLLECTION ON FACEBOOK 59
notified that their friends’ apps are about to collect their information (multiple answers
allowed), 99 out of 114 participants answered that they would restrict access to their
personal data while 8 participants answered that they would un-friend their Facebook
friend. Only 5 participants answered that they would take no action. We emphasise
that the reaction of a user may strongly depend on the relationship between the user
and their friends. When participants were asked what action they would take if they are
notified that one of their apps is about to collect their friends’ information (multiple
answers allowed), 64 out of 114 replied that they would restrict access to their friends’
personal information for this app. Only 5 out of 114 answered that they would take no
action. The answers to the questions in the third part help to confirm that the answers
of our participants in the first part were not due to salience bias; participants who
were concerned in the first part about not being notified for the collateral information
collection replied that they also want to take an action in the third part.
The last part of our questionnaire collected demographics and statistics about Facebook
and app usage. Participants were between 16 and 53 years old with an average age of
29 years. They have had their Facebook accounts for between 6 months and 10 years.
Moreover, 69% of our participants have installed an app at least once, and among
those 87% have installed 1 or 2 apps in the last six months. 54% of the participants
were female, 42% male while 4% preferred not to disclose their gender. Participants
varied greatly in their number of friends, from 10 to 1,000. The 51% of participants
changed their privacy settings on Facebook; 79% restricted who could see their profile
information, 41% who could see them in searches, and 35% who can collect their
information through friends’ apps (multiple answers were allowed). Considering the
participants that have had not change their privacy settings, one explanation could be
that privacy settings on Facebook are constantly changing and following these changes
might be cumbersome [323]. Interestingly, among users who already took an action
by restricting their permissions to their friends’ apps, 90% choose to be notified too.
Furthermore, 82% of our participants is pursuing or has obtained a higher education
degree, where 55% had an IT background based on personal interest and 44% through
higher education.
We conclude from our questionnaire that there is indeed evidence that users are
concerned about collateral information collection. Our participants’ concern is
bidirectional, meaning that the large majority of them prefer to be notified and even take
actions, whether this occurs from their friends or their own side, to prevent collateral
information collection. While we do not want to generalise our findings to all Facebook
users, we argue that these findings justify that collateral information collection is a
privacy issue on Facebook, and thus, it merits a deeper investigation.1
1Results of our Facebook questionnaire study: http://iraklissymeonidis.info/fbapps/Survey/
survey.html
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4.3 Likelihood of collateral information collection
In this section, we investigate the research question: what is the likelihood that an
installed app enables collateral information collection? To answer this question, we
estimate the likelihood of at least one Facebook friend of a user installing an app that
enables collateral information collection. In order to estimate this likelihood, we build
a model incorporating Facebook friends, the application space and the probabilities
of installing apps. Then, we conduct two case studies to estimate this likelihood. Our
first case study assumes a uniform app adoption model, which takes into account
the popularity of an app and the Facebook users. Our second case considers a more
realistic, non-uniform app adoption model, alongside different network topologies
tailored to the Facebook ecosystem. We have instantiated our numerical estimations
with the AppInspect dataset [15].
4.3.1 Basic likelihood model
Let an OSN with k users and the corresponding set be denoted by U, i.e., U =
{u1, . . . ,uk}. The user is denoted by u, with u ∈U. Let f ∈ Fu be a friend of u and
Fu ⊆U the set of u’s friends. Moreover, let A j be an app and L the set of all A js that
are offered by the OSN to every ui, and s the size of the set, i.e., L = {A1, . . . ,As}.
Moreover, let AU j be the number of users who have installed A j. For our likelihood
estimation, we consider the number of Monthly Active Users (MAU) to represent the
number of active users. For instance, when we conducted this research Facebook had
k ≈ 2× 109 users (i.e., MAU) [277] and more than s > 25,000 apps [15] (January
2017).
To estimate the likelihood that u’s personal data can be collected by A j, installed by f ,
we compute the probability of at least one arbitrary f installing any available A j. Let
Q f be the probability of f installing A j that enables collateral information collection.
For all the friends of u (i.e., Fu) the probability of not installing any A j is the product of
probabilities for each f (assuming that these probabilities are independent). Let Ω be
the probability of at least one of u’s friends installing A j (regardless if u has installed
A j), i.e.,
Ω= 1− ∏
f∈Fu
(1−Q f ) . (4.1)
To estimate the likelihood Ω, we compute the probability of a friend of a user installing
an app using two different app adoption models (uniform and a non-uniform) as follows.
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4.3.2 Case study 1 – uniform distribution
Each f decides whether to install A j without considering any app adoption signals
from other users. The probability of at least one friend of u installing A j is uniformly
distributed among u’s friends and is equal to 1−Q. Note that Q = Q f1 = · · · = Q fk′
for uniform distribution with 1≤ k′ ≤ k. The probability Q, is then computed as the
number of all users who installed the app, i.e., AU j, divided by the number of users of
the OSN, i.e., the cardinality of U (with regard to active users):
Q =
AU j
|U| . (4.2)
We used the publicly available dataset provided by Huber et al. [15, 165] to extract
the range of MAU for apps that enable collateral information collection. The dataset
consists of 16,808 Facebook apps from the period between 2012 and 2014. It contains
the application name, ID, number of active users (daily, weekly and monthly) and the
requested permissions. To illustrate the influence of different values of MAUs on Ω, we
only consider the upper tier of apps, i.e., over 500,000 MAU; while the most popular
app that collects friends’ data has 10,000,000 MAU, therefore 5 ·105 ≤ AU j ≤ 1 ·107.
To cover most users, we assume the number of friends for a given u (i.e., |Fu|) to be
between 0 and 1,000. Finally, we estimate the population of Facebook to be 1.1 ·109
MAU for the period of 2012 to 2014 [277].
For A js with AU j ≥ 5 ·106, the probability Ω grows steeply with the average number of
friends (see Fig. 4.8). For a median of 200 friends the probability Ω is larger than 0.6.
For a user with 300 friends and more, the probability Ω exceeds 0.8. Note that most of
Facebook users have more than 200 friends [314]. From Eqns. (4.1) and (4.2) it is clear
that Ω depends strongly on AU j. For instance, our most popular app TripAdvisor [310]
has approximately 1 · 107 MAU (i.e., AU j ≈ 1 · 107). Assuming that on average a
user has 200 friends [314] (i.e., |Fu| ≈ 200), and considering U = 1.1 ·109 (i.e., the
population of Facebook), we estimate that the probability of at least one of u’s friends
installing TripAdvisor is larger than 78% (Ω≥ 0.78).
To further elaborate our results, we empirically computed the probability Ω on a
synthetically generated OSN network graph. We used the Erdo˝s-Rényi [102] model
(ER), to create a graph with 1 · 106 nodes and a mean node degree of d = 200. To
emulate the theoretical results depicted by Eqn. (4.2), the simulation assigned app
installations randomly following a uniform distribution. Therefore, each node in the
graph has the same probability to install the app, i.e., Q = AU j|U| .
The Fig. 4.9a shows the probabilities Ω observed in the simulation. Note that, the
results are consistent with Fig. 4.8, with Ω increasing with the degree of the nodes.
The plot is noisy for degrees less than 170 and higher than 230, since there are just a
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few nodes with these degrees in the simulated graph, as expected for an ER graph (see
Fig. 4.9b). Indeed, ER graphs are created by including each edge uniformly at random
with a certain probability Q. Therefore, the resulting degree distribution is binomial
with an expected value of 200. Fig. 4.9b shows the theoretical degree distribution of
an ER graph with k = 1 ·106 and d = 200. The standard deviation is very low (14.14),
thus most of the nodes have a degree close to 200.
The probability of a user having at least one friend with the app installed is computed
assuming uniformity. Both Eqn. (4.2) and the simulation (see Fig. 4.9a) are based on
the assumption that the probability of a friend installing A j is equal to the mean app
adoption rate of the network, i.e., Q f = Q for all friends of u. Case study 2 deals with
the analysis of Ω when the uniformity assumption is relaxed.
4.3.3 Case study 2 – non-uniform distribution
Realistic OSN do not usually conform to the uniformity assumption, thus assuming
Q = AU j|U| = Q
f1 = · · · = Q fk′ where 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k may not be realistic. App adoption
has been proclaimed to be affected by different signals [249], which in turn may be
affected by the underlying network structure. Research in OSNs has reported node
degree distributions following a power law and clustering coefficients much higher
than in a random network [127, 334, 218]. We have resorted to simulations in order to
introduce all these factors into the estimations of the probability Ω.
Each simulation uses two models: one to generate the synthetic network in which
the probability under study is computed (i.e., network topology), and the other to
decide which users of the network install the application (i.e., app adoption model).
Regarding the network topology, we have considered two different models: Barabási-
Albert [11] (BA); that generates networks with a power-law degree distribution; and
Watts-Strogatz [329] (WS), that is able to generate small-world networks with high
clustering and small diameter. Regarding app adoption, two different models have been
implemented: uniform (unif), where all users install an app with the same probability
(and each installation is independent from other installations and the underlying network
topology); and preferential (prop), where the probability of a user installing an app is
proportional to the number of friends that have already installed the app owing to local
network effects [283].
Therefore, the configuration of a simulation is defined by the network model, the app
adoption model, and a set of parameters that configure both models: the number of
nodes denoted by k, expected mean node degree d, and a fraction of users installing the
app denoted by e. The number of nodes k determines the network size for every model.
The expected mean node degree d (and its relation to k) is used to adjust the additional
specific parameters of the underlying network models. Finally, the fraction of users
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Figure 4.8: Likelihood of collateral information collection based on real data [15] (per
MAU).
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Figure 4.9: Simulation results on an ER graph with k = 1,000,000 and d = 200.
in the network installing the app e is used by the app adoption model to compute the
actual user base.
We performed simulations with configurations using all possible pairs of network and
app adoption models, for network sizes k ∈ [104,105,106], mean degree d ∈ [200] and
e = [5 ·105/1.1 ·109,106/1.1 ·109,5 ·106/1.1 ·109, ·107/1.1 ·109]. The Fig. 4.10 and
Fig. 4.11 present the results for k = 106 and all tested e values. Owing to computational
limitations, the largest simulated network size is k = 1 ·106; however, the trends are
consistent across all network sizes. We have omitted the results for smaller k for the
sake of brevity.
The Fig. 4.10 shows the results of the simulation using the BA model to generate
the graph, together with the theoretical degree distribution of those graphs. The BA
model generates graphs with a few very high degree nodes (known as hubs) and lots of
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Figure 4.10: Simulation results on a BA graph with k = 1,000,000 and d = 200.
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Figure 4.11: Simulation results on a WS graph with k = 1,000,000 and d = 200.
low degree nodes, as shown in the theoretical degree distribution of a BA graph (see
Fig. 4.10c). Regarding the simulation results for the two app adoption models, there are
small differences between the observed Ω values. When combining networks generated
with the BA model with a uniform app adoption model (see Fig. 4.10a), the probability
for a hub to install an app is the same as for any other node. To the contrary, when
combining BA with the prop app adoption model (see Fig. 4.10b), hubs have a higher
probability of installing the app than non-hubs, since having a higher degree makes
them more likely to have (more) friends with the app installed. As a consequence, each
installation affects more users on average, and thus, Ω increases.
The Fig. 4.11 shows the results of the simulation using the WS model, together with
the theoretical degree distribution of those graphs. The WS model generates highly
clustered networks2 with very low variability in node degrees. Indeed and as it is
illustrated in Fig. 4.11c, the vast majority of nodes will have a degree between 195 and
205. As a consequence, Fig. 4.11a and Fig. 4.11b are noisy for degrees outside this
interval. The simulation results show, on the one hand, that Ω is about the same for
all nodes in the graph, which is consistent with the fact that the degrees of the nodes
are similar. On the other hand, the results also show a significant difference between
using the unif (see Fig. 4.11a) and the prop (see Fig. 4.11b) app adoption models.
2The expected clustering coefficient can be adjusted with the rewiring probability parameter.
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This is caused by the strong clustering coefficient exhibited by the network. With unif
app adoption, each node installs the app with the same probability. On the contrary,
with prop app adoption, when an app is installed by a member of a community, it
propagates to be adopted also by other members. However, each new installation inside
the same community implies only a small increase in the overall Ω. That is because
most of the users affected by the installation were already affected by installations from
other members of the community.
In summary, irrespective of app adoption models, the likelihood that a friend of a given
user installs an app enabling collateral information collection is significant. If the app is
popular, i.e., has millions of users, it is highly likely that a user is affected by collateral
information collection from one of her friends.
4.4 Significance of collateral information collection
In this section, we answer the research question: how significant is the collateral
information collection? To estimate how much information is collected, we build a
model including friends, profile attributes, and Facebook access control, i.e., privacy
settings and third-party application (app) permissions. This model can be used to
compute the amount of the user’s attributes that can be collected by apps (and thus
third-party application providers (app providers)) when installed by the friends of
a user. We investigate different ways of acquiring data: direct collection from the
users themselves, indirect and exclusive collection through the friends of a user. To
instantiate our model, we use several snapshots of the most popular apps on Facebook
using the AppInspect dataset [15].
4.4.1 Basic collateral information collection model
Users and users’ friends. Each user ui in an OSN (i.e., ui ∈ U) has a personal
profile where they can store, update, delete and administer their personal data [42]. A
given ui’s profile consists of attributes ai such as name, email, birthday and hometown.
We denote the set of attributes of a ui’s profile as T and n as the size of T , i.e.,
T = {a1, . . . ,an}. For instance, Facebook currently operates with a set of n = 25
profile attributes. Note that we use the term attribute and profile item interchangeably.
For any user ui in U, we consider u to be a user under consideration and fi ∈ Fu one of
their friends. Let Fu∗ be the union of u’s friends and the u itself, or Fu∗ = {u}∪Fu, and
let f ∗ be an element of Fu∗, i.e., f ∗ ∈ Fu∗. Clearly Fu∩{u} = /0, as u is not a friend
of u. For instance, Fu∗ = {u, f1, . . . , fk′} describes a user u and her k′ friends, where
1≤ k′ ≤ k. Note that Table 4.2 list the notations used in this chapter.
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Applications and application providers. Let L be the set of apps an app provider
can offer to every ui in an OSN and s the size of this set, i.e., L = {A1, . . . ,As}. Let A j,
for 1≤ j ≤ s, be the set of attributes that each A j can collect, i.e., A j ⊆ T . Each A j is
owned and managed by an app provider denoted by Pj. The set of A js that belong to Pj
Table 4.2: Notation for the collateral information collection model.
Notation Description
U = {u1, . . . ,uk} Set of k users ui in an Online Social Network (OSN).
Fu∗ = {u, f1, . . . , fk′} Set of k′ friends (i.e., fi ∈ Fu) and u themselves (i.e., the user
under consideration), where k′ ≤ k, Fu∗ = {u}∪Fu and {u}∩
Fu = /0.
T = {a1, . . . ,an} Set of n attributes ai of u’s profile.
A j / A
u, f
j / A
u,Fu
j An app j / an app j installed by: a user f / all users in Fu which
can collect u’s profile attributes.
Au, fj / A
u,Fu
j Set of ais for each A j installed by: a user f / all users in Fu which
can collect attributes of u’s profile.
L = {A1, . . . ,As} Set of s apps A j hosted by an OSN.
Lu, f / Lu,Fu Set of A js installed by: a user f / all users in Fu, that can collect
attributes of u’s profile.
AU j The number of Monthly Active Users (MAU) of an A j.
Pj / P
u, f
j / P
u,Fu
j An app provider Pj offering a set of A js / a set of A js installed by
user f / a set of A js installed by all users in Fu offered by Pj that
can collect u’s profile attributes.
Pu, fj / P
u,Fu
j Set of ais all A js installed by, a user f / all users in Fu and belong
to the Pj that can collect u’s profile attributes.
AP = {P1 . . .Pm} Set of m app providers Pjs hosted by an OSN.
APu, f /APu,Fu Set of Pjs whose A js: installed by a user f / all users in Fu which
can collect u’s profile attributes.
Cu, fPM,A j / C
u,Fu∗
PM,A j Set of permissions ri an A j can request and, a user f (i.e., f ∈ Fu∗)
/ all users in Fu∗ (i.e., Fu∗ = {u}∪Fu), accept(s) to collect u’s
profile attributes.
Cu, fPV / C
u,Fu
PV Set of privacy settings that an OSN offers and allows: a user f /
all users in Fu, to access u’s profile attributes.
Cu, fA j / C
u,Fu
A j Set of access settings (i.e., a combination of permissions and
privacy settings) granted and accepted by u and: a user f / / all
users in Fu to access and collect u’s profile attributes by an A j.
Πu,F
u
A j / Π
u,Fu
Pj Set of ais for each, A j / Pj, installed by all users in F
u that can
collect u’s profile attributes.
∆u
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
/ ∆u
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
Set of ais for each, A j / Pj, exclusively installed by all users in Fu
(and not through the user themselves, i.e., A′uj ∩Au,F
u
j ) that can
collect u’s profile attributes.
d / e The mean node degree / the fraction of users that installed an app,
i.e., AU|U|
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is denoted by P j, i.e., P j ⊆ L . The set of all Pjs is denoted by AP and m the size of
the set, i.e., AP = {P1, . . . ,Pm}. From our analysis, we identified s = 16,808 apps and
m = 2,055 app providers on Facebook indicating that a Pj can have more than one A j,
i.e., P j = {A1, . . . ,As′} with 1≤ s′ ≤ 160 [15].
Collateral information collection by an application A j. When A j is installed
by f (i.e., f ∈ Fu), a set of attributes ai can be collected from u’s profile. We denote by
Au,F
u
j an A j that users in Fu installed and as A
u,Fu
j the set of attributes ai that A
u,Fu
j can
collect from u’s profile. Clearly, Au,F
u
j ⊆ A j ⊆ T . The set of all Au,F
u
j s installed by the
users in Fu is denoted by Lu,Fu . Clearly, Lu,Fu ⊆ L .
We denote by~ai a vector of size n×1 which corresponds to ai, i.e.,
~ai = [
1
0 . . .0
i
10 . . .
n
0] .
Moreover, we consider ~Au,F
u
j a vector of length n, which corresponds to A
u,Fu
j , i.e.,
~Au,F
u
j =
∨
ai∈Au,F
u
j
~ai := ~A
u,Fu
j [i] =
{
1 if ai ∈ Au,F
u
j ,
0 if ai /∈ Au,F
u
j ,
(4.3)
for 1≤ i≤ n and 1≤ j ≤ s.
Note that:
• x∪ y =
{
z = 0 if x = y = 0,
z = 1 otherwise.
• and~x∨~y =~z where~x[i]∨~y[i] =~z[i].
For instance, an Au,F
u
j = {a1,ai,an} is represented as~A j =~a1∨~ai∨~an = [
1
10 . . .0
i
10 . . .0
n
1].
It represents the attributes that can be collected by A j when is installed by f (i.e., the
user’s friend).
Collateral information collection by application provider Pj. We denote by
APu,Fu the set of app providers whose apps Au,F
u
j s are installed by users in Fu and who
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can collect attributes of user u’s profile. Hence,
APu,Fu =
⋃
f∈Fu
APu, f . (4.4)
Each Pu,F
u
j consists of a set of A
u,Fu
j s denoted by P
u,Fu
j which users in Fu installed. Each
Pu,F
u
j can collect attributes of u’s profile. To identify which ais can be collected by Pj
we consider ~Pu,F
u
j a vector of length n (i.e., n ∈ T ), which corresponds to Pu,F
u
j , i.e.,
~Pu,F
u
j =
∨
A∈Pu, fj
f∈Fu
~Au, f =
∨
A∈Pu,Fuj
~Au,F
u
. (4.5)
Note that: ~Pu,F
u
j =
∨
f∈Fu
~Pu, fj = (~P
u, f1
j ∨·· ·∨~Pu, fij ).
The complexity of evaluating Eqn. (4.5) for all f in Fu is O(n×|Pu,Fuj |).
u
{a1−a12}
f1
f2
f3
A1 = {a1−a4}
A2 = {a1,a4,a5}
A4 = {a8}
A6 = {a10,a11}
A1 = {a1−a4}
A3 = {a4,a6,a7}
A5 = {a9}
A7 = {a12}
Pu,F
u
1 = {a1−a7}
Pu,F
u
2 = {a8,a9},
Pu,F
u
3 = {a10,a11}
Pu,F
u
4 = {a12}
Figure 4.12: Example for collateral information collection while enabling profiling to
P j.
Example (see Fig. 6.2). Let Fu = { f1, f2, f3} friends of u. The set of A js that
all f ∈ Fu installed is Lu,Fu = {Au,Fu1 . . .Au,F
u
7 }. The set of Pjs for all A js installed is
described as APu,Fu =APu, f1 ∪APu, f2 ∪APu, f3 = {Pu, f11 ,Pu, f12 ,Pu, f13 }∪{Pu, f21 ,Pu, f22 }∪
{Pu, f34 } = {(Pu, f11 ∪Pu, f21 ),(Pu, f12 ∪Pu, f22 ),Pu, f13 ,Pu, f34 }. Each Pu,F
u
1 = P
u, f1
1 ∪Pu, f21 =
{(Au, f11 ∪ Au, f12 ) ∪ (Au, f21 ∪ Au, f23 )}, Pu,F
u
2 = P
u, f1
2 ∪ Pu, f22 = {Au, f14 ∪ Au, f25 }, Pu,F
u
3 =
{Au, f16 } and Pu,F
u
4 = {Au, f37 }. Each A j installed by u’s friends can collect a set of
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∆u
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
Au,uj
Figure 4.13: Exclusive collateral information collection of attributes by an application
A j.
ai attributes from u’s profile such that, A1 = {a1,a2,a3,a4}, A2 = {a1,a4,a5}, A3 =
{a4,a6,a7}, A4 = {a8}, A5 = {a9}, A6 = {a10,a11}, A7 = {a12}. The total collection
of ais for each Pj is Pu,F
u
1 = (A
u, f1
1 ∪ Au, f12 ) ∪ (Au, f21 ∪ Au, f23 ) = ({a1,a2,a3,a4} ∪
{a1,a4,a5})∪ ({a1,a2,a3,a4} ∪ {a4,a6,a7}}) = {a1 − a7}, Pu,F
u
2 = A
u, f1
4 ∪Au, f25 =
{a8}∪{a9}= {a8,a9}, Pu,F
u
3 = A
u, f1
6 = {a10,a11} and Pu,F
u
4 = A
u, f1
7 = {a12}.
Exclusive collateral information collection by application A j and application
provider Pj. We denote by ∆u
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
the set of ai attributes that can be collected by
A j exclusively from u’s friends (and not through the user themselves), i.e., A′uj ∩Au,F
u
j .
Let~∆u
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
be a vector of length n which ∆u
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
provides, where n = |T |, i.e.,
~∆u
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
= ~A′uj
∧
~Au,F
u
j . (4.6)
Note that~x′∧~x = [
1
0 . . .
n
0] and~x′∨~x = [
1
1 . . .
n
1]. The complexity of evaluating Eqn. (4.6)
for all f ∈ Fu is O(n4).
Similarly, we denote by ∆u
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
the set of ais that can be collected by A js exclusively
from u’s friends and belong to Pu,F
u
j , and ~∆
u
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
be a vector of length n which
∆u
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
provides, i.e.,
~∆u
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
= ~P′uj
∧
~Pu,F
u
j . (4.7)
The complexity of evaluating Eqn. (4.7) for all f ∈ Fu is O(n4×|Puj |× |Pu,F
u
j |).
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4.4.2 Application permissions and user’s privacy settings
To control the collateral information collection of A j from a u’s profile, access control
settings are provided by the OSN. On Facebook the access control settings consist of
permissions and privacy settings [122]. Permissions depend on the friend f , where
f ∈ {u}∪Fu and on the application A j, as each f should accept the permissions that
each A j is requesting. Privacy settings also depend on the user u, as each u chooses
with whom their profile information is shared.
Permissions and application A j. Each A j can request a set of permissions ri to be
accepted from a user f such as user_emails, user_friends and friends_birthday. We
denote by AC the set of permissions an application A j can request from a friend f
(with cardinality n), i.e., AC = {r1, . . . ,rn}, where f ∈ Fu∗. Moreover, we denote by
Cu,F
u∗
PM,A j the set of permissions an A j can request, and F
u∗ accepts; thus A j can collect
attributes of u’s profile, where 1≤ j ≤ s. Clearly Cu,Fu∗PM,A j ⊆ AC .
We consider~ri a vector of length n which corresponds to ri, for 1≤ i≤ n, i.e.,
~ri = [
1
0 . . .0
i
10 . . .
n
0] .
Moreover, we consider ~Cu,F
u∗
PM,A j a vector of length n, which corresponds to C
u,Fu∗
PM,A j , i.e.,
~Cu,F
u∗
PM,A j =
∨
r∈Cu,Fu∗PM,A j
~r := ~Cu,F
u∗
PM,A j [i] =

1 if access is provided by Fu∗
to u’s profile for a given A j,
0 otherwise,
(4.8)
for 1≤ i≤ n and for 1≤ j ≤ s.
Privacy settings and user u. Each u can allow a user f (i.e., f ∈ Fu) such as a
friend, friend of a friend or any user to access the attributes of u’s profile. We denote by
Cu,F
u
PV the set of attributes of u’s profile that u allows to access for Fu using the privacy
settings of Facebook.
We consider ~Cu,F
u
PV a vector of length n, which corresponds to C
u,Fu
PV , i.e.,
~Cu,F
u
PV =
[
1
1 . . .
i
1 . . .
n
1] if an access to u’s profile is provided by u to Fu,
[
1
0 . . .
i
0 . . .
n
0] otherwise ,
(4.9)
for 1≤ i≤ n.
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Permissions vs. privacy settings. We denote as Cu,F
u
A j the set of access settings
provided by u and Fu to u’s profile for an A j, as a combination of permissions (i.e.,
Cu,F
u∗
PM,A j ) and privacy settings (i.e., C
u,Fu
PV ).
We consider ~Cu,F
u
A j a vector of length n which correspond to C
u,Fu
A j , i.e.,
~Cu,F
u
A j =
~Cu,F
u
PV ∧~Cu,F
u∗
PM,A j , (4.10)
for 1≤ j ≤ s.
• Remark: a∧b =
{
1 i f a = b = 1,
0 otherwise,
• Extension: ~a∧~b =~c where~a[i]∧~b[i] =~c[i] .
The complexity of evaluating Eqn. (4.10) for all f in Fu is O(n2).
Collateral information collection with permissions. We denote by Πu,F
u
A j and
Πu,F
u
Pj the set of attributes that can be collected by A j and Pj respectively, for the
accepted access settings to u’s profile by u and Fu.
Let ~Πu,F
u
A j be a vector of length n which Π
u,Fu
A j provide, i.e.,
~Πu,F
u
A j =
~Au,F
u
j ∧~Cu,F
u
A j . (4.11)
for 1≤ j ≤ s.
The complexity of evaluating Eqn. (4.11) for all f in Fu is O(n3).
Let ~Πu,F
u
Pj be a vector of length n which Π
u,Fu
Pj provides, i.e.,
~Πu,F
u
Pj =
∨
A j∈Pu,F
u
j
(~Au,F
u
j ∧~Cu,F
u
A j ) . (4.12)
for 1≤ j ≤ s.
The complexity of evaluating Eqn. (4.12) for all f in Fu is O(n3×|Pu,Fuj |).
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Exclusive collateral information collection with permissions. We denote by
∆u
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
and ∆u
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
the set of attributes that can be collected by A j and Pj
(respectively) exclusively from u’s friends (and not through the user themselves, i.e.,
A′uj ∩Au,F
u
j ), for the accepted access settings to u’s profile by u and Fu.
Let~∆u
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
be a vector of length n which ∆u
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
provides, i.e.,
~∆u
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
= (~Auj ∧~CuA j)′∧ (~A
u,Fu
j ∧~CAu,Fuj ) , (4.13)
for 1≤ j ≤ s.
The complexity of evaluating Eqn. (4.13) for all f in Fu is O(n12) and O(n12×|Puj |×
|Pu,Fuj |)
Let~∆u
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
be a vector of length n which ∆u
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
provides, i.e.,
~∆u
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
= ~Π′uj
∧
~Πu,F
u
j . (4.14)
for 1≤ j ≤ s.
The complexity of evaluating Eqn. (4.14) for all f in Fu is O(n12×|Puj |× |Pu,F
u
j |).
4.4.3 Numerical study of collateral information collection: the
case of Facebook apps
To illustrate the significance of collateral information collection, we extended our
analysis to Facebook apps (i.e., A js) and app providers (i.e., Pjs) using the AppInspect
dataset [15, 165]. For each A j, apart from the application name and ID, the dataset
provides us with the number of monthly active users, the requested permissions and
the A js each Pj owns. We compute and compare the proportion of attributes A js and
their respective Pjs can collect: 1) through the user themselves (i.e., direct collection
by apps and potential data fusion by app providers), 2) through the user and the user’s
friends combined (i.e., collateral information collection) and 3) exclusively through
the user’s friends (i.e., exclusive collateral information collection). Out of the 16,808
apps in the dataset, 1,202 enable collateral information collection˙ corresponding to
7.15%. Out of these 1,202, our analysis focuses on A js and Pjs that have more than
AU ≥ 10,000 MAU; there are 207 and 88, respectively.3
3Results of our numerical study on Facebook: http://iraklissymeonidis.info/fbapps/fb_apps_
statistics/index.html.
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Figure 4.14: Default permissions settings for apps on (a) 2012 (left) and (b) 2017
(right) on Facebook.
Before delving into the details, we point our two limitations of our numerical study.
First, the dataset does not contain information about the individual users of the listed
apps, but only their aggregate numbers. Therefore, it is not possible to perform a
per-user evaluation of the privacy loss due to collateral information collection. Instead,
we had to resort to per app and per app provider analysis as it would impact an average
user and an average friend of the user.
Second, the dataset does not contain information about the privacy settings of individual
users. Therefore we are not able to factor in those when numerically evaluating the
extent of the collateral information collection; we assume that all permission requests
are granted. This is not a far-fetched assumption, as default privacy settings for
apps have been and still are very much pro-sharing (see Fig. 4.14). In a nutshell,
most attributes are accessible by default for apps installed by the friends of a user.
Furthermore, the more recent “Apps Others use” dialogue (see Fig. 4.14 (b)), does not
list photos, potentially indicating that these might not be accessible for apps through
Facebook friends.
Direct information collection. First, we aimed to investigate the number of
attributes that apps can collect: from users giving explicit consent when installing
an app. Figure 4.15 (a) shows that more than half of the 207 apps collect a single
attribute from the users. Other characteristic number of attributes are 2 (14%) and 7
(12%), respectively. Furthermore, there was a single app collecting 9 attributes. Note
that 10% of the apps did not ask for any extra attribute (i.e., user_xxx) outside of the
basic information granted to all apps.
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Collateral information collection. Second, and more importantly, we were
interested in the extent of collateral information collection, when apps and app providers
become entitled to collect attributes of a user without direct consent, through their
friend installing the app. Performing the analysis over the dataset with regard to apps,
using Eqn. (4.3) we found that 72.4% of apps can collect exactly one attribute from
Fu (see Fig. 4.15 (b) for details). There are some apps that collect between 2 and 7
attributes in a collateral fashion, with a peak at 6 attributes. Furthermore, there were
several apps that collected 11 attributes from the friends of the user.
Exclusive collateral information collection. With regard to attributes that can be
collected exclusively from the friends of a user (i.e., collected from friends but not
from the user themselves, see Fig. 4.13), using Eqn. (4.6), we found that more than
30% of the apps collect at least one attribute. Specifically, 28.9% of the apps under
consideration can collect exactly one attribute, 1.45% as much as 10, and one app 11
attributes (see Fig. 4.15 (c) for details).
Potential data fusion by app providers offering multiple apps. Considering
direct information collection and turning towards the 88 app providers, Fig. 4.15 (d)
shows that providers predominantly collect 1 or 2 attributes per user. The slight increase
in collected attributes indicates that app providers offering multiple apps are able to
gather an enriched set of personal information from a single user. Extremes also
do exist: one app provider collect as much as 17 attributes from a single user via a
combined offering of multiple apps. It is interesting to see that are 4 app providers
collecting at least 7 attributes, while there are almost 30 apps collecting the same
amount; this indicates that data-ravenous apps are concentrated in a few app providers.
Data fusion also strengthens the extent of collateral information collection, as seen in
Fig. 4.15 (e) compared to Fig. 4.15 (b): there is a slight but visible increase towards
collecting more attributes compared to the single app scenario throughout the whole
range of the histogram. Furthermore, some app providers collect as much as 14 and 18
attributes, exhibiting strong potential for data fusion and thus profiling. A similar effect
of data fusion can be seen with regard to exclusive collateral information collection
in Fig. 4.15 (f). A surprising nuance is the disappearance of the 11-attribute app: the
exclusive collateralness of a given attribute vanishes, if another app from the same app
provider collects the same one directly.
The most important observation here is that collateral information collection and data
fusion are orthogonal mechanisms, which, surprisingly, amplify each other’s effects,
resulting in more pronounced and obscure information gathering. As a countermeasure,
bringing transparency to such a scenario should provide straightforward benefits to
Facebook users.
SIGN
IFICAN
CE
O
F
CO
LLATERAL
IN
FO
RM
ATIO
N
CO
LLECTIO
N
75
0 20 40 60 80
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
0.48%
0.96%
12.5%
0.48%
2.41%
2.89%
4.34%
14%
51.2%
10.6%
Relative frequency of attributes (%) by A js from u.
(a)
N
u
m
o
f
p
r
o
fi
l
e
i
t
e
m
s
0 20 40 60 80
1
6
5
11
3
2
4
7
72.4%
11.1%
0.96%
2.41%
3.86%
5.31%
3.38%
0.48%
Relative frequency of attributes (%) by A js from Fu.
(b)
N
u
m
o
f
p
r
o
fi
l
e
i
t
e
m
s
0 20 40 60 80
11
10
5
3
2
1
0
0.48%
1.45%
0.48%
0.48%
0.48%
28.9%
67.6%
Relative frequency of attributes (%) by A js exclusively from Fu.
(c)
N
u
m
o
f
p
r
o
fi
l
e
i
t
e
m
s
0 20 40 60 80
17
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1.13%
1.13%
1.13%
1.13%
1.13%
4.54%
4.54%
4.54%
21.5%
36.3%
12.5%
Relative frequency of attributes (%) by Pjs from u.
(d)
N
u
m
o
f
p
r
o
fi
l
e
i
t
e
m
s
0 20 40 60 80
18
14
11
6
5
4
3
2
1
1.13%
1.13%
2.27%
9.09%
2.27%
4.54%
6.81%
10.2%
62.5%
Relative frequency of attributes (%) by Pjs from Fu..
(e)
N
u
m
o
f
p
r
o
fi
l
e
i
t
e
m
s
0 20 40 60 80
10
7
3
1
0
2.27%
1.13%
1.13%
36.3%
59%
Relative frequency of attributes (%) by Pjs exclusively from Fu.
(f)
N
u
m
o
f
p
r
o
fi
l
e
i
t
e
m
s
Figure 4.15: Number of attributes gathered via direct, collateral and exclusive collateral information collection wrt apps (A j, top)
and app providers (Pj, bottom).
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Figure 4.16: Total number of apps and app providers requesting collateral information
collection of sensitive attributes (per attribute).
Potentially sensitive profile items. The collection of profile items deemed
potentially sensitive by users deserve a more detailed look. Both related literature
and our user study (see Sect. 4.2) found that attributes with connection to location,
relationships, religious/ political views and photos/videos are particularly guarded more
closely by users (i.e., where participants were at least very concerned). Analysing the
AppInspect dataset with an eye on permissions granting access to such information, we
derived the following results concerning collateral and exclusive collateral information
collection and data fusion (see Fig. 4.16). The two most popular groups affected by
collateral information collection are location-related attributes (including work history,
education, hometown and location) and photos. Almost, half of the 207 apps collected
the photos of the user’s friends (97), with location (39) and work history (35) being
the second and third most popular attributes. It is also easy to see that apps requesting
these three attributes are clustered to a few app providers (between 2 to 4 app per app
provider, mean value over all 3 attributes). In case of less popular collaterally collected
attributes, the requesting apps are more uniformly distributed across app providers
(between 1 to 1.6 app per app provider, mean value over the remaining 5 attributes).
Note that exclusive collateral information collection also happens as evidenced by the
yellow and green bars in Fig. 4.16.
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4.5 Legal analysis
In this section, we investigate the research question: Under the data protection
legislation, is collateral information collection considered a risk for the protection of
the personal data of Facebook users? To answer this question, we use the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [113] as a point of reference. We investigate the
responsibility of collateral information collection, meaning who the data controller
and data processor are. We discuss the relevance of transparency and consent for data
protection. Furthermore, we review the necessity of implementing concepts of data
protection by design and default. Based on our legal analysis, we identify who is
responsible for such information collection, and argue that the lack of transparency and
consent makes collateral information collection dubious from a data protection point
of view.
4.5.1 General Data Protection Regulation
After 20 years and many technological innovations, the Data Protection Directive
(Directive 95/45/EC) [111] was due for an update. A Regulation was chosen over a
Directive, as a Regulation applies directly and does not need to be transposed into
national law. After long negotiations on 24 May 2016 the European GDPR [113]
entered into force and applied from 25 May 2018. The GDPR constitutes a single set
of rules for all Member States that regulates the processing of personal data if it is done
in the context of an establishment of an actor (controller/processor) within the EU, or if
personal data of people who are in the EU is processed in the context of offering goods
or services or the monitoring of their behaviour. Besides this extended territorial scope,
the GDPR also brought some additional changes. In line with the research question
of this section is the specification of (joint) controllership and the introduction of data
protection by design and by default.
4.5.2 Controllers and processors
The GDPR, as the Directive 95/46/EC before, still uses the distinction between
controllers and processors to associate certain duties on actors in the case of data
processing. A controller is anybody who, alone or with others, determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data [113]. A processor is any party that
processes the personal data on behalf of the controller. This distinction is important, as
the controller is the main responsible party for implementing and complying with the
provisions of the GDPR.
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The controller should normally be, as the name already says, the entity who has the
control. The control can be stemming from 1) explicit or implicit legal competence (the
controller might be appointed by law, or the capacity to determine is not explicitly laid
down by law but stems from common legal provisions or established legal practice) or b)
factual influence: in this case an assessment of the factual circumstances is made [105].
It should be noted that therefore, the determination of who is controller and processor
is a factual one and cannot be contractually allocated to another person/entity which,
considering the factual circumstances, has neither legal nor factual influence on how the
personal data are processed. However, the content of contracts can be useful to assess
who factually has the control. The control relates to the determination of the purposes
and means of the data processing. Essentially, this means what level of influence the
entity has on the “why” and the “how” of the processing [105].
4.5.3 Joint control
It is possible that for a single data processing several controllers are involved. The
Directive was not explicit on this, and the concept of joint controllers was mainly
provided by the Article 29 Working Party, however, the GDPR now includes explicitly
the concept of joint controllers in Article 26 GDPR. The Regulation specifies that
where two or more controllers jointly determine the purposes and means of processing,
they are joint controllers and they need to determine their respective responsibilities for
compliance with the Regulation in a transparent manner. This includes an arrangement
the essence of which shall be made available to the data subject, and which may
designate a contact point for data subjects. Nonetheless, the data subject may exercise
his or her rights in respect of and against each of the controllers.
Just the fact that different parties co-operate when processing personal data does
not mean that they are joint controllers. If they do not share common purpose or
means with regard to the specific processing, then it might only be a transfer of data
between separate controllers. It will often not be clear-cut and depend on the factual
circumstances whether several controllers are considered to be separate controllers or
in case they are considered joint controllers, to which extent they share the control. The
same data set can be processed by several separate controllers or by joint controllers,
e.g. when a travel agency books a journey and hotel every controller (travel agency,
airline, and hotel) is a separate controller, however, if the controllers set up a common
platform for the booking and thereby determine the essential elements of the means,
they are joint controllers for this data processing [105].
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4.5.4 Collateral information collection: who is controller?
The Article 29 Working Party in their opinion 5/2009 on online social networking
specified that social networking service providers (i.e., Online Social Networks
(OSNs)), such as in the case of Facebook, are data controllers under the Data Protection
Directive [13]. As the concept of controller and processor has not much changed
under the Regulation, it can be understood that Facebook is still a controller under
the Regulation. Furthermore, third-party application providers (app providers) might
be data controllers, if they develop applications which run in addition to the ones
from social networking service providers, and users decide to use such a third-party
application (app) [106]. Note that, we will use the terms social networking service
provider and OSN interchangibly.
Whether Facebook and the app provider are separate or joint controllers will depend on
in how far they share the purposes and means of the data processing. In general, the app
provider will be a separate controller when it determines its own purposes and means
for the processing of personal data. With regards to the processing activities of the
app provider, the social networking service provider will generally not be a controller
as it only provides access to the data (and thereby transfers it to the next controller),
except of course the app provider is acting on behalf of the social networking service
provider [13]. In that case, it could be either that the app provider is a processor
whereby the purpose is fully decided upon by the social network service provider, or,
if they determine the means, e.g. the platform together, there could be a case of joint
control.
Is your Facebook friend a controller? According to Helberger et al. [159], “users are
in many cases the primary perpetrators of privacy infringements on social networking
sites”. The Regulation, like the Directive, does not apply in certain cases. One of these
exemptions is referred to as the household exemption. Article 2 of GDPR, provides
that the Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural
person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. In their opinion on
social networking service providers, the Article 29 Working Party explained that the
users of OSNs will be data subjects in most cases, or might fall under the household
exemption [106]. However, there can be cases in which the user might not be covered
by the household exemption. This is especially the case if the user is acting on behalf
of a company or association, or uses Facebook for commercial, political or charitable
goals [106]. Also, the exemption does not apply if the information is made accessible
to an indefinite number of people [67]. This is, for instance, the case when the profile
information is accessible beyond self-selected contacts or is index-able by search
engines [106]. In such cases, it is beyond the personal or household sphere, and the
user might be a controller [106].
If users qualify as controllers, they have to comply in principle with the data protection
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obligations. However, the European data protection law was not intended for amateur
controllers [159]. Some provisions can be applied without many problems. For instance,
amateur controllers should also ask for their friends’ consent before they process their
friends’ data and in principle provide information to their friends such as why they
publish their data and where they do it [159]. However, in many cases “compliance
with many provisions in data protection law probably exceeds the knowledge and
experience of most users” [159]. Therefore, some provisions are not possible to be
complied with by amateur controllers [159].
4.5.5 Transparency and information
While the principle of transparency was not as such mentioned in Directive 95/46/EC, it
can be found very explicitly in the GDPR [113]. Article 5 specifically requires that data
shall be processed in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject. Moreover,
in Section 1 of GDPR, the rights of the data subject includes specific requirements on
transparent information provision. Even Article 26 GDPR on joint controllers includes
the requirement that the determination of the respective responsibilities should be done
in a transparent manner. The Recitals 39 and 58 of the GDPR clarify that the principle
of transparency requires that any information and communication relating to the
processing of personal data need to be concise, easily accessible, easily understandable,
in clear and plain language, and that visualisation can be used. In particular, information
should be provided on the identity of the controller, the purposes of the processing
and “further information to ensure fair and transparent processing in respect of the
natural persons concerned and their right to obtain confirmation and communication of
personal data concerning them which are being processed” [113]. However, users do
not only need information when they are the data subjects: if they are controllers, they
will need information to comply with their duties as data controllers [159]. To be more
specific, they will need practical information about the potential security and privacy
risks on the social networking services and they will need legal information [159]. The
Article 29 Working Party recommends social network providers to provide adequate
warnings to users about the privacy risks related to themselves and others when they
upload information to the social networking service.
Even though in principle every controller must ensure the transparency of its processing,
the social networking service provider faces higher expectations regarding information
provisioning [159].
4.5.6 Consent and information
From a legal perspective, one of the main challenges of data protection attached to
app permissions, as described above, is the fact that personal data processing may lack
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legitimacy. Article 6 of the GDPR [113] provides a limited number of legal grounds
legitimising personal data processing, such as the consent of the data subject. Consent,
as stated in Article 4 (11) GDPR, is defined as “any freely given, specific, informed and
unambiguous indication for the data subject’s wishes”. As enshrined in Article 6 (1) (a),
the data controller, i.e., Facebook or apps, may collect, store, use and further disclose
the data if the user has given her consent. For the consent to be valid, it has to fulfil
certain criteria, which are specified in Article 7 GDPR, including that the controller
needs to be able to demonstrate that consent has been given, the request for consent
needs to be clearly distinguishable from other matters, understandable for the user and
the user can withdraw consent at any time.
4.5.7 Data protection by design and default
An important change by the GDPR that is relevant to this chapter is the introduction
of data protection by design and default in Article 25 of the GDPR. This provision
obliges the controller to take appropriate technical and organisational measures to
implement data protection principles to ensure that by default only personal data that
are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. Such measures
should ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible to an indefinite
number of persons without the individual’s intervention. This provision is important,
as the main problem in the Facebook case described in this chapter is the possibility to
access user A’s data via user B since the default settings allow this data sharing while
user A is not aware and never actively consented to it. Article 25 GDPR will require
that the default settings are set in the most data protection friendly way, and therefore
the user typically will have to actively opt-in if she wants to give apps access to data
through her friends.
Furthermore, the GDPR stipulates that appropriate technical and organisational
measures should be implemented which meet in particular the principles of data
protection by design and by default [113]. These measures could provide “transparency
with regard to the functions and processing of personal data, enabling the data subject
to monitor the data processing, enabling the controller to create and improve security
features” [113].
4.5.8 Profiling
Profiling is defined in Article 4 GDPR as “any form of automated processing of
personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects
relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that
natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences,
interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements” [113]. As stated in Sect. 4.1,
82 FACEBOOK THIRD-PARTY APPLICATIONS
app providers offering multiple apps could utilise data fusion to construct a more
complete representation of users. Hence, data fusion implements certain sub-cases of
profiling (e.g., directly extracting personal preferences and interests from Facebook
attributes) while enabling other sub-cases of profiling by virtue of expanding the
knowledge of the app provider (i.e., the data controller) on a given data subject.
Regulating profiling plays a significant role in the GDPR, as it is mentioned in several
articles and recitals. Article 22 GDPR declares that data subjects shall have the right not
to be profiled if this profiling results in legal or other significant effects detrimental to
them. The only exception relevant to our case is when the data subjects give explicitly
consent. As per Recital 71 GDPR, in any case, such processing should be subject to
suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to the data subject and
the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an
explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision.
Also, such measure should not concern a child.
Article 13 GDPR moreover states that in the case of profiling, the controller is
obliged to provide the data subject with information necessary to ensure fair and
transparent processing, including the profiling logic and the significance and the
envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject. On top of this,
Article 15 GDPR states that the data subjects have the right to access their personal data
and the above information anytime (with a reasonable frequency) after the profiling
took place. Article 21 GDPR also defines the right to object if profiling is done to
enable direct marketing at any time and free of charge. Last, Article 35 GDPR makes a
Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) mandatory, in particular, if the processing
is performed in order to take decisions relating to natural persons, and includes a
systematic evaluation with respect to natural persons based on automated processing, in
general, and profiling, in particular. Another focal case for a DPIA is if the processing is
on a large-scale and involves special categories of data (as defined in Article 9 GDPR).
4.5.9 Is collateral information collection a risk for the protec-
tion of the personal data?
It is clear from the above that the GDPR poses some well-defined requirements to
the social networking service providers, i.e., Facebook in our case, with regards to
the protection of users’ personal data. Several points, mostly concerning the legal
obligation of users as amateur data controllers, on the one hand are murky at best.
On the other hand the problem clearly converges when the personal data of users can
be transferred from one controller to the other, as from Facebook to an app provider,
without notifying the users (i.e., Article 5 GDPR) and without obtaining consent from
the user (i.e., Articles 6, 7 GDPR).
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With respect to the obligations of the data controller and processor to transparency,
app providers can become data controllers and processors of a user’s personal data,
without the user becoming aware of such data transfer (i.e., collateral information
collection). It should be noted that a Facebook user and their friends have insufficient
information on both the amount of data that will be collected and the purposes their
data will be used for by an app and its provider [291]. In other words, data collection
and processing go far beyond the user’s and their friends’ legitimate expectations and
interferes with the principle of transparency as per Article 5 GDPR.
Furthermore, considering the obligations of data controller and processor with regard
to consent, third-party apps on Facebook may collect and proceed to process a user’s
personal data without prior, informed and direct consent from the user themselves, that
is operating exclusively based on the consent provided by one of her friends. In other
words, consent can be given only by the user who installed the app (i.e., friend) and not
by the data subject (i.e., user) whose data is collected and processed. One might say
that Facebook app settings give the users control over their personal data to be handed
to apps by their friends via ticking the appropriate checkboxes in the sub-menu “Apps
Others Use”. Therefore, one could claim that consent has been theoretically given.
However, it should not be considered as valid as it is not informed. In fact, owing to
the default, pro-sharing privacy setting on Facebook (see Fig. 4.14), users are generally
unaware of the fact that they have to uncheck the boxes (actively opt out) in order to
prevent such data processing [126, 38]. This also goes against the concept of privacy
by default [85]. It is worth mentioning that in a relevant case in the U.S., the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) required that such apps cannot imply consent, but this should
be rather affirmatively expressed by users [125].
Finally, profiling is a separate concern on its own behalf; nevertheless, data fusion (a
technique partly constituting and greatly enabling profiling) has an amplifying effect
on collateral information collection (see Tab. 4.1). Moreover, this amplifying effect is
mutual. Therefore, data protection obligations of app providers offering multiple apps
are even more pronounced. As for all automated processing, especially if the outcome
of automated processing are decisions relating to data subjects (natural persons) by
the data processor, details about how and why the processing is done, and its potential
effects on the data subject should be given to the data subject. We have no examples
of this happening in the case of app providers or Facebook: we are not aware of any
systematic means (potentially with the technical help of the Facebook Developers
Platform[122]) where this information flow can be realised. To sum up, data fusion
potentially resulting in profiling may happen without any transparency and consent: the
data subject is simply not aware of such processing taking place. Another, intriguing
aspect of profiling is the obligation for the profiler to conduct a DPIA if the decision
based on profiling affect data subjects significantly and/or profiling is large-scale and
involves special categories of data. Given the popularity of certain apps and the type of
attributes collected a DPIA could be obligatory. Finally, the Article 29 Working Party
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identifies any “datasets that have been matched or combined, for example originating
from two or more data processing operations performed for different purposes and/or
by different data controllers in a way that would exceed the reasonable expectations of
the data subject” likely to result in a high risk; therefore any operations resulting in
such datasets should be covered by a DPIA [104].
4.6 Solutions to collateral information collection
In this section, we investigate the research question: how can we mitigate collateral
information collection? To answer this question, we propose a privacy dashboard
extension that aims at improving transparency and helping users to make informed
decisions about such information collection, while introducing a scoring computation
for evaluating the collateral information collection over the third-party applications
(apps) and third-party application providers (app providers). Moreover, we discuss
alternative solutions focusing on notification, access control mechanisms, cryptographic
solutions, on app auditing, and in particular on a Data Protection Impact Assessment
(DPIA) driven by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
4.6.1 Enhancing transparency with dashboard
Transparency Enhancing Technologies (TETs) [263, 331, 131], can support decision-
making processes by helping users to understand the problem and foster users’ control
by assisting them to make informed decisions [154, 209]. For instance, to take
action about the amount of information that may be affected by collateral information
collection. The increase of awareness on personal data collection is in line with the
legal principle of data protection by design and default (Articles 39 and 78 of the
GDPR [113]). Furthermore, driven by our questionnaire responses, there are evidences
that participants are not only concerned about the collateral information collection, but
they also want to be notified and restrict access to their personal data on Facebook. They
also consider removing the apps that can cause the collateral information collection.
In order to design a Transparency Enhancing Technology (TET) with regard to collateral
information collection, we need two main ingredients: 1) a quantitative measure
characterising the added exposure of profile attributes, and 2) a usable way to present
this information to the user. Fortunately, established methods for constructing both
ingredients are available in the literature [194, 293]. However, both the quantitative
metrics such as a privacy score and usable presentation schemes such as dashboards
are not yet tailored to the specifics of collateral information collection. In the following
section we demonstrate how to integrate our quantification mechanisms for collateral
information collection into these frameworks.
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Privacy Score
In a nutshell, we describe the premises to compute the Privacy Score (PS) for an
app (i.e., A j) and an app provider (i.e., Pj), as an indicator of the level of collateral
information collection. The higher the PS the more significant the threat for a user,
meaning that more personal data of the profile of a user (i.e., u) can be collected by an
A j and Pj. To compute the PS, Liu and Terzi [194] proposed a formula consisting of the
product of the visibility of a user’s profile attribute (i.e., ai) in an Online Social Network
(OSN) graph with its sensitivity that represents its perceived importance (weight). Our
PS computation formula represents the case of collateral information collection from
A js and Pjs in an OSN.
Sensitivity. We denote by S the set of different attribute weights in u’s profile, i.e.,
S = {σ1, . . . ,σn}. We consider σi for 1≤ i≤ n the number of different attribute weights
in u’s profile where {σi ∈Q|0≤ σi ≤ 1]}, i.e., ai is more sensitive than ai′ iff σi > σi′ ,
therefore,
σi =

1 if very sensitive,
0 if not sensitive,
0 < σi < 1 if in between,
(4.15)
for 1≤ i≤ n.
Privacy Score of u for A js. We denote by PSu,F
u
A the PS of u for all A js, where
{PSu,FuA ∈ Q| 0 ≤ PSu,F
u
A ≤ 1}, when A js can collect attributes from u’s profile in Fu,
i.e.,
PSu,F
u
A =
∑ni=1(σi×~Πu,F
u
A j )
|T | =
∑ni=1(σi×
∨
A∈Lu,Fu (~A
u,Fu
j [i]∧~Cu,F
u
A j [i]))
|T | . (4.16)
The complexity of evaluating Eqn. (4.16) for all f in Fu is O(n5×|Lu,Fu |).
Privacy Score of u for all Pj. We denote by PSu,F
u
P the PS of u for all Pjs, where
{PSu,FuP ∈Q|0 ≤ PSu,F
u
P ≤ 1]}, when Pjs can collect attributes from the u’s profile in
Fu, i.e.,
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PSuP =
∑ni=1
(
σi×~Πu,F
u
Pj
)
|T | =
∑ni=1
(
σi×∨P∈AP u,Fu (∨A j∈Pu,Fuj (~Au,Fuj [i]∧~Cu,FuA j [i])))
|T | .
(4.17)
The complexity of evaluating Eqn. (4.17) for all f in Fu is O(n5×|Pu,Fuj |× |AP u,F
u |).
Quantifying sensitivity. One way to measure and quantify the perceived sensitivity
of users is by running survey studies. Minkus et al. [217] measured the sensitivity
attributed to different privacy settings by Facebook users from a survey of 189
participants. They estimated how users perceive the importance of each privacy setting.
They identified variations of how sensitive each privacy permission is. For instance, the
permission “What personal information goes into apps others use?” is considered more
sensitive (i.e., σi = 2.82) than “Who can send you friend requests?” (i.e., σi = 1.09).4
Their sensitivity estimations, however, is slightly different from quantifying the
sensitivity of the attributes in our case. Although there is a relation between privacy
settings and attributes, there are no studies to identify the correlation between the
perceived sensitivity from a privacy setting to the set of attributes. Moreover, there
are no studies yet for measuring the sensitivity of the attributes collected by app / app
provider and neither for collateral information collection. Nevertheless, Minkus et
al. [217] provide us with sensible default sensitivity values; these can be then updated
by running a new survey (this is left for future work). Privacy-conscious users can then
adjust the sensitivity values on demand and dynamically.
A different promising direction for quantifying the sensitivity of attributes is by
demonstrating that attributes an app can collect before, during or after the installation.
This can be achieved through a privacy dashboard demonstrating all possible attributes
an app can collect during app installation with the help of authorisation dialogues [322].
4.6.2 Damage control: Privacy dashboard
To enhance transparency, several tools have been suggested [158, 175]; among these
privacy dashboard is a well established instrument [328]. For privacy dashboards,
several designs have been proposed [36, 130], with some of them specifically tailored
for Facebook [293, 46]. Within our work, we propose components that can be
used in existing dashboard designs [293, 36, 46], aiming to extend and enhance the
minimisation of data disclosure by the users for the collateral information collection
(see Fig. 4.17 for an initial user interface design).
4Note that, our proposed sensitivity values (i.e. σi) should be from 0≤ σi ≤ 1 and other evaluations of
σi can be scaled accordingly.
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Figure 4.17: Privacy dashboard: user interface concept.
Functional requirements. Transparency should be reflected by visualising the
personal data that can be disclosed to apps and app providers by the friends of a user
on Facebook. Specifically, the dashboard extension should demonstrate which app is
collecting which of the personal data of a user and through which friend. Moreover,
the dashboard extension should demonstrate the impact of data fusion via multiple
apps offered by a single app provider. The dashboard extension should provide all the
quantitative representations in a readable and understandable format. Orthogonal to
these issues, a user should be able to adjust the weights of sensitivity for her personal
profile attributes, as this should be reflected in the computation of the privacy score.
However, she should also be able to use the dashboard right away with reasonable
default weights.
Proposed design. Technically speaking, the proposed dashboard tools illustrate
how the data disclosure of a user takes place through the acquisition of the user’s
personal data via apps (and respective app providers) when installed by their Facebook
friends. It displays the nature and proportion of the user’s personal data that can
be collected by apps and, more importantly, by app providers. To better help
users to understand, the privacy metrics are visualised and the level of potential
information dissemination is represented by colour scale to indicate the level of
collateral information collection [153].
From our user opinion study, we have identified that Facebook users are more concerned
about certain types of personal information such as photos, videos, location, and
relationships [217]. Our dashboard can accommodate the visualisation of data fusion
and the degree of collateral information collection by assigning different weights
(sensitivity) to each attribute in the user’s profile. These weights can then be manually
fine-tuned by the user for an app and app provider.
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Dashboard technical limitations on Facebook. Implementing a privacy dash-
board on Facebook has several limitations. To identify which of the installed apps for a
user enable the collateral information collection, the list of apps needs to be retrieved
from Facebook. Currently, as the Facebook Application Programming Interface (API)
does not allow for inspecting the installed apps of a user, one way is by scraping
the app centre page. However, Facebook has designed their web interface to resist
high volume content retrieval. It is possible for a skilled developer to circumvent
this protection and to collect and identify which installed apps enable the collateral
information collection for a user. That can be automated but the task is far from trivial
for a non technically-savvy user (e.g., using Selenium [268]). The list of apps can
be retrieved while a user is logged in to her Facebook account. To identify which
friends have also installed similar apps, a scraping operation needs to be performed
for each page of an app. To identify apps that enable collateral information collection
and have been installed only by friends of a user, it needs all possible pages of apps to
be scraped and downloaded from the Facebook app centre; assuming that a developer
has a compilation of the majority of popular apps that enable collateral information
collection. Making the problem more complex, Facebook is susceptible to constant
changes: it updates the interface, the permissions, and the privacy settings regularly,
making the development of a dashboard cumbersome and with a need for continuous
modification.
Detailed design and implementation of the dashboard remain the next step in our
future work. Additional information such as claimed purpose of collection by the apps
can be added to the dashboard. Moreover, further functionality can be added to the
dashboard such as leading the users from the dashboard to uninstall the app, which
would strengthen compliance with the GDPR [113].
4.6.3 Alternative countermeasures
In this chapter, we discussed that TETs can support notification and facilitate direct
consent in order to comply with the GDPR [113]. Notification can be enhanced using
privacy nudges [326, 59] while direct consent with privacy authorisation dialogues for
apps [322, 338], and access control mechanisms [324, 164, 240] tailored to collateral
information collection. Considering privacy nudges, such an enhanced notification can
be provided in the following manner: a notice about the additional attributes that the
app provider will collect, a timer interface before the Facebook users clicks the “app
installation”, or even a “sentimental nudge” about collateral information collection
as bad practice. Furthermore, as standalone consent mechanisms, access controls
and authentication dialogues should be designed in the following manner: to provide
permissions for collateral information collection for both the friends and the users, and
to explicitly highlight such permissions while Facebook users install an app that enables
such information collection. Moreover, permissions should have a direct, one-to-one
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mapping to the attributes of the profile of a Facebook user, which is not the case for the
user_friends permission.
Additional to transparency solutions, other countermeasures to collateral information
collection can use cryptographic primitives to minimise or mitigate such indirect
information collection. Such solutions can help to better control the dissemination
of the information of Facebook users, providing strong privacy guarantees to the
users. For instance, flyByNight [196] and Scramble! [26] are utilising encryption
schemes to ensure confidentiality and integrity of messages exchanged among Facebook
users. However, encryption solutions on Facebook and other OSNs and are commonly
detected and blocked from their systems.
Considering Facebook, v2.x of the API has the potential to decrease both the likelihood
and the impact of collateral information collection. Apps using these API versions can
only see a shortened friend list for the installing user: those who have also installed the
app and granted the user_f riends permission. The app can gather profile attributes only
from users appearing in this friend list. While this is an API change we acknowledge,
it does not constitute a total solution. First, although it may considerably reduce the
risk of getting exposed to collateral information collection, those affected may still
suffer from exclusive collateral information collection: there could be some attributes
exclusively collected through friends and not directly. Second, since there are a plethora
of affected apps, the beneficial effect of the API change is not so pronounced for a user:
the probability of installing at least one app enabling exclusive collateral information
collection is still high. Third, this API change does not have any effect on multi-app
data fusion. Illustrating this through Table 4.1, the new API makes sure that the top
cells are nonempty sets, should the lower cells be nonempty sets as well.
Finally, a DPIA can be viewed more than just an obligation for high-risk data processing
operation: it can be also viewed as a legal countermeasure against privacy threats
with regard to collateral information collection. As DPIA is a process for building
and demonstrating compliance with GDPR, it can provide meaningful information
both to data protection authorities and concerned data subjects, thereby promoting
transparency and also trust. Moreover, for Facebook apps and app providers, a
qualitative DPIA can be augmented by a more quantitative privacy risk assessment
based on our proposed Privacy Score, which captures all traditional aspects of risk
computation (see Sect. 4.6.1). Such an enhanced DPIA promotes comparability over
different apps and app providers, and conveys more tangible information towards
users.
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4.7 Chapter summary
We conclude that collateral information collection poses a privacy threat for Facebook
users. In a nutshell, we presented a multi-faceted study concerning the collateral
information collection caused by third-party applications (apps) when installed by
the friends of a user on Facebook. Our main findings were the following. Using
a questionnaire, we showed that the vast majority of our participants were very
concerned and would like proper notification and control mechanisms regarding
collateral information collection. Also, they would like to restrict the apps accessing
the profile data of both the user and their friends, when their friends’ enable the
collateral information collection and vice versa. Running simulations for various
network topologies and app adoption models, we quantified the probability that a
Facebook user can be affected by the collateral information collection. Assuming an
app with more than 1 M users (such as TripAdvisor), there is an 80% probability for this
problem to appear. Employing real data from the Facebook third-party apps ecosystem,
we quantified the significance of collateral information collection by computing the
proportion of attributes collected by apps installed by the friends of a user. Based on
popular apps, we identified that almost half of the 207 apps that enable the collateral
information collection collected the photos of the friends of a user, with location
and work history being the second and third most popular attributes. Through the
prism of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), we investigate and conclude
that collateral information collection is likely to result in a risk for the protection of
the personal data of the Facebook users. The cause is the lack of transparency and
consent, the non-existence of privacy by default in Facebook’s privacy settings, and the
amplifying effect of data fusion and, potentially, profiling.
To mitigate the collateral information collection, we proposed solutions aiming at
enhancing transparency and increasing control of the information dissemination of
Facebook users through third-party apps. In particular and for enhancing transparency,
we proposed a privacy dashboard extension to enhance the existing privacy dashboard
designs when collateral information collection needs to be instantiated and quantified.
Such an enhancement can also help to empower the users’ decisions and enforce
restrictive actions if necessary. Moreover, we discuss alternative solutions, focusing on
notification and access control mechanisms, cryptographic countermeasures and app
auditing and in particular on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) driven by the
GDPR.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first one to report the potential user
profiling threat that could be posed by third-party application providers (app providers).
They can gain access to complementary subsets of personal data from user profiles
by offering multiple apps. Moreover, our study can serve as a guide for future apps,
software platforms, or permission systems such that, the interdependent aspects of
privacy can be directly taken into consideration in the design phase.
Part III
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5.1 Introduction
Car sharing demonstrates a high potential for users with the short-term, occasional and
dynamic use of cars [215]. As a combination of car rental and car ownership, cars can
be owned by private individuals or companies and shared to different users, potentially
unknown to car owners [6]. Traditional car sharing systems, even if they are extensively
used today [6, 215], may not be flexible enough regarding users’ convenience. For a
car owner to share a car, she (or another designated person) has to transfer the physical
key to the one who is going to use the car. Handing physical keys may not even be
feasible, in some cases.
In this work, we consider physical-Keyless car Sharing System (KSS), where a user
can use a car without the need of analogue physical keys. Such physical keys can be
replaced by digital keys on mobile devices such as smart phones, or tablets. Using
a mobile device as a key and in-vehicle telematics a user can access (i.e., lock and
unlock) and drive a car [234, 132, 52]. Moreover, with the use of mobile devices, users
can share their cars with others such as family members, friends [315, 320, 181, 64] or
even with people unknown to them, complicating the landscape of car sharing.
5.2 Security and privacy threats and functional
challenges
Despite the advantages, security and privacy play a crucial role in car sharing systems.
Security-wise, car sharing systems face physical objects being shared (cyber-physical
security issues [24]), digital platforms running on public cloud resources being
utilised (inheriting infrastructure security issues) and third-party financial providers
being integrated (e.g., attack on the financial provider of Uber [222]), among others.
Concerning the privacy angle, car sharing systems generate, control, process and
transfer large amounts of personal data [300, 78, 97]. Thus, new threats have emerged:
providers are able to track users via their transactions (e.g., in car sharing [101, 272]),
poorly managing privacy (see Fig. 5.1) and inferring additional sensitive information
such as religious beliefs [255] or even health-related information [137]. Sensitive
personal data are related to fundamental rights and freedoms, and merit protection
regarding the collection and processing by the data controllers, as it is articulated in
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [113].
Also, a car sharing system can introduce various other concerns with respect to
connectivity issues [88], car key revocations when a mobile device is stolen [143],
and the fact that malicious users can attempt to manipulate or even destroy potential
forensic evidence on a car or their devices. In short, the shared car is a mobile entity,
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Figure 5.1: Example of bad privacy practices of a car sharing company: Screen-shot
used as evidence for a speeding ticket report. The highlighted record corresponds to the
user and the period of car use, while several other users are visibly exposed. Together
with the name and client-ID (i.e., blurred left part), additional information is included
in the report such as the pick-up location, the type, the usage-cost and the period of
each listed user used a car.
and network connectivity with a physical-keyless car sharing system may not always be
established. Hence, sharing and accessing a car can become problematic for locations
with less reliable, or even limited network connectivity. Moreover, to access (unlock) a
car, the digital key may need to be stored in a mobile device of the owner. However,
the annual theft rate of mobile devices (e.g., smart phones), only in the U.S. exceeds
220 M with a rising tendency nowadays (in 2018) [278, 143]. Considering the fact that
a revocation and update operation of the digital key of cars should be performed on a
stolen or damaged device, this can be problematic for car owners. Such operations are
expensive in time and cost, as they are mainly performed on stations authorised by the
car manufacturer. Furthermore, as users have physical access to the shared car, they
may act maliciously and attempt to manipulate or even destroy the evidence stored
in the car or on their devices. However, in the case of disputes of car incidents, law
enforcement should be able to retrieve the information related to the shared car without
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violating the privacy of other users [113].
5.3 Contribution
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work that proposes a detailed design of
KSS and that extensively specifies the security and privacy threats of such a system.
Therefore, the main contributions of this chapter are the following:
• We propose a novel high level system model for a KSS that allows car owners
to use and share their car with others, unknown to them, by generating and
distributing access rights (e.g., authorisation access tokens). It uses digital keys
of cars and a fully-fledged system to provide such sharing possibilities. For the
analysis, we describe the entities involved, we define the functional requirements
for such a system and specify the required operations.
• We investigate the threats of such a system by performing an initial adversarial
analysis for each entity that is participating in the KSS. In order to comprehen-
sively examine the threats that can jeopardise the security of the system and the
privacy of its users, we use two frameworks namely STRIDE and LINDDUN,
respectively.
• Based on the threat analysis, we specify the security and privacy requirements
that need to be fulfilled, aiming to allow owners to use their cars as well as others
to book and share cars in a secure and privacy-preserving manner.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Sect. 5.4 describes the aim and
the methodology of the analysis of a KSS. Sect. 5.5 proposes a novel KSS, Sect. 5.6
analyses the security and privacy threats and Sect. 5.7 specifies countermeasures as
a set of security and privacy requirements tailored to the proposed system. Sect. 5.8
describes the key points of this chapter while Sect. 5.9 provides the summary of this
work and proposes the follow-up directions of the chapter.
5.4 Methodology for secure and privacy-preserving
system analysis
The aim of this work is to systematically perform an analysis of the KSS and to specify
the requirements that such a system needs to fulfil (see Fig. 5.2). The requirements can
be functional, to define how the system should operate, security related, to define how
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Figure 5.2: System analysis and specification of requirements corresponding to the
Secure-System Development Life Cycle (S-SDLC) stages.
the KSS should be designed to restrict adversaries aiming to exploit the operations of
the system and privacy related to define how the KSS should be designed to restrict
adversaries aiming to violate the privacy of the KSS users.
To analyse a KSS holistically and in a structured way, that is to specify the system model
(i.e., entities and operations) and identify the threats, we used the system engineering
approach (i.e., S-SDLC), as described in Sect. 1.5. In particular, we analyse the system
model and identify the entities involved in a KSS, meaning all the players in the system.
Moreover, by defining which functional requirements should be put in place, we specify
the minimal operations of such a system. Note that, since there was no physical-keyless
car sharing system described in the literature, several iterations of the system model,
the requirements and the threat analysis were performed until finalisation.
The entities of the KSS can threaten the system, holistically or its parts, by becoming
adversaries. The adversaries can, deliberately, try to exploit the vulnerabilities
of the KSS operations and harm the system. To identify such vulnerabilities, we
perform a comprehensive analysis of the threats (i.e., security and privacy) taking into
consideration the capabilities of the adversaries. For such analysis, we used relevant
threat-analysis frameworks (i.e., STRIDE and LINDDUN), as we describe in Sect. 5.6.
To mitigate the threats, it is essential that the outcome of the analysis results into
requirements (i.e., security and privacy) aiming to harden the KSS operations in a
secure and privacy-preserving manner, restricting the opportunities for any potential
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Figure 5.3: System model of physical-Keyless car Sharing System (KSS).
adversary to exploit the system.
5.5 High-level system model analysis
This section details the high-level system model and specifies the functional
requirements that the KSS should fulfil.
5.5.1 Entities involved
Our high-level system model for a KSS consists of the following entities (see Fig. 5.3).
Users. Users are individuals or companies, who are willing to share their cars (i.e.,
owners) or use cars that are available for sharing (i.e., consumers). Car owners can
provide consumers with permanent or temporary (on-demand) access to their cars. A
consumer can be anyone such as a family member, friend or even unknown to the
owner of a car.
Keyless car Sharing Management System (KSMS). The Keyless car Sharing
Management System (KSMS) is a server (or a set of servers) that manages the
operations of the KSS. It aims to provide administrative support such as (i) profile
management, i.e., cars and users registration, (ii) booking management, i.e., post/search
offers and requests, and car bookings, (iii) access provision management, i.e., assign,
update and revoke access rights for users to access and use cars, (iv) payment
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management, i.e., billing calculation and fee payment. Note that we will use physical-
keyless and keyless interchangeably throughout the text.
On-Board Unit (OBU). The On-Board Unit (OBU) is an embedded or standalone
hardware/software component. It is used for storing the digital key of the car and
performing critical operations related to sharing the car such as the authorisation of
users accessing the car. It is equipped with a wireless interface such as WiFi, Bluetooth,
Near-Field Communication (NFC) and Long-Term Evolution (LTE) communication.
Car Manufacturer (CM). The Car Manufacturer (CM) is a company that
manufactures cars. It provides the car and its owners with static physical and digital
keys (bound to the physical key) for their cars. It is also responsible for the generation,
distribution and revocation of the keys which are stored within the OBU of the car.
Keyless car Sharing Application (KSApp). The Keyless car Sharing Application
(KSApp) is a software application developed for mobile devices such as smart phones.
Users can interact with the KSMS via the KSApp application.
Mobile Device (MD). The Mobile Device (MD) is any mobile device such as
smart phone or tablet that can run the KSApp. It is equipped with a wireless interface
such as WiFi, Bluetooth, NFC and LTE. It is noteworthy to stress that while MDs are
becoming powerful, none of them still have unlimited memory, processing power and
battery capacity.
Authorities. Authorities are government agencies that are responsible for managing
information about cars and their owners. Their aim is to administrate records for
car ownership, blacklists of stolen cars, safety certificates of cars, driving licence
certificates of users and to perform forensic investigations of car incidents.
Third Parties (TPs). Third Parties (TPs) are any organisations, institutions or
companies that may be interested in the data generated by the KSMS, such as insurance
companies.
5.5.2 Functional requirements
In order to be acceptable to the KSS users, our proposed system model should satisfy
the following Functional Requirements (FRs).
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• FR1. Users should be able to share their cars with other users. In detail, a
car owner and a consumer should be able to (i) create (register), update and
withdraw a profile, (ii) post car sharing offers and requests, (iii) search for offers
and requests, (iv) accept (i.e., booking) or rejects requests, (v) use the KSApp
on her MD to access a car, (vi) pay (be paid) for using (sharing) a car and (viii)
assign/receive reputation scores to/from other users.
• FR2. An owner should be able to (i) generate, update, distribute and revoke
(temporary) authorisation access tokens to the selected consumers, (ii) update
and revoke (temporary) digital keys to lock/unlock and drive her car, (iii) retrieve
the drop-off location of the car, and (v) report to KSMS when the car is not
returned and/or stolen, and determine the location of the car with the help of he
KSMS and authorities.
• FR3. A consumer should be able to (i) book a car, (ii) receive an authorisation
access tokens (temporary) for the car, and (iii) retrieve the pickup location of the
car.
• FR4. The KSMS should be able to (i) validate the identity of users and their
driving licences, (ii) validate the profile information of cars, ownership and
safety conditions, (iii) manage the users’ profile access, search, update and
withdrawal, (iii) post and inquire car sharing offers, requests and bookings, (iv)
generate, distribute, update and revoke digital keys to cars and users, and (v)
generate, distribute, update and revoke authorisation access tokens to the selected
consumers.
• FR5. The MD should not perform computationally intensive operations as most
of MDs are resource-constrained devices.
• FR6. The OBU should perform all the necessary operations (e.g., cryptographic)
to authenticate and allow the selected users (i.e., consumers) to access the
reserved cars.
5.5.3 System model specification of operations
For the FRs of the system, the specifications of all operations that a KSS should provide
are described next (see Fig. 5.4).
A. KSMS operational management. Operations that the KSMS needs to
perform.
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A.1 System Setup. In technical terms, the KSMS performs all the necessary steps
to offer the car sharing service such as system setup and network configuration. From an
administration perspective, it specifies the servers involved and enables the interaction
with the authorities, the CMs and TPs.
A.2 KSMS management. KSMS manages all or a part of the operations of the
KSS, including management of the profile of users and cars, the booking management,
the car access provision management, the billing-payment management and the
reputation-scores management.
B. Users and cars profile management. Operations of the profile management
of users and cars such as the registration and account management.
B.1 Registration of users and cars. A user provides to the KSMS all of the
necessary information for the service registration such as an email address, a proof of
her identity (e.g., passport, identity card), and her driving licence. Moreover, an owner
of a car provides the KSMS with all the necessary information for registering her car
such as the type, model, colour, engine power and certificates. The KSMS can also
communicate with the authorities and the insurance companies (i.e., third parties) for
completing and verifying the validity of the information provided by the owner and her
car.
B.2 Users and cars operational management. A user can access, store, update
or delete her profile information on the KSMS via the KSApp on her MD such as
her username, age, contact details and friends. For stolen cars, the car owner can
communicate with the KSMS to revoke the digital key of her car, stored in OBU, using
her MD-KSApp. The KSMS then is responsible for revoking (and re-issuing) such a
digital key for cars by communicating with the CM.
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Figure 5.4: Specification of operations for a KSS.
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C. Sharing operational management. Operations related to car sharing such as
booking, using and paying for a car, are performed in distinct phases i.e., pre-sharing,
sharing, post-sharing respectively.
C.1 Pre-sharing phase. Takes place before a car is shared.
C.1.1 Booking management. Users communicate with the KSMS using their
KSApps on their MDs for the operations of posting, searching and booking a car.
• Post car sharing offers and requests An owner (consumer) post a car sharing
offer (request) which includes: her profile data, the requesting (offering) price of
sharing, the (preferred) pickup and drop-off location, the availability (preferred)
period, and the (preferred) profile data of her (a) car.
• Search for offers and requests Users send inquiries for the available offers or
requests to KSMS.
• Accept (i.e., booking) or rejects requests If a user is interested in booking a car,
the following operations are performed: (i) a consumer submits a request to book
the car, (ii) the owner receives one or more requests for the car and (iii) the owner
accepts one of the requests notifying the selected consumer or rejects all of the
requests.
C.1.2 Access provision management. The KSMS provides all of the necessary
actions for car access provision. In short, the MD-KSApp of an owner assigns
access rights to the selected consumer and the car tailored to the pre-agreed booking
period. Such car access provision can be realised by an authorisation access token and
cryptographic operations over such a token. Both the MD-KSApp of the consumer
and the OBU receive the authorisation access token which can be used to (temporarily)
access the car. For “misbehaving” consumers, the car owner can update and revoke on
demand the access token using the entities of the KSS such as her MD-KSApp and the
KSMS.
C.2 Car sharing phase. Takes place while a car is shared.
C.2.1 Check-in. The selected consumer uses the received authorisation token to
access the car using her MD-KSApp.
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C.2.2 Using the car. The OBU of the car monitors and (continuously) verifies
whether the shared-car satisfies the pre-agreed booking conditions. For instance, it
verifies whether the car is within the pre-agreed booking period, distance covered and
region of travelling.
C.2.3 Check-out and billing. After car use by a consumer, the car can be used
again by another user such as the owner or another consumer. The OBU of the car
and/or the consumer via her MD-KSApp, notifies the KSMS and/or the MD-KSApp of
the owner for the time and drop-off location of the car. Then, the KSMS computes the
cost of using the car considering the initial booking information and the actual sharing
period.
C.3 Post-sharing phase. Takes place after a car is shared.
C.3.1 Payment management. The consumer pays the owner the fee for using the
car with the assistance of the KSMS.
C.3.2 Reputation scores management. The owner (consumer) of the car
assigns/receives a reputation score for sharing (using) a car with the assistance of
the KSMS.
5.6 Threat analysis
This section provides an extensive and structured analysis of the security and privacy
threats of the proposed KSS model. It describes the adversarial model for each entity
of the KSS in detail. Based on the adversaries and the operations specified, we identify
the threats that can harm the security of the system and privacy of users.
5.6.1 Adversaries
Every KSS entity can be realised into a broad spectrum of adversarial models [84, 55].
In a nutshell, adversaries can be passive adversaries, meaning that they aim to collect
and extract information exchanged within the system without violating the protocol [55].
An entity can be an active adversary where it uses an arsenal of attacks and deliberately
aims, by all possible means, to break or extract information from the system.
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For each entity, we consider the following levels of adversarial activity that the KSS
should be able to confront.
Users are passive or active adversaries. A malicious user can try to passively
and/or actively manipulate the information exchanged with and stored within the KSS.
For instance in an attempt to gain financial benefits or lower the credibility of the
system, an adversary can try to extract, collect or alter the availability period, location
and profile information (e.g., type, and the number of seats) of a car targeting the
KSS users or the system itself. Such adversaries can vary from sophisticated hackers,
to organised crime or even to governmental agencies. Depending on the resources
and capabilities, an adversary can try to corrupt any set of users or other entities (i.e.,
KSMS) of the KSS. However, we assume that adversaries are not able to break the
underlying cryptographic primitives.
OBU is tamper-proof and tamper-evident. An adversary can try to attack the
OBU of a car, aiming to retrieve the cryptographic keys or to collect the personal
data of passengers during sharing. For the personal data of passengers, it can try
to collect the location history of cars and the driving behaviour of passengers [306].
We assume that an OBU is equipped with tamper-resistant mechanisms such as a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [312, 259], that can safely store cryptographic keys,
perform cryptographic operations and validate software updates [231]. Moreover, an
OBU needs to be tamper-evident [282] aiming to detect and keep irrefutable evidence
when an adversary attempts to break or alter the hardware and software components
of the device. We also assume that the KSMS and the CM(s) patch the software
bugs [296, 201] regularly in order to preclude intrusive attacks [82, 216], which can
threaten the passengers’ safety [295].
MD-KSApp is untrustworthy but tamper-proof and tamper-evident. We
assume that only the legitimate user of a MD-KSApp can access the KSS through the
device using entity authentication mechanisms. The MD-KSApp should be equipped
with security mechanisms to provide protection against unauthorised access, data
breaches and malware. For instance, a MD-KSApp should be equipped with a credential
management mechanisms, such as keychain tools [174], that can be used to authenticate
users, encrypt data and store private keys, passwords and certificates in a secure manner.
The MD-KSApp should also record, in a tamper-evident way, attempts of adversaries
to disturb the operations of the MD and the KSApp.
KSMS and CM can be passive or active adversaries. The KSMS and/or the
CM can try to learn and extract information about the KSS acting as honest-but-curious
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adversaries. They can try to extract information about the booking preferences of
users, with whom an owner is sharing her car, and with which frequency. Advancing to
active adversaries, the KSMS and/or the CM can try to disturb the functionality of the
KSS. For instance, they can try to collect the information exchanged within the KSS or
execute only a fraction of operations honestly. However, we assume that they are not
able to break the underlying cryptographic primitives.
Authorities, third parties and any external entity can be passive or active
adversaries. They can try to eavesdrop and collect information exchanged within the
KSS. Their aim can be to gain access to, collect and/or modify information exchanged
within the KSS in an attempt to disrupt and extract information from the users and the
KSS. Adversaries can be sophisticated hackers, organised crime or even governmental
agencies that can be capable of taking control of a fixed set of users or any user of a
KSS. However, we assume that such adversaries are not able to break the underlying
cryptographic primitives.
5.6.2 Security and privacy threat analysis
This section analyses the threats to a KSS. The threat analysis is based on the STRIDE
and LINDDUN frameworks.
Security threats
The STRIDE framework describes the security threats in six main classes, i.e., spoofing,
tampering with data, repudiation, information disclosure, denial-of-service, and
elevation of privilege.
Spoofing. An adversary can attempt to illegally access a legitimate entity of a KSS
such as the MD-KSApp or the KSMS. Spoofing attacks introduce functional and
trust related issues and may have an economic impact on the KSS. For instance, an
adversary can try to gain a competitive advantage for a booking request to be accepted
by impersonating a trusted (for the car owner) consumer such as a family member, a
friend or an acquaintance. Regarding the economic implications, an adversary can
attempt to benefit from making an impersonated profile to pay for the car she booked
and used. Therefore, it is essential to have thorough user registration procedures and
strong entity authentication mechanisms.
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Tampering with data. An adversary can attempt to modify the information
provided by and exchanged within the KSS such as manipulating the booking’s
availability period, location and profile information (e.g., type, number of seats) of a
car. For instance, an adversary can try to alter the travel duration and distance covered
by the shared-car aiming to affect the cost. By stating inaccurate information, an
adversary can attempt to gain financial advantages and lower the credibility of users
and the KSMS. Therefore, the integrity and authenticity of the messages and stored
information should be guaranteed.
Repudiation. Disputes can arise when entities (do not) perform an action while
stating the contrary such as by claiming inaccurate information about the travelling
period and location of the car. Hence, the non-repudiation of messages exchanged and
actions performed must be guaranteed and disputes must be consistently resolved.
Information disclosure. An adversary can attempt to eavesdrop messages sent
through the KSS. By eavesdropping messages exchanged among the KSMS, the MD-
KSApps of users, and the OBUs of cars, an adversary can attempt to retrieve critical
information about the system. For instance, it can try to retrieve the access token, the
booking details and the location of a car. By collecting such information, an adversary
may aim to reuse the valid messages (i.e., authorisation access token) and digital key
obtained to access a car, impersonating a legitimate user. Hence, confidentiality of
information must be guaranteed. Moreover, information disclosure also constitutes a
privacy threat to users posing additional risks, such as profiling of a user.
Denial-of-Service (DoS). Denial-of-service attack (DoS) aims to make car sharing
services unavailiable to a single or a set of multiple users. For the KSS, an adversary
can attempt to make any KSS operation unavailable to its users such as to post
offers/requests, and to generate, distribute and revoke digital keys to access a car,
by blocking the MD-KSApp of users, the KSMS, and the OBU of cars. Moreover, an
adversary can try to perform an attack manually targeted to specific users. For instance,
an adversary can attempt to gain competitive advantages by blocking offers from other
users. Therefore, the KSMS should be safeguarded with network security tools, while
the MD-KSApp of users and OBU of cars should be protected from malware using
software security tools.
Elevation of privilege. An adversary can attempt to gain elevated access to the
resources of the KSS. For instance, an elevated access can imply that an adversary
can attempt to elevate her profile privileges from (i) consumer to car owner gaining
unlimited access to a car, and (ii) from passenger to car driver. Moreover, an escalated
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privilege at KSMS incurs that an adversary can attempt to execute operations as
a system administrator aiming to retrieve information of users, alter car sharing
offers/requests and bookings. In order to mitigate privilege escalation attacks,
authorisation and access control mechanisms that comply with the principle of least
privilege for processes and accounts of users should be deployed.
Privacy threats.
The LINDDUN framework describes the privacy threats in seven main classes,
i.e., linkability, identifiability, non-repudiation, detectability, information disclosure,
content unawareness and policy and consent noncompliance.
Linkability. An adversary can attempt to distinguish whether two or more Items of
Interest (IOI) such as messages, actions and subjects are related to the same user. For
instance, an adversary can try to correlate and deduce whether a user posted a car
sharing request, booked a car, and drove to a particular location. Hence, unlikability
among IOI must be guaranteed.
Identifiability. An adversary can attempt to correlate and identify a user from
messages exchanged and actions performed. For instance, an adversary can try to
identify a user by analysing the messages the user exchanged with the OBU, KSMS
and MD-KSApp to access a car. Thus, the anonymity and pseudonymity of users must
be preserved.
Non-repudiation. In contrast to security, non-repudiation can be used against the
privacy of users. An adversary can attempt to collect evidence provided and exchanged
through the KSMS and the OBU of cars aiming to deduce information about a user. It
may, for example, deduce whether a user drove to a particular location (e.g., clinic).
Hence, plausible deniability must be guaranteed.
Detectability. An adversary can try to distinguish the type of IOI such as messages
exchanged among the KSS entities from random noise. For instance, an adversary can
attempt to identify when the MD-KSApp of a user communicates with a KSMS and
the OBU of cars. Thus, undetectability and unobservability of IOI must be guaranteed.
Information disclosure. An adversary can attempt to eavesdrop and collect
information exchanged within the KSS. Information disclosure can affect not only
THREAT ANALYSIS 109
the security of the system but can also lead to privacy issues of users through
profiling [199, 109, 101]. For instance, an adversary can attempt to learn the location
and availability of a car, whether a user is absent from home and with whom a
user is travelling with. Moreover, the behaviour of users may be inferred by a
systematic collection and automated processing of the personal data of users by an
adversary [306, 101]. For instance, an adversary may infer the (i) sharing preferences
of a car owner by collecting information about their sharing patterns such as rental
time, duration, and car location, (ii) free time activities of consumers by analysing
the history of the pickup, drop-off, and drive locations, and (iii) circles of friends by
analysing with whom, when and how often they share their cars, such as to family
members, friends and acquaintances. An adversary can even attempt to infer sensitive
information about users such as their health condition, by identifying users who use
cars for disabled people, or regular visits to hospitals. Profiling constitutes a high risk
for the privacy of users [109]. Therefore, the confidentiality of information must be
guaranteed.
Content Unawareness. An adversarial KSS can attempt to collect more informa-
tion than necessary about their users, violating the principle of proportionality [113]
and explicit consent by the users [110]. For instance, it can use the personal data of
users for unauthorised purposes such as advertisement and monetising the collected
data with data brokers [267]. In contrast, the KSMS may only need to know about the
eligibility of a user to drive a car without the need to collect other personal information
such as date of birth, gender and the issuing country of the driving licence. In another
example, the location of the car can be revealed only when necessary such as upon
a misbehaving consumer exceeding the geographical restrictions agreed during the
booking or when a car is not returned on time. Hence, transparency and awareness on
the information dissemination of users must be guaranteed.
Policy and Consent Noncompliance. An adversarial KSS can attempt to collect,
store, and process personal information of users in contrast to the principles described
in the GDPR [113, 103]. For instance, an adversarial KSMS can attempt to (i) collect
sensitive information about users such as sexual orientation and religion beliefs [255],
(ii) export information about their users to data brokers for revenue [49], (iii) read
contacts of their friends from their MDs and their Online Social Network (OSN) profiles
(e.g., Facebook or Google+) [42, 290] for advertisement reasons, and (iv) not allow
users to opt-out from the KSS service [113, 103]. An adversarial KSS can also attempt
not to comply with the privacy policy that it advertises.
110 PHYSICAL-KEYLESS CAR SHARING SYSTEMS
5.7 Security and privacy requirements
Based on the threat analysis, this section specifies a set of Security Requirements (SRs)
and Privacy Requirements (PRs) for the proposed KSS to mitigate the identified threats.
Security requirements
To mitigate the security threats of Sect. 5.6, security measures need to be applied aiming
to protect the messages exchanged, actions performed and information stored within
the KSS. The relevant countermeasures are entity authentication, data authentication,
non-repudiation, confidentiality, availability, and authorisation defined by the STRIDE
framework, as high-level solutions.
• SR1 – Entity Authentication. It assures to an entity (e.g., KSMS or OBU)
that the identity of a second entity (e.g., owner or consumer) is the one that is
claiming to be. It aims to mitigate spoofing attacks. Entity authentication is
achieved when a user proves that (i) she knows something such as passwords, (ii)
possesses something such as an access token, a ticket and a specific device, (iii)
has specific properties (i.e., use of biometrics), or (iv) a combination of those.
Regarding the use of passwords, it is important for the KSS to support strong
password policies, and that passwords are sent in an encrypted form and stored
always as salted hashes within the KSS databases.
• SR2 – Data Authentication. It ensures that the information stored and
exchanged within the KSS is authentic. For instance, such information can
the booking details, the (temporal) authorisation access tokens, the digital keys
and the profile of the entities involved (e.g., users and cars). It aims to mitigate
tampering with data attacks. Data authentication is achieved with the use of
integrity tools such as Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms [247]
and digital signatures [256].
• SR3 – Non-repudiation. It is achieved when an entity (e.g., owner or consumer)
is technically not able to refuse an action or transaction performed. It provides
protection against false denial of origin, receipt, submission and delivery of a
message [340]. For instance, a user cannot deny that she posted an offer, agreed
to book a car, accessed a car, drove to a particular location and paid for using a
car. It aims to mitigate repudiation attacks (i.e., disputes). Non-repudiation can
be achieved with the use of digital signatures and audit trails.
• SR4 – Confidentiality. It ensures that only the intended users will be able to
read the information stored and transferred within the KSS. It aims to mitigate
information disclosure attacks. For instance, confidentiality of the information
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exchanged needs to be guaranteed while the MD-KSApp, the OBU and the
KSMS are communicating interchangeably. Confidentiality can be achieved with
cryptographic tools such as symmetric [71], asymmetric [188] and homomorphic
encryption schemes [136]. Confidentiality can also be combined with MAC
algorithms when authenticated encryption is used [247].
• SR5 – Availability. It ensures that the resources of the KSS are available to
legitimate users. It aims to mitigate DoS attacks. To safeguard availability,
network tools need to be applied such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems
and Intrusion Prevention Systems. To protect the MD-KSApp of users and the
OBU of cars, software security tools are necessary such as anti-malware tools.
• SR6 – Authorisation. It ensures that an entity has the access rights to read,
write, and execute a set of resources of the KSS such as files and operations.
It aims to mitigate elevation of privilege attacks. For authorisation, access
control mechanisms need to be used such as Access-Control Lists (ACLs), or
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) mechanisms [266]. Moreover, the access
control policies should follow the principle of least privilege for user accounts
and processes.
Privacy requirements
To mitigate the privacy threats listed in Sect. 5.6, Privacy Enhancing Technologies
(PETs) and Transparency Enhancing Technologies (TETs) need to be deployed aiming
to safeguard and protect the personal data of users which will be exchanged, processed
and stored within the KSS. The countermeasures relevant to privacy-threats are
unlinkability, anonymity, pseudonymity, plausible deniability, undetectability and
unobservability, confidentiality, content awareness, and policy and consent compliance
defined by the LINDDUN framework, as high-level solutions.
• PR1 – Unlinkability. It ensures that two or more IOI such as messages
exchanged and actions performed within the KSS, cannot be linked to the same
user [245]. It aims to mitigate linkability attacks. Unlinkability can be achieved
with the use of pseudonyms [225], anonymous credentials [50] and private
information retrieval [22].
• PR2 – Anonymity. It ensures that messages exchanged and actions performed
cannot be correlated to the identity of a single user, within the KSS. It aims to
mitigate identifiability attacks. Anonymity can be achieved using Mix-nets [58],
anonymous communication channels [308] and Secure Multiparty Computation
(MPC) [68].
112 PHYSICAL-KEYLESS CAR SHARING SYSTEMS
• PR3 – Pseudonymity. It ensures that pseudonyms are used instead of the
real identities of the KSS users. Considering anonymity, it aims to mitigate
identifiability attacks. Pseudonymity can be achieved by using Pseudo-Random
Function (PRF) [166] that can generate random identifiers [32].
• PR4 – Plausible deniability. Unlike non-repudiation, it ensures that an
adversarial entity is not able to trace and prove that a user has performed a
specific action or operation such as driving to a particular location or booking
a car for a selected period. It aims to mitigate non-repudiation privacy threats.
Plausible deniability is achieved with the use of off-the-record messaging [41].
In distinctive cases and in the contrary to plausible deniability, the security
requirement of non-repudiation should be provided by the KSS such as upon
legal requests for car incidents. In short, there should be mechanisms to identify
an action performed, a message sent or a specific user of the KSS upon a specific
(abusive) incident and a corresponding legal request. However, it should be
performed without violating the data protection rights of other KSS users or even
the same user and for other (sharing) operations [113].
• PR5 – Undetectability and unobservability. It ensures that the messages
exchanged and the actions performed cannot be distinguished from others by an
adversary. Essentially, an adversary observes only noise and cannot extract any
meaningful information by monitoring the traffic of the KSS. It aims to mitigate
detectability attacks. Undetectability and unobservability can be achieved with
the use of Mix-nets [56] and dummy traffic [58].
• PR6 – Confidentiality. Apart from security, confidentiality is also an important
privacy requirement for the information provided by and exchanged within the
KSS. It can be achieved using authenticated encryption [31], MPC [68] and
private information searches [60].
• PR7 – Content Awareness. It aims to raise the awareness of users by better
informing them on the amount and quality of the submitted information within
the KSS. It aims to mitigate the content unawareness privacy threats. Content
awareness can be achieved with the use of TETs such as privacy nudges [325],
privacy dashboards [290, 228] and privacy risk metrics [193].
• PR8 – Policy and consent compliance. It aims to ensure the compliance of
the KSS under the existing data protection legislation such as the GDPR [113].
Compliance should be achieved in advance and before users access and use such
a system. It aims to mitigate the policy and consent non-compliance privacy
threat. Policy and consent compliance can be achieved with the use of Data
Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) [107, 337] of the KSS.
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5.8 Observations and key points
Although a KSS can provide benefits for users, it can also introduce several security
and privacy issues. Concerning security, one of the most challenging tasks is the access
provision management such as generation, distribution and revocation of (temporary)
digital keys and authorisation access tokens for a car. The desired properties of such
operations should be user, car and period specific. In short, the (temporary) digital
keys and access tokens should be valid for only (i) the selected users (i.e., owner and
consumers), (ii) the selected car, and (iii) the agreed period of sharing the car (i.e.,
booking). There are threats that can be mitigated by using techniques such as end-to-
end encryption, MAC algorithms and digital signatures. However, it is important to
ensure that this solution is under control of multiple parties. The owner, consumers,
the car and the KSMS should be all involved in the generation and distribution process
of these digital keys. Thus, any single party should not be able to generate the access
keys and potentially abuse the system. Advanced cryptographic technologies such as
MPC, homomorphic encryption and distributed ledgers can be used to achieve these
properties.
Regarding privacy issues, protecting the users of KSS against authorised insiders such
as the KSMS, is probably the most challenging task. A curious KSMS may be able
to infer personal data about users by analysing (i) the booking history of consumers
such as the type of cars, manufacturers and engine power, (ii) the sharing history of car
owners such as the rental time, duration and car location history, and the (iii) friends
circles of users by analysing how often and with whom an owner (consumer) share
(use) a car such as to (with) family members, friends, acquaintances or even with
people unknown to them. These privacy concerns call for PETs solutions to be used
in the KSS. An example of cost-effective and commonly used PETs are pseudonyms,
MPC and anonymity systems such as Tor.
Considering the system’s performance, a KSS should be able to execute the necessary
operations aiming to provide users with a “good” service level. Among various
cryptographic possibilities, designing such a system should take into consideration
performance constraints such as the communication and computational costs of the
existing mechanisms. In order to satisfy all the requirements, the protocol designers
should find the “right” balance between the system’s security and users’ privacy in
combination with the KSS functionality.
5.9 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we presented a novel physical-keyless car sharing system that allows
users to share their cars with others more conveniently. First, we devised a high-level
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model, we described the functional requirements and defined the operations that need
to be provided by such a system. Based on this model and considering the STRIDE
and LINDDUN frameworks as a reference, we performed a comprehensive security
and privacy threat analysis, respectively. Finally, to mitigate the identified threats, we
specified a set of security and privacy requirements for such systems.
Follow-up directions. As a follow-up work to KSS analysis, we aim to design,
implement and evaluate a protocol for car access provision.
Chapter 6
SePCAR: A Secure and
privacy-enhancing protocol
for car access provision
Publication Data: I. Symeonidis, A. Aly, M. A. Mustafa, B. Mennink, S. Dhooghe,
and B. Preneel, ”SePCAR: A Secure and Privacy-Enhancing Protocol for Car
Access Provision,” In 22nd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
(ESORICS 2017), Lecture Notes in Computer Science 10493, S. N. Foley, D. Gollmann,
and E. Snekkenes (eds.), Springer-Verlag, pp. 475–493, 2017.
Contributions: Main author except for the security proofs (Sect. 6.5) and the
performance evaluation (Sect. 6.6).
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present an efficient secure and privacy-enhancing protocol for car
access provision, named SePCAR. The protocol is fully decentralised and allows
users to share their cars conveniently without sacrificing their security and privacy.
It provides a generation, update, revocation, and distribution mechanisms for access
tokens to shared cars, as well as procedures to resolve disputes and to deal with law
enforcement requests, for instance in the case of car incidents. We prove that SePCAR
meets its appropriate security and privacy requirements and that it is efficient: our
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practical efficiency analysis through a proof-of-concept implementation shows that
SePCAR takes only 1.55 seconds for a car access provision.
6.1.1 Straw-man arguments
A way to mitigate the security and privacy concerns is to implement a peer-to-peer
protocol between both users and cars. The car owner can generate a temporary access
token for her car using the car key and distribute it to the other user, the consumer, who
can use the token to access the car. This approach has two main limitations: (i) the
owner and the consumer may not trust each other, thus affecting the accountability of
the system, and (ii) the owner has to have a copy of the car key on her personal device
which is prone to get lost or stolen. These limitations can be overcome by having a
centralised entity to generate the access token on behalf of the car owner. However,
such a centralised entity will have to be fully trusted by both users, which might not be
realistic under real-world scenarios. It can jeopardise the users’ privacy as it will have
access to booking details of users and car keys.
6.1.2 Our contributions
We design a concrete and fully decentralised secure and privacy-enhancing protocol
for car access provision, named SePCAR. The protocol provides generation and
distribution of access tokens for car access provision, as well as update and revocation
operations to facilitate mutually agreed modifications of the booking details and
protecting against misbehaving consumers, respectively. It internally uses secure
multiparty computation to facilitate forensic evidence provision in the case of car
incidents or at the request of law enforcement. SePCAR is described in detail in
Sect. 6.4.
We prove that the protocol fulfils the desired security and privacy requirements. First,
departing from Chapter 5, we give a detailed list of security and privacy requirements
in Sect. 6.2. Then, in Sect. 6.5, we prove that SePCAR meets its security and privacy
requirements as long as its underlying cryptographic primitives (listed in Sect. 6.3)
are secure. Our theoretical complexity and practical efficiency analysis in Sect. 6.6
demonstrates SePCAR’s competitiveness. In particular, we implemented a prototype
as a proof-of-concept in C and we achieved a car access provision in ≈ 1.55 seconds.
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Figure 6.1: System model of a physical-Keyless car Sharing System (KSS) [288].
6.2 System model and requirements
We describe the system model and functionalities of a physical-Keyless car Sharing
System (KSS). Moreover, we specify the threat model, the security, privacy and
functional requirements which it needs to satisfy, and our assumptions about the
system.
6.2.1 System model
We follow the KSS system model of Chapter 5 (see also Fig. 6.1). Users are individuals
who are willing to share their cars, owners (uo), and use cars which are available
for sharing, consumers (uc); both use of Mobile Devices (MDs) such as smart
phones. An On-Board Unit (OBU) is an embedded or a standalone hardware/software
component [171] that is part of the secure access management system of a car. It has
a wireless interface such as Bluetooth, Near-Field Communication (NFC) or Long-
Term Evolution (LTE) communication. The Car Manufacturer (CM) is responsible
for generating and embedding a digital-key into each car. These keys are used for car
sharing and are stored in the manufacturers’ Data Base (DB). The Keyless car Sharing
Management System (KSMS) is a set of Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) servers
that assists owners with car access token generation, distribution, update and revocation.
Each server individually retrieves its share of the car key, Kcar, and the servers jointly
encrypt the booking details, MB, to generate an access token, AT car. The access token
is published on a Public Ledger (PL), which serves as a public bulletin board that
guarantees the integrity of the data [212]. While a bulletin board PL can be part of the
KSMS, we will refer to them distinctively from one to another for improved readability
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of the protocol description (SePCAR). The booking details are typically agreed upon
by owner and consumer prior to the beginning of the protocol.
6.2.2 Threat model
Within the KSS, the KSMS, the CM and the PL are considered honest-but-curious
entities. They will perform the protocol honestly, but they are curious to extract
private information about users. Owners are passive adversaries while consumers and
outsiders are malicious. The OBU of a car is trusted and equipped with a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) [312, 259] that supports secure key storage and cryptographic
operations such as symmetric and public key encryption, following the EVITA [116,
336] and PRESERVE [248, 243] specifications. The MD of users are untrusted as they
can get stolen, lost or broken.
6.2.3 Protocol design requirements
The keyless car sharing system should satisfy the following Security Requirements
(SRs), Privacy Requirements (PRs) and Functional Requirements (FRs). Here, we
recall that MB refers to the booking details, AT car the access token to the car and Kcar
the car key. Note that a high-level description of the requirements was presented at
Chapter 5.
• SR1 – Confidentiality of MB. No one but the shared car, uo and uc should have
access to MB.
• SR2 – Authenticity of MB. The shared car should verify the origin and integrity
of MB from uo.
• SR3 – Confidentiality of AT car. No one but the shared car and uc should have
access to AT car.
• SR4 – Confidentiality of Kcar. No one but the shared car and the CM should
have access to Kcar.
• SR5 – Backward and forward secrecy of AT car. Compromise of a key used
to encrypt any AT car should not compromise other tokens (future and past)
published on the PL of any honest uc.
• SR6 – Non-repudiation of origin of AT car. The uo should not be able to deny
it has agreed to the terms of MB, and participated in providing the respective
AT car.
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• SR7 – Non-repudiation of delivery of AT car. The uc should not be able to deny
it has obtained and used the AT car to open the car (once she has done so).
• PR1 – Unlinkability of uc and the car. No one but the shared car, uo and uc
should be able to link two booking requests of the same uc for the car.
• PR2 – Anonymity of uc and the car. No one but the shared car, uo and uc
should learn the identity of uc and the car.
• PR3 – Undetectability of AT car operation. No one but the shared car, uo and
uc (if necessary) should be able to distinguish between AT car generation, update
and revocation.
• PR4 – Forensic evidence provision. The KSMS should be able to provide
authorities with the transaction details of an access provision to a car at the
request of law enforcement without violating the other users’ privacy.
• FR1 – Offline authentication. Access provision should be provided for
locations where cars have limited (or no) network connection.
6.2.4 Assumptions
For SePCAR, we assume that before every car access provision, the booking details
are agreed upon by owner and consumer, but that both keep these booking details
confidential against external parties. SePCAR relies on a Public-Key Infrastructure
(PKI) [248], and we assume that each entity has her private/public key pair with
their corresponding digital certificates. The communication channels are secure and
authenticated among entities using SSL/TLS [86] and NFC [17]. The OBU is equipped
with a TPM [312, 259], and it is designed to resist deliberate or accidental physical
destruction (i.e., black box). The MPC servers are held by non-colluding organisations,
i.e., organisations with conflicting interests such as authorities, car owner unions and
car manufacturers.
6.3 Cryptographic building blocks
This section specifies, the cryptographic functionalities that are used across this chapter,
as well as the MPC functionalities and cryptographic building blocks.
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6.3.1 Cryptographic functionalities
SePCAR uses the following cryptographic building blocks. The suggested instantiations
are the ones used in our proof-of-concept implementation.
• σ← sign(Sk,m) and true/false← verify(Pk,m,σ) are public-key operations for
signing and verification respectively. These can be implemented using RSA as
defined in the PKCS #1 v2.0 specifications [177].
• z← prf(K,counter) is a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) that uses as input a
key and a counter. This function can be implemented using CounTeR mode
(CTR) with AES (as the message input is small).
• c← enc(Pk,m) and m← dec(Sk,c) are public-key encryption and decryption
functions. These can be implemented using RSA as defined in the RSA-KEM
specifications [19, 219].
• c← E(K,m) and m← D(K,c) are symmetric key encryption and decryption
functions. These can be implemented using CTR mode with AES.
• v ← mac(K,m) is a symmetric key MAC function. This function can be
implemented using CBC-MAC with AES.1
• z← hash(m) is a cryptographic hash function. This function can be implemented
using SHA-512.
We will furthermore use the notation z← query(x,y) to denote the retrieval of the xth
value from the yth database DB (to be defined in Sect. 6.4), and z← query_an(y) to
denote the retrieval of the yth value from the PL through an anonymous communication
channel such as Tor [308], aiming to anonymously retrieve a published record submitted
using the publish(y) function.
6.3.2 Secure multiparty computation
Ben-or et al. [33] (commonly referred to as BGW) proved that it is possible to calculate
any function with perfect security in the presence of active and passive adversaries
under the information-theoretic model, as long as there is an honest majority: 1/2 for
passive and 2/3 for active adversaries. The former can be achieved by assuming the
use of private channels among the servers and the latter using Verifiable Secret Sharing
(VSS).
1CBC-MAC is proven to be secure as long as it is only evaluated on equal-size messages (or on prefix-free
messages) [30], which is the case for SePCAR. For variable length messages, one should resort to encrypted
CBC-MAC or replace the key for the last block CMAC [168].
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Our protocol is MPC-agnostic, meaning that it does not depend on the solution that
implements the MPC functionality; example protocols that could be executed within
our protocol are SPDZ [75] or MASCOT [178]. However, the three-party protocol
for Boolean circuits that was introduced by Araki et al. [16] is fairly suited for our
current needs, given its performance and threshold properties. Hence, we use this
protocol in our simulation. It can perform non-linear operations with relatively high
throughput and somewhat low latency (when tested on 10 Gbps connections). The
scheme provides threshold security against semi-honest and malicious parties. Note
that Furukawa et al. [134] further adapt the protocol [16] to provide security against a
malicious adversary.
On an incremental setup for KSMS. Our protocol can support an incremental
setup and deployment where an (l>2)-case of KSMS servers is trivial, e.g., using
Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson (BGW) [33]. The 2-party case setting could also
be achieved with MPC protocols such as SPDZ [75], however, the forensic properties
would require that all the shares would be handed out to a single party (i.e., authorities).
6.3.3 Multiparty computation functionalities
SePCAR uses the following cryptographic functionalities for MPC:
• [x]← share(x) is used to secretly share an input. This function can be instantiated
using Araki et al.’s sharing functionality.
• x← open([x]) reconstructs the private input based on the secret shares.
• [z]← XOR([x], [y]) outputs a secret shared bit, representing the XOR of secret
shared inputs [x] and [y]. Note that for both arithmetic or Boolean circuits, such
functionality could be implemented without requiring any communication cost.
• [z]← AND([x], [y]) outputs a secret shared bit, representing the AND of two
secret shared inputs [x] and [y]. This function can be instantiated using Araki et
al.’s AND operation.
• [z]← eqz([x], [y]) outputs a secret shared bit, corresponding to an equality test of
two secret shared inputs [x] and [y]. This is equivalent to computing [z]← [x] ?= [y]
where z ∈ {0,1}.
• [C]← E([K], [M]) secretly computes a symmetric encryption from a secret shared
key [K] and a secret shared message [M]. We include a succinct review on how
to implement AES below.
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• [V ]←mac([K], [M]) secretly computes a MAC from a secret shared key [K] and
a secret shared message [M].
On the secure equality test. Various protocols have been proposed to implement
the equality tests (previously referred to an eqz functionality). Common approaches
provide either constant rounds or a logarithmic number of them in the bit size of its
inputs, which could be proven more efficient for sufficiently small sizes. Furthermore,
they also offer different security levels, i.e., perfect or statistical security [54, 72, 192].
In this work we assume the use of any logarithmic depth construction, which matches
the current state of the art.
On AES over MPC. The block-cipher AES has been the typical functionality for
bench-marking MPC protocols during the last few years; this has resulted in faster
and leaner MPC implementations of the cipher. As the MPC parties hold a secret
shared key K and a secret shared message M, the outcome of the operation is a secretly
shared AES encrypted ciphertext [12, 73, 74, 144]. Note that we assume the use of the
methods proposed by Damgård and Keller [73] with some minor code optimisations.
6.4 SePCAR
This section provides a detailed description of SePCAR. For simplicity and without loss
of generality, we consider a single owner, consumer and shared car. The description
straightforwardly scales to a larger set of owners, consumers, and cars. Table 6.1 lists
the notation used in this chapter and Fig. 6.2 illustrates the high-level overview of
SePCAR.
SePCAR consists of four steps: session keys generation and data distribution, access
token generation, access token distribution and verification and car access. We will
discuss these steps in detail in the remainder of the section, with an overview picture
given in Fig. 6.8. We first discuss a few prerequisite steps which have to be performed.
After the discussion of the fourth (and last) step, we complete the section with an
overview of the possible operations after SePCAR: access token update and revocation.
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Figure 6.2: SePCAR high level overview.
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Figure 6.3: The DB of CM (left) and the DB of the ith server Si (right).
6.4.1 Prerequisites
Before SePCAR can commence, two prerequisite steps need to take place: car key
distribution and setting the details for the car booking.
Car key distribution takes place immediately after the xth owner, IDuox , has registered
her yth car, IDcaruoy , with the KSMS. The KSMS forwards ID
caruo
y to the CM to request
the symmetric key Kcaruoy of the car. The CM retrieves K
caruo
y from its DB, DBCM
and generates ` secret shares of Kcaruoy and ID
caruo
y , denoted by [K
caruo
y ] and [ID
caruo
y ],
respectively. Then, it forwards each share to the corresponding KSMS server, i.e., Si.
Upon receipt of the shares, each Si stores IDuo together with the shares [IDcaruoy ] and
[Kcaruoy ] in its local DB, DBSi . The representations of the DB of CM and Si are shown
in Fig. 6.3. For simplicity, in some parts of SePCAR we will use IDuo , IDcar and Kcar
instead of IDuox , ID
caruo
y and K
caruo
y .
Car booking allows uo and uc to agree on the booking details, i.e., MB = {hash(Certuc),
IDcar, Lcar, CDuc , ACuc , IDB}, where hash(Certuc) is the hash of the digital certificate
of uc, Lcar is the pick-up location of the car, CDuc is the set of conditions under which
uc is allowed to use the car (e.g., restrictions on locations, time period), ACuc are the
access control rights under which uc is allowed to access the car and IDB is the booking
identifier. Recall that it is assumed that an owner and a consumer agree on the booking
details beforehand.
6.4.2 Step 1: Session keys generation and data distribution
The consumer uc generates two symmetric session keys, K
uc
1 and K
uc
2 . Key K
uc
1 will be
used by each Si to encrypt the access token, such that only uc has access to it. Kuc2 will
be used to generate an authentication tag which will allow uc to verify that the access
token contains MB which was agreed during the car booking. In addition, uo sends
the necessary data to each Si, such that the access token can be generated. In detail,
as shown in Fig. 6.4, uo sends a session-keys-generation request, SES_K_GEN_REQ,
along with IDB to uc. Upon receipt of the request, uc generates K
uc
1 and K
uc
2 using the
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Table 6.1: SePCAR notation.
Symbol Description
KSMS, Si Set of KSMS servers, the ith server for i ∈ {1 . . . l}
PL, CM Public Ledger, Car Manufacturer
uo, uc owner, consumer
IDB, IDuo , IDuc , IDcar ID of booking, uo, uc, car
CDuc /ACuc , Lcar Set of conditions/access rights under which uc is allowed to
access a car, car’s location
DBCM / DBSi Database that CM holds with (IDuo , IDcaruo , Kcaruo ) / that
Si holds with (IDuo , [IDcaruo ], [Kcaruo ]) for all owners (uo’s)
and their registered cars
~Duo Car records (IDuox , [ID
caruo
y ], [K
caruo
y ]) of the xth uo for the
yth car extracted (query) from DBSi , where |~Duo |= n
~Dcar The matched (eqz output) yth car key (
1
[0] · · · [0]
y
[1][0] · · ·
n
[0]),
where |~Dcar |= n
Pkx / Skx, Certuc Public/private key pair of the KSS entity x, certificate of uc
MB Booking details, i.e, {hash(Certuc ), IDcar , Lcar , CDuc , ACuc ,
IDB}
σuo , σcarAccess Signature (sign output) of MB with Skuo , and {MB,T ScarAccess}
with Skcar
Kcar , Kuc , Kuc1 /K
uc
2 Symmetric key of the car, uc’s master key, uc’s session keys
generated be (prf output) Kuc and counter/counter+1
Muc , AT uc Concatenation of MB with σuo , a secure access token as the
encryption (E output) of Muc with Kcar
CSi Ciphertext (enc output) of session keys {[Kuc1 ], [Kuc2 ]} with
PkSi
[Cuc ] Ciphertext (E output) of {[AT uc ], [IDcar ]} with [Kuc1 ]
CB, [CB] Message digest (mac output) of MB with Kuc2 , and [MB] with
[Kuc2 ]
T SPubi , T S
car
Access Time-stamp of uc accessing the shared car, a record published
(publish) on the PL submitted by Si
prf() function instantiated by uc’s master key, i.e., Kuc and counter and counter+1.
Then, uc transforms these into ` secret shares, [K
uc
1 ] and [K
uc
2 ], one for each Si in such
a way that none of the servers will have access to the keys but that they can jointly
evaluate functions using these keys securely. Then, it encrypts [Kuc1 ] and [K
uc
2 ] with the
public-key of each Si, CSi = enc(PkSi ,{[Kuc1 ], [Kuc2 ]}), such that only the corresponding
Si can access the corresponding shares. Finally, uc forwards to uo an acknowledgement
message SES_K_GEN_ACK along with IDB and {CS1 , . . . ,CSl}.
While waiting for the response of uc, the owner uo signs MB with her private key, i.e.,
σuo = sign(Skuo ,MB). In a later stage, the car will use σuo to verify that MB has been
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approved by uo. Then uo transforms Muc = {MB,σuo} into ` secret shares, i.e., [Muc ].
Upon receipt of the response of uc, uo forwards to each Si an access-token-generation
request, AT_GEN_REQ, along with IDuo , the corresponding CSi and [Muc ].
6.4.3 Step 2: Access token generation
The servers generate an access token and publish it on the PL. In detail, as shown in
Fig. 6.5, upon receipt of AT_GEN_REQ from uo, each Si uses the IDuo to extract [Kcar]
from DBSi as follows. Initially, each Si uses IDuo to retrieve the list of identities of all
cars and car key shares related to the set of records that correspond to uo. The result is
stored in a vector ~Duo of size n×3, i.e.,
~Duo =

IDuo [IDcaruo1 ] [K
car
1 ]
...
...
...
IDuo [IDcaruoy ] [Kcary ]
...
...
...
IDuo [IDcaruon ] [Kcarn ]
 ,
where n is the number of cars which uo has registered with the KSS.
To retrieve the record for the car to be shared, each Si extracts [IDcar] from [Muc ] and
performs a comparison with each of the n records of ~Duo using the eqz() function. The
comparison results in 0 for mismatch and 1 for identifying the car at position y. The
result of each iteration is stored in a vector ~Dcar of length n, i.e.,
~Dcar =
( 1
[0] · · · [0]
y
[1][0] · · ·
n
[0]
)
.
Owner (uo) Consumer (uo) S1 . . .Si . . .Sl
msg{SES_K_GEN_REQ, IDB}
Kuc1 ← prf(Kuc ,counter)
Kuc2 ← prf(Kuc ,counter+1)
counter← counter+2
[Kuc1 ]← share(Kuc1 )
[Kuc2 ]← share(Kuc2 )
for i = 1 . . . l do
CSi ← enc(PkSi ,{[Kuc1 ], [Kuc2 ]})
end for
σuo ← sign(Skuo ,MB)
Muc ←{MB,σuo}
[Muc ]← share(Muc)
msg{SES_K_GEN_ACK, IDB,{CS1 , . . . ,CSl}}
msgi{AT _GEN_REQ, IDuo ,CSi , [Muc ]}
Figure 6.4: SePCAR step 1: Session keys generation and data distribution.
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Each Si then multiplies ~Dcar and ~Duo to generate a third vector of length 3, i.e.,
~Dcar×~Duo =
(
IDuo [IDcaruoy ] [K
caruo
y ]
)
,
from which the share of the secret-key [Kcar] of a car can be retrieved. Then, the KSMS
servers Si collaboratively encrypt [Muc ] using the retrieved [Kcar] to generate an access
token for the car in shared form, [AT car].
As AT car and IDcar need to be available only to uc, a second layer of encryption is
performed using Kuc1 . To retrieve the shares of the session keys, {[Kuc1 ], [Kuc2 ]}, each Si
decrypts CSi using its private key. Then, the servers encrypt [AT car] and [IDcar] with
[Kuc1 ] to generate [C
uc ]. In addition, they generate an authentication tag, [CB], using
the mac() function with [Kuc2 ] and [MB] as inputs. Finally, each Si sends to PL an
access-token-publication request, AT_PUB_REQ, along with [CB] and [Cuc ].
6.4.4 Step 3: Access token distribution and verification
The PL publishes the shares of the encrypted access token which are then retrieved
by uc. Once retrieved, uc can obtain the access token and use it to access the car. In
detail, as shown in Fig. 6.6, upon receipt of AT_PUB_REQ, PL publishes [CB], [Cuc ]
and T SPub, which is the time-stamp of the publication of the encrypted token. Then PL
sends an acknowledgement of the publication, AT_PUB_ACK, along with T SPubi to at
least one Si which forwards it to uo who, in turn, forwards it to uc.
Upon receipt of AT_PUB_ACK, uc uses T SPubi and the query_an() function to
anonymously retrieve [Cuc ] and [CB] from PL, such that PL cannot identify uc. Then,
uc uses the open() function to reconstruct CB and Cuc using the retrieved shares. Next,
uc verifies the authentication tag CB locally using the mac() function with Kuc2 and MB
PL S1 . . .Si . . .Sl
~Duo ← query(IDuo ,DBSi)
for y = 1 . . .n do
~Dcary ← eqz([IDcar], [IDcaruoy ])
end for
[Kcar]← ~Dcar×~Duo
[AT car]← E([Kcar], [Muc ])
{[Kuc1 ], [Kuc2 ]}← dec(SkSi ,CSi)
[Cuc ]← E([Kuc1 ],{[AT car], [IDcar]})
[CB]←mac([Kuc2 ], [MB])
msgi{AT _PUB_REQ, [CB], [Cuc ]}
Figure 6.5: SePCAR step 2: Access token generation.
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Owner (uo) Consumer (uo) PL S1 . . .Si . . .Sl
publish(T SPubi , [CB], [Cuc ])
msg{AT _PUB_ACK,T SPubi }
msg{AT _PUB_ACK,T SPubi }
msg{AT _PUB_ACK,T SPubi }
query_an(T SPubi )
T SPubi [C
B] [Cuc ]
14774098 ersdf3tx0 fwefw234
. . . . . . . . .
msg{[CB], [Cuc ]}
CB← open([CB])
if CB ?= mac(Kuc2 ,MB) then
Cuc ← open([Cuc ])
{AT car, IDcar}← D(Kuc1 ,Cuc)
else
Break
end if
Figure 6.6: SePCAR step 3: access token distribution and verification.
as inputs. In the case of successful verification, uc is assured that the token contains the
same details as the ones agreed during car booking. Then, uc decrypts Cuc using K
uc
1 to
obtain the access token and the car identity, {AT car, IDcar}.
6.4.5 Step 4: Car access
The consumer uses the access token to obtain access to the car. In detail, uc sends
{AT car, IDcar,Certuc} to the car using a close range communication channel such as
NFC or Bluetooth (see Fig. 6.7). Upon receipt, the OBU of the car obtains Muc =
{MB,σuo} by decrypting AT car with Kcar. It then performs three verifications. It
checks if the access attempt satisfies the conditions specified in MB. Then, it verifies
σuo to be assured that the booking details MB have not been modified and have been
indeed approved by the car owner. Finally, it verifies the identity of uc. For the last
verification, as the OBU receives Certuc (along with the hash(Certuc) in MB), it can
use any challenge-response protocol based on public/private key [87] and RFIDs [88].
If any of these verifications fails, the OBU terminates the car access process and
denies access to the car. Otherwise, it grants uc access to the car, signs {MB,T ScarAccess},
where T ScarAccess is the time-stamp of granting the access and asynchronously sends
msg{σcarAccess,T ScarAccess} to uo.
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Owner (uo) Car Consumer (uo)
msg{AT car, IDcar,Certuc}
{MB,σuo}← D(Kcar,AT car)
verify(Pkuo ,MB,σuo)
Challenge / Response
σcarAccess← sign(Skcar,{MB,T ScarAccess})
msg{σcarAccess,T ScarAccess}
verify(Pkcar,{MB,T ScarAccess},σcarAccess)
Figure 6.7: SePCAR step 4: car access. Dashed lines represent close range
communication.
6.4.6 Access token update and revocation
Upon an agreement between uo and uc to update or revoke an access token, SePCAR
can be performed as described in steps 1-3. The values of an update request can
be changed according to new booking details, MˆB, whereas for revocation, each of
the parameters in MˆB can receive a predefined value indicating the revocation action.
However, there are occasions when uo may need to enforce an update or revocation
of an access token. To prevent uc from blocking such operations, SePCAR should be
executed only by uo, without the involvement of uc. More specifically, uo generates
session keys, requests an access token, queries the PL, and sends the token to the car
using long range asynchronous communication channel such as LTE.
6.5 Security and privacy analysis
We prove that SePCAR satisfies the security and privacy requirements of Sect. 6.2,
provided that its underlying cryptographic primitives are sufficiently secure. The
theorem statement and the proof given below are informal; a formal description of the
security models and the stand-alone proof are given in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 1. If communication takes place over private channels, the MPC is
statistically secure,
• the signature scheme sign is multi-key existentially unforgeable [142],
• the pseudo-random function prf is multi-key secure [140],
• the public-key encryption scheme enc is multi-key semantically secure [28],
• the symmetric key encryption scheme E is multi-key chosen-plaintext secure [29],
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• the MAC function mac is multi-key existentially unforgeable [142], and
• the hash function hash is collision resistant [258],
then SePCAR fulfils the security and privacy requirements of Sect. 6.2.
Note that, indeed, for each of the keyed cryptographic primitives we require security
in the multi-key setting, as these are evaluated under different keys. For example, sign
is used by all owners, each with a different key; enc is used for different keys, each
for a different party in the KSMS, and E and mac are used for independent keys for
every fresh evaluation of the protocol. We refer to Bellare et al. [28] for a discussion
on generalizing semantic security of public-key encryption to multi-key security; the
adaptation straightforwardly generalizes to the other security models.
sketch. We describe the security and privacy requirements and analyse how these are
achieved from the cryptographic primitives, separately. We recall that consumer and
owner have agreed upon the booking details prior to the evaluation of SePCAR, hence
they know each other.
SR1 – Confidentiality of MB. In one evaluation of the protocol, uc, uo, and the
shared car learn the booking details by default or design. The KSMS servers only
learn shares of the booking data, and under the assumption that the MPC is statistically
secure, nothing about the booking data is revealed during the MPC. The outcomes of
the MPC are CB and Cuc satisfying
CB = mac(Kuc2 ,MB) , (6.1)
Cuc = E(Kuc1 ,{E(Kcaruoy ,{MB,σuo}), IDcar}) , (6.2)
both of which reveal nothing about MB to a malicious outsider due to the assumed
security of mac, E, and the independent uniform drawing of the keys Kuc1 and K
uc
2 . The
nested encryption E does not influence the analysis due to the mutual independence of
the keys Kuc1 and K
caruo
y .
SR2 – Authenticity of MB. An owner who initiates the access token generation
and distribution, first signs the booking details using its private key before sending
those to the KSMS in shares. Therefore, once the car receives the token and obtains
the booking details, it can verify the signature of the owner on the booking details.
In other words, the car can verify the source of the booking details, the owner and
their integrity. Suppose, to the contrary, that a malicious consumer can get access to a
car of an owner uo. This particularly means that it created a tuple (MB,σuo) such that
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verify(Pkuo ,MB,σuo) holds. If σuo is new, this means that uc forges a signature for the
secret signing key Skuo . This is impossible by assumption that the signature scheme is
existentially unforgeable. On the other hand, if (MB,σuo) is old but the evaluation is
fresh, this means a collision hash(Certuc) = hash(Certuc′), which is computationally
infeasible as the hash function is collision resistant.
SR3 – Confidentiality of AT car. The access token is generated by the KSMS
servers obliviously (as the MPC is statistically secure) and only revealed to the public
in encrypted form, through Cuc of (A.5). Due to the uniform drawing of the key Kuc1
(and the security of the public-key encryption scheme used to transmit this key), only
the legitimate user can decrypt and learn the access token. It shares it with the car over
a secure and private channel.
SR4 – Confidentiality of Kcar. Only the car manufacturer and the car itself hold
copies of the car key. The KSMS servers learn these in shared form, hence learn
nothing about it by virtue of the statistical security of the MPC. Retrieving a car key
from encryptions made under this key constitutes a key recovery attack, which in turn
allows to break the chosen-plaintext security of the symmetric key encryption scheme.
SR5 – Backward and forward secrecy of AT car. The access token is published
on the public ledger as Cuc of (A.5), encrypted under symmetric key Kuc1 . Every honest
consumer generates a fresh key Kuc1 for every new evaluation, using a pseudo-random
function prf that is secure, i.e., that is indistinguishable from a random function. This
implies that all session keys are drawn independently and uniformly at random. In
addition, the symmetric encryption scheme E is multi-key secure. Concluding, all
encryptions Cuc are independent and reveal nothing about each other. (Note that nothing
can be said about access tokens for malicious users who may deviate from the protocol
and reuse one-time keys.)
SR6 – Non-repudiation of origin of AT car. The car, that is a trusted entity, verifies
the origin through verification of the signature, verify(Pkuo ,MB,σuo). The consumer
uc verifies the origin through the verification of the Message Authentication Code
(MAC) algorithm, CB ?= mac(Kuc2 ,MB). Note that the consumer does not effectively
verify AT car, but rather CB, which suffices under the assumption that the MPC servers
evaluate their protocol correctly. In either case, security fails only if the asymmetric
signature scheme or the MAC function are forgeable.
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SR7 – Non-repudiation of delivery of AT car. The owner can verify correct
delivery through the verification of the message sent by the car to the owner,
verify(Pkcar,{MB,T ScarAccess},σcarAccess) at the end of the protocol. The security breaks
only if the signature scheme is forgeable.
PR1 – Unlinkability of uc and the car. The only consumer-identifiable data
is in the consumer’s certificate included in the booking details. Note that these are
agreed upon between the consumer and the owner, so the owner learns the identity
of the consumer by default. Beyond that, the consumer only communicates with the
car, which is supposed to learn the identity of the consumer so that it can perform
proper access control. The consumer consults the PL over an anonymous channel. The
booking details are transferred to and from the KSMS, but these are secretly shared in
Muc and encrypted with Kuc1 , K
car using AES; hence, they do not leak by virtue of their
confidentiality (security requirement SR1).
PR2 – Anonymity of uc and the car. The reasoning is identical to that of PR1.
PR3 – Undetectability of AT car operation. Access token generation, update, or
revocation is performed using the same steps and the same type of messages sent to the
KSMS and PL. Hence, outsiders and system entities cannot distinguish which operation
has been requested.
PR4 – Forensic evidence provision. In the case of disputes, the information
related to a specific transaction (and only this information) may need to be reconstructed.
This reconstruction can be done only if the KSMS servers collude and reveal their
shares. In our setting, these servers have competing interests, thus they would not
collude unless law authorities force them to do so. Due to the properties of threshold
secret sharing, the private inputs can be reconstructed by a majority coalition. That is,
if the KSMS consists of three parties, it suffices two of such parties to reconstruct the
secrets (for semi-honest and malicious cases).
FR1 – Oﬄine authentication. Note that steps 1-3 of the protocol require a network
connection, but step 4, car access, is performed using close range communication and
with no need of a network connection. The decryption and verification of the access
token can be performed by the car offline (it has its key Kcar and the owner’s public-key
Pkuo stored). Sending the confirmation signature σcarAccess can also be done offline.
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6.6 Performance evaluation
Below we analyse the theoretical complexity and practical efficiency of SePCAR.
6.6.1 Theoretical complexity
The complexity of MPC protocols is typically measured by the number of commu-
nication rounds produced by non-linear operations, as linear operations can usually
be performed without any information exchange and are virtually free of charge. In
one evaluation of SePCAR, the non-linear operations performed by the KSMS servers
are (i) the retrieval of the car key through multiple calls of the eqz functionality using
the IDcar and their counterparts in ~Dcar as parameters, and (ii) two evaluations of the
encryption scheme E and one evaluation of the mac algorithm.
For (i) the evaluations of the eqz functionality, the multiplicative depth in dlog(|IDcar|)e+
1, where |IDcar| is the number of bits in IDcar. Note that we can parallelize the eqz call
for all ~Dcar entries. Therefore, the bulk of the overhead of extracting the car key comes
from implementing the equality test in logarithmic depth [192]. Besides executing
the eqz tests, we also have to perform an extra communication round since we need
to multiply the result of each equality test with its corresponding car key. The total
number of communication rounds for (i) is thus dlog(|IDcar|)e+1.
For (ii) the two evaluations of the encryption scheme E and the single evaluation
of mac we use, as mentioned in Sect. 6.3, CTR mode of AES and CBC-MAC with
AES, respectively. Note that in a single AES evaluation the number of non-linear
operations equals the number of S-Boxes evaluated in these functions, but many can be
parallelized. Denote by ν the number of communication rounds needed to encrypt a
single 128-bit block using AES. The two evaluations of CTR mode can be performed in
parallel, and cost 2 ·ν rounds. The evaluation of CBC-MAC is inherently sequential and
costs
⌈ |MB|
128
⌉
·ν communication rounds. The total number of communication rounds
can thus be expressed as:(
dlog(|IDcar|)e+1
)
+2 ·ν+
⌈ |MB|
128
⌉
·ν . (6.3)
6.6.2 Efficiency
Our protocol is agnostic towards the underlying multiparty protocol. In our experiments
we have incorporated the 3-party semi-honest protocol by Araki et al. [16], given its
relative efficiency of AES calls compared to alternatives such [75, 178]. The upshot of
our experiments is that SePCAR needs only 1.55 seconds for a car access provision.
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We elaborate on our simulation below, following the steps of Sect. 6.4. An allocation
of the time on the different steps is provided in Table 6.2 where time is averaged over
1000 runs.
Step 1. Recall that step 1 handles the preparation and sharing of the booking
details and generation of keys. For enc we use RSA defined in the PKCS #1 v2.0
specifications [177] with 2048-bit keys (≈ 2 ms). For sign we use RSA with SHA-2
with a 512-bit output (≈ 50 ms). The prf is implemented using AES in CTR mode
(≈ 2 ms). For all these functions we use OpenSSL [233]. The share function is
implemented by the sharing primitive introduced by Araki et al. [16].
Step 2. In this step, the KSMS servers retrieve the car key and perform the
corresponding encryption and other subroutines linked to generating the MAC. We
consider the following message configuration size: hash(Certuc) of 512 bits string,
IDcar of 32 bits string, Lcar of 64 bits string, CDuc of 96 bits string, ACuc of 8 bits
string, IDB of 32 bits string and σuo of 512 bits string. The booking details MB are of
size 768 bits (including padding) and the final access token AT uc is of size 1408 bits
(including padding). For the dec function we use RSA with 2048-bit keys (≈ 2 ms).
The symmetric encryption E is implemented in CTR mode and the mac in CBC mode.
As mentioned before, the functions E, mac, and eqz use the primitives proposed by
Araki et al. [16], and we use the multiparty AES method of Damgård and Keller [73].
Using this method, a single S-Box evaluation takes 5 communication rounds. A single
evaluation of AES consists of 20 sequential evaluations of an S-Box, where we included
the key expansion and took into account that parallelizable S-Boxes do not add up to the
number of communication rounds, hence encryption requires ν= 100 communication
rounds. From (6.3) we obtain that in our simulation the total number of communication
rounds is (
5+1
)
+2 ·100+6 ·100 = 806 .
Key expansion for different keys needs to be performed only once, and for multiple
evaluations of SePCAR for the same car the round complexity reduces.
Step 3. In this step the consumer retrieves, reconstructs, and verifies the assigned
access token. The PL is implemented using SQLite. The implementation of open()
again follows the primitive of Araki et al. [16], and mac is implemented using AES in
CBC mode (≈ 13 ms).
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Table 6.2: Performance of SePCAR.
Phase Description Time (in sec)
Step 1 Sharing the booking details and keys 0.220±0.027
Step 2 Extracting car key and making access token 1.274±0.032
Step 3 Verifying the access token 0.055 (+1 Tor [307])
Total 1.551±0.043 (+1 Tor)
Step 4. The final step consists of a challenge-response protocol between uc and the
car, but it does not directly affect the performance of SePCAR hence we omit it from
our implementation.
Environment Settings. We implemented our simulation for SePCAR in C
programming language and evaluated it using a machine equipped with an Intel i7,
2.6 GHz CPU and 8 GB of RAM.2 The communication within the KSMS was simulated
using socket calls and latency parameters. We used the setting from Araki et al. [16]
to simulate the LAN latency (≈ 0.13 ms) and from Ramamurthy et al. [253] for
WiFi (≈ 0.50 ms). We did not assume any specific network configuration for our
experimentation.
2The implementation can be obtained from https://bitbucket.org/Siemen11/sepcar.
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Owner (uo) Car Consumer (uc) PL S1 . . .Si . . .Sl
MB = {hash(Certuc), IDcar,Lcar,CDuc ,ACuc , IDB}
msg{SES_K_GEN_REQ, IDB}
Kuc1 ← prf(Kuc ,counter)
Kuc2 ← prf(Kuc ,counter+1)
counter← counter+2
[Kuc1 ]← share(Kuc1 )
[Kuc2 ]← share(Kuc2 )
for i = 1 . . . l do
CSi ← enc(PkSi ,{[Kuc1 ], [Kuc2 ]})
end for
σuo ← sign(Skuo ,{MB})
Muc ←{MB,σuo}
[Muc ]← share(Muc)
msg{SES_K_GEN_ACK, IDB,{CS1 , . . . ,CSl}}
msgi{AT _GEN_REQ, IDuo ,CSi , [Muc ]}
~Duo ← query(IDuo ,DBSi)
for y = 1 . . .n do
~Dcary ← eqz([IDcar], [IDcaruoy ])
end for
[Kcaruoy ]← ~Dcar×~Duo
[AT car]← E([Kcaruoy ], [Muc ])
{[Kuc1 ], [Kuc2 ]}← dec(SkSi ,CSi)
[Cuc ]← E([Kuc1 ],{[AT car], [IDcar]})
[CB]←mac([Kuc2 ], [MB])
msgi{AT _PUB_REQ, [CB], [Cuc ]}
publish(T SPubi , [CB], [Cuc ])
msg{M_PUB_ACK,T SPubi }
msg{AT _PUB_ACK,T SPubi }
msg{AT _PUB_ACK,T SPubi }
query_an(T SPubi )
T SPubi [C
B] [Cuc ]
14774098 ersdf3tx0 fwefw234
. . . . . . . . .
msg{[CB], [Cuc ]}
CB← open([CB])
if CB ?= mac(Kuc2 ,MB) then
Cuc ← open([Cuc ])
{AT car, IDcar}← D(Kuc1 ,Cuc)
else
Break
end if
msg{AT car, IDcar,Certuc}
{MB,σuo}← D(Kcar,AT car)
verify(Pkuo ,MB,σuo)
Challenge / Response
σcarAccess← sign(Skcar,{MB,T ScarAccess})
msg{σcarAccess,T ScarAccess}
verify(Pkcar,{MB,T ScarAccess},σcarAccess)
Figure 6.8: SePCAR complete representation.
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6.7 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we presented a protocol for car access provision namely SePCAR.
Driven by the security and privacy requirements identified in the previous chapter
(Chapter 5), SePCAR provides a generation, update, revocation, and distribution
mechanisms for access tokens to shared cars and also procedures to solve disputes and
to deal with law enforcement requests, for instance in the case of car incidents. We
proved the security and privacy properties and measured the efficiently of SePCAR for
a car access provision.

Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
Our personal information is being
bought and sold without our knowl-
edge and consent.
BRUCE SCHNEIER, Cryptographer,
computer security professional and
privacy specialist
We conclude this dissertation by summarising our main research results and
contributions. Moreover, we discuss open problems and point out some future research
directions.
7.1 Conclusions
The focus of this thesis was to analyse and design privacy-enhancing solutions for
information sharing systems. More in particular:
• Chapter 4: We comprehensively analysed the interdependent privacy issue of
Facebook third-party applications (apps) and third-party application providers
(app providers), quantified the collateral information collection, and proposed
solutions as countermeasures.
• Chapter 5: We methodologically analysed the security and privacy threats
of physical-keyless car sharing systems, and we elicit the requirements as
countermeasures.
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• Chapter 6: We designed, developed and evaluated a protocol namely Secure and
Privacy-enhancing protocol for Car Access Provision (SePCAR) for secure and
privacy-enhancing car access provision.
Collateral information collection of third-party apps on Facebook. We
conclude that collateral information collection is a privacy issue for Facebook users.
Our main findings were the following. The vast majority of our participants are very
concerned about the collateral information collection and would like proper notification
and control mechanisms regarding collateral information collection, for themselves and
also their friends. We identified that the likelihood of a Facebook user to be affected
by the collateral information collection is mainly related to the popularity of an app
(e.g., 80% probability for TripAdvisor). We quantified the significance of collateral
information collection and identified that almost half of the 207 apps that enable the
collateral information collection, collect the photos, the location and the work history of
a user from their friends. We identified that the lack of transparency and consent is the
main issue considering the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and that poses
a risk to the privacy of users. Finally, we proposed solutions to collateral information
collection in the direction of enhancing transparency and increasing control with a
particular focus on a privacy dashboard extension. Moreover, we discussed alternative
solutions focusing on notification and access control mechanisms, cryptographic
countermeasures and application auditing and in particular on Data Protection Impact
Assessment (DPIA) driven by the GDPR. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the
first to report the potential user profiling threat that could be posed by app providers.
A security and privacy analysis for keyless car sharing systems. We presented
a novel keyless car sharing system that allows users to share their cars with others
more conveniently. First, we devised a high-level model of our system and specify the
functional requirements and interactions among system entities. Based on this model
and taking the STRIDE and LINDDUN frameworks as a reference, we performed a
comprehensive threat analysis. Finally, to mitigate the identified threats, we specified a
set of security and privacy requirements for such systems. In a nutshell, this work can be
used as a guide (i) to design secure and privacy-preserving protocols that support other
physical asset sharing systems designs such as accommodation rental (e.g., Airbnb),
and (ii) to assess the security and privacy risks imposed on users by such systems.
SePCAR: A secure and privacy-enhancing protocol for car access provision.
We designed, developed and evaluated a protocol namely SePCAR for a car access
provision. SePCAR is proven to be secure and privacy-enhancing, efficiently
performing in≈ 1.55 seconds for a car access provision. The security level of SePCAR
relies on its underlying cryptographic primitives. The implementation was performed
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in C and evaluated using an Intel i7, 2.6 GHz CPU and 8 GB of RAM. We presented
a formal analysis of the security and privacy requirements of our protocol, and we
designed a prototype as a proof-of-concept. SePCAR provides a complementary
solution to physical keys, aiming for those that hold mobile devices and want a dynamic
and efficient way to access a car.
7.2 Future work
There are several directions for future research that we can distil from our results, that
worth further investigation and effort.
Interdependent privacy. We identified four directions for potential future work on
collateral information collection. First, conducting a fully rounded quantitative survey
would pay immediate dividends by (1) extending the sample size and demographic
coverage compared to our questionnaire, (2) collecting answers from online social
network sites other than Facebook and (3) quantifying the perceived sensitivity of users
concerning various profile attributes.
Second, we are particularly interested in using DPIA as a countermeasure to collateral
information collection and other social and mobile apps related to privacy threats,
especially by augmenting the current DPIA state-of-the-art with a quantitative privacy
risk assessment. It is likely that app providers (in particular those with multiple apps
and/or many users) are obliged to perform a DPIA, both for individual apps and for
their complete app suite, to demonstrate compliance to the GDPR.
Third, the data fusion aspect of app providers offering multiple apps may have another
dimension: when app providers offer apps on multiple platforms, such as Facebook,
Android or Google Drive. We would like to investigate, whether such cross-platform
data fusion (and thus, profiling) is happening and/or at least feasible. For example,
imagine if social profile items from Facebook could be combined with the precise
location of users from a mobile app. Furthermore, Facebook Login, a widely used
Single Sign-On (SSO) mechanism, may transfer the collateral information collection
issue to other websites and services.
Fourth and last, an interesting but unexplored aspect of collateral information collection
is whether such data gathering could harm the privacy of users, or can be beneficial to
users under some special circumstances.
Design and develop secure and privacy-preserving physical asset sharing
systems. We will design and implement fully-fledged secure and privacy-preserving
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solutions for physical asset sharing systems. We are aiming at extending our work [285]
and design a system that handles other operations such as bookings and payments
offering the same security and privacy guarantees to [285]. The goal will be to identify
all the non-functional requirements and design solutions that satisfy them. Physical
asset sharing systems are many fold: in fact, 17 sectors have been identified from
transport through accommodation rental to equipment. In our design solutions, we
plan to combine various advanced technologies such as distributed ledgers, smart
contracts, Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) and zero-knowledge proofs to offer
technical guarantees for satisfying the non-functional requirements. We will also pay
attention to provide accountability, conditional privacy and forensic evidence provision
for such systems. Moreover, being compliant with the GDPR and consider other non-
functional requirements such as risk assessment and efficiency in the system design
and development phase is also within the objectives that we are aiming to investigate.
Appendix A
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A.1 Questionnaire: Whether users are concerned
about the collateral information collection
Facebook offers entertainment applications such as Crime scene, Candy Crash saga,
and Angry birds. When you install an app from the Facebook app store, the app may
collect your information on Facebook. For instance, Candy Crash saga collects your
name, profile picture, country and email address. Other apps may collect other types of
information.
When your friends install apps on Facebook, these apps not only collect their
information but may also collect your information. The types of information that
a friend’s Facebook app can collect about you are listed in Fig. A.1.
Example 1. If your friends install Travelling apps, they may collect your current
location to notify your friends if you are close by.
Example 2. If your friends install a Dating app (finding potential dating matches
for you) the app may collect your birthday, gender, and sexual preferences to find out
whether you are attracted by the same physical preferences (e.g., short, tall, brunette,
blond) as your friend.
By default, Facebook allows apps that your friends install to collect information about
you. Note that apps that your friends install collect your information without notifying
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Figure A.1: The types of information that a Facebook app can collect
you in advance or asking for your approval. However, Facebook does have app settings
to manually restrict the collection of your information.
Bellow you will find a questionnaire regarding user preferences about Facebook apps.
Your answers will only be used for scientific purposes. No personal information will
be used and responses will be aggregated if published.
On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means ‘not concerned at all’ and 5
means ‘extremely concerned’, how concerned are you about the following:
(Not concerned at all, Slightly concerned, Moderately concerned, Very
concerned, Extremely concerned).
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• The default privacy settings on Facebook allow my friend’s apps to collect my
information.
• Facebook does not notify me in advance of the possibility that one of my friend’s
apps is going to collect information about me.
• Facebook does not notify me in advance of the possibility that one of my apps is
going to collect information about my friends.
• Facebook does not ask for my approval in advance of the possibility that one of
my friend’s apps is going to collect information about me.
On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means ‘not concerned at all’ and 5 means
‘extremely concerned’, how concerned are you about the following pieces
of your information: (Not concerned at all, Slightly concerned, Moderately
concerned, Very concerned, Extremely concerned).
• Bio
• Birthday
• Family and relationships
• Interested in Religious and political views
• If I’m online
• My status updates
• My photos
• My videos
• My links
• My notes
• Home Town
• Current location
• Education and work
• Activities, interests, things I like
• My app activity
146 APPENDIX
Would you like to be notified in the following cases? (Never, Depending on
the type of information that is collected, Always, I don’t know)
• When one of my friend’s apps is going to collect pieces of my information.
• When one of my apps is going to collect pieces of my friend’s information.
Can you please elaborate on your answer to the previous question? (open
answer).
Which actions would you take if you are notified that one of your friend’s
apps is going to collect your information? (Check all that apply)
• I would take no action.
• I would restrict access to my personal information for apps that collect my
information.
• I would restrict access to my information for this friend.
• I would request my friend to remove the App.
• I would un-friend my friend.
• I don’t know.
• Other:
Which actions would you take if you are notified that one of your apps is
going to collect your friends’ information? (Check all that apply)
• I would take no action.
• I would ask my friend for her/his approval.
• I would restrict access to my friends’ personal information for this App.
• I would remove this app from my list.
• I don’t know.
• Other:
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For how long have you had a Facebook account? (Approximately)
How many Facebook friends do you have? (Approximately)
Have you ever installed an app on Facebook?
• Yes
• No
If yes, how many Facebook apps have you installed in the past six months?
• 1 – 2
• 3 – 4
• 5 – 6
• 7+
What kind of apps do you often use on Facebook? (For instance games,
lifestyle, navigation, weather, etc)
Have you ever changed the apps privacy settings?
• Yes
• No
If yes, do you remember which permission you changed? (Check all that
apply)
• I restricted who can see my profile information.
• I restricted who can see me in searches.
• I restricted who can collect my information through my friends’ apps.
• Other:
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In which country were you born?
In which year were you born?
What is your gender?
• Male
• Female
• Prefer not to answer
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
• No degree or up to high school
• Bachelor’s degree or equivalent
• Master’s degree and above
• Other:
Do you have an IT background? (Check all that apply)
• Online courses or seminars
• Higher education
• Personal interest
• Other:
Remarks and Questions.
A.2 Extended Security and Privacy Analysis
We prove that SePCAR satisfies the security and privacy requirements of Section 6.2,
provided that its underlying cryptographic primitives are sufficiently secure. In
Section A.2.1 we describe the security models of the cryptographic primitives. Then,
the formal reasoning is given in Section A.2.2.
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A.2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
The security definitions for signature schemes and MAC functions are inspired by
Goldwasser et al. [142], for pseudorandom functions by Goldreich et al. [140], for
public key encryption by Bellare et al. [28], and for symmetric key encryption by
Bellare et al. [29].
We will, in fact, need security of the cryptographic primitives in the multi-key setting,
as these are evaluated under different keys. For example, sign is used by all owners uo,
each with a different key; enc is used for different keys, each for a different party in
the KSMS, and E and mac are used for independent keys for every fresh evaluation of
the protocol. We refer to Bellare et al. [28] for a discussion on generalising semantic
security of public key encryption to multi-key security; the adaptation straightforwardly
generalises to the other security models.
In below definitions, for a function f , we define by Func( f ) the set of all functions
with the exact same interface as fK . We denote a random drawing by
$←−.
Definition. Let µ ≥ 1. Consider a signature scheme sign = (keygen,sign,verify).
For any adversary A , we define its advantage in breaking the µ-multikey existential
unforgeability as
Advµ-eufsign (A) =
Pr
(
(Pk1,Sk1), . . . ,(Pkµ,Skµ) $←− keygen : Asign(Ski,·)(Pki) forges
)
,
where “forges” means that A outputs a tuple (i,M,σ) such that verify(Pki,M,σ) =
1 and M has never been queried to the i-th signing oracle. We define by
Advµ-eufsign (q, t) the supremum over all adversaries making at most q queries and running
in time at most t.
Definition. Let µ ≥ 1. Consider a pseudorandom function prf = (keygen,prf). For
any adversary A , we define its advantage in breaking the µ-multikey pseudorandom
function security as
Advµ-prfprf (A) =
∣∣∣Pr(K1, . . . ,Kµ $←− keygen : Aprf(Ki,·) = 1)−
Pr
(
$1, . . . ,$µ $←− Func(prf) : A$i = 1
)∣∣∣ .
We define by Advµ-prfprf (q, t) the supremum over all adversaries making at most q queries
and running in time at most t.
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Definition. Let µ≥ 1. Consider a public-key encryption scheme enc=(keygen,enc,dec).
For any adversary A , we define its advantage in breaking the µ-multikey semantic
security as
Advµ-pkeenc (A) =
∣∣∣Pr((Pk1,Sk1), . . . ,(Pkµ,Skµ) $←− keygen : AO0(Pki) = 1)−
Pr
(
(Pk1,Sk1), . . . ,(Pkµ,Skµ) $←− keygen : AO1(Pki) = 1
)∣∣∣ ,
where Ob for b ∈ {0,1} gets as input a tuple (i,m0,m1) with i ∈ {1, . . . ,µ} and
|m0| = |m1| and outputs encPki(mb). We define by Advµ-pkeenc (t) the supremum over
all adversaries running in time at most t.
Definition. Let µ≥ 1. Consider a symmetric-key encryption scheme E=(keygen,E,D).
For any adversary A , we define its advantage in breaking the µ-multikey chosen-
plaintext security as
Advµ-skeE (A) =
∣∣∣Pr(K1, . . . ,Kµ $←− keygen : AE(Ki,·) = 1)−
Pr
(
$1, . . . ,$µ $←− Func(E) : A$i = 1
)∣∣∣ .
We define by Advµ-skeE (q, t) the supremum over all adversaries making at most q queries
and running in time at most t.
Definition. Let µ ≥ 1. Consider a MAC function mac = (keygen,mac). For
any adversary A , we define its advantage in breaking the µ-multikey existential
unforgeability as
Advµ-macmac (A) = Pr
(
K1, . . . ,Kµ $←− keygen : Amac(Ki,·) forges
)
,
where “forges” means that A outputs a tuple (i,M,σ) such that mac(Ki,M) =
σ and M has never been queried to the i-th MAC function. We define by
Advµ-macmac (q, t) the supremum over all adversaries making at most q queries and running
in time at most t.
Finally, we consider the hash function hash to be collision-resistant. We denote the
supremal probability of any adversary in finding a collision for hash in t time by
Advcolhash(t). The definition is, acknowledgeably, debatable: for any hash function there
exists an adversary that can output a collision in constant time (namely one that has a
collision hardwired in its code). We ignore this technicality for simplicity and refer to
[258, 280, 257] for further discussion.
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A.2.2 Analysis
We prove that SePCAR satisfies the security and privacy requirements of Section 6.2
provided that its underlying cryptographic primitives are sufficiently secure.
Theorem 2. Suppose that communication takes place over private channels, the MPC
is statistically secure, hash is a random oracle, and
Advµo+µcar-eufsign (2q, t)+Adv
µc-prf
prf (2q, t)+Adv
l-pke
enc (t)+
Advq+µcar-skeE (2q, t)+Adv
q-mac
mac (q, t)+Adv
col
hash(t) 1 ,
where µo denotes the maximum number of uos, µc the maximum number of ucs, µcar the
maximum number of cars, l the number of servers in the KSMS, q the total times the
protocol gets evaluated, and t the maximum time of any adversary.
Then, SePCAR fulfills the security and privacy requirements of Section 6.2.
Proof. Recall from Section 6.2 that uos and CM are honest-but-curious whereas ucs
and outsiders may be malicious and actively deviate from the protocol. Cars are trusted.
Via a hybrid argument, we replace the pseudorandom functions prf(Kuc , ·) by
independent random functions $uc . This step is performed at the cost of
Advµc-prfprf (2q, t) , (A.1)
as in every of the q evaluations of SePCAR there are two evaluations of a function
prf, and there are at most µc instances of these functions. As we assume that the
MPC is performed statistically secure, we can replace the KSMS by a single trusted
authority (with l interfaces) that is trusted, perfectly evaluates the protocol, and does not
reveal/leak any information. Assuming that the public-key encryption reveals nothing,
which can be done at the cost of
Advl-pkeenc (t) , (A.2)
we can for simplicity replace it with a perfectly secure public-key encryption ρKSMS to
the KSMS directly (an encryption does not reveal its origin and content, and only KSMS
can magically decrypt), therewith eliminating the fact that KSMS has l interfaces and
has to perform multiparty computation. Now, as the pseudorandom functions are
replaced by random functions, the keys to the symmetric encryption scheme E are all
independently and uniformly distributed, and as the public-key encryption scheme is
secure, these keys never leak. Therefore, we can replace the symmetric encryption
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functionalities by perfectly random invertible functions, picaruo for the cars and unique
piuc ’s for every new encryption under uc’s session keys, at the cost of
Advq+µcar-skeE (2q, t) , (A.3)
as there are q+µcar different instances involved and at most 2q evaluations are made
in total. Note that this means that, instead of randomly drawing Kuc1 ← $uc , we now
randomly draw piuc $←− Func(E).
We are left with a simplified version of SePCAR, namely one where the KSMS is
replaced by a single trusted authority, the pseudorandom functions are replaced by
independent random drawings (uc uses $uc which generates fresh outputs for every
call), public-key encryptions are replaced with a perfectly secure public-key encryption
function ρKSMS, and symmetric-key encryptions are replaced by perfectly random
invertible functions picaruo and piuc . The simplified protocol is given in Figure A.2.
Here, the derivation of the car key (or, formally, the random function corresponding to
the encryption) from the database is abbreviated to picaruo ← query(IDuo ,DBKSMS) for
conciseness.
We will now treat the security and privacy requirements, and discuss how these are
achieved from the cryptographic primitives, separately. We recall that uc and uo have
agreed upon the booking details prior to the evaluation of SePCAR, hence they know
each other by design.
SR1 – Confidentiality of MB. In one evaluation of the protocol, uc, uo, the trusted
KSMS, and the shared car learn the booking details by default or design. The booking
details only become public through the values CB and Cuc satisfying
CB = mac(Kuc2 ,MB) , (A.4)
Cuc = piuc({picaruo ({MB,σuo}), IDcar}) . (A.5)
The latter value reveals nothing about MB as piuc is randomly generated for every
evaluation, whereas the former value reveals nothing about MB as Kuc2 is randomly
generated for every evaluation. The nested encryption piuc ◦picaruo does not influence
the analysis due to the mutual independence of the two functions.
SR2 – Authenticity of MB. An owner who initiates the access token generation
and distribution, first signs the booking details using its private key before sending
those to the KSMS in shares. Therefore, once the car receives the token and obtains
the booking details, it can verify uo’s signature on the booking details. In other words,
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the car can verify the source of MB, uo, and its integrity. Suppose, to the contrary, that
a malicious consumer can get access to a car of an uo. This particularly means that
it created a tuple (MB,σuo) such that verify(Pkuo ,MB,σuo) holds. If σuo is new, this
means that uc forges a signature for the secret signing key Skuo . Denote the event that
this happens by
E1 : A forges sign(Skuo , ·) for some Skuo . (A.6)
On the other hand, if (MB,σuo) is old but the evaluation is fresh, this means a collision
hash(Certuc) = hash(Certuc′). Denote the event that this happens by
E2 : A finds a collision for hash . (A.7)
We thus obtain that a violation of SR2 implies E1∨E2.
SR3 – Confidentiality of AT car. The access token is generated by the KSMS
obliviously (as it is trusted), and only revealed to the public in encrypted form, through
Cuc of (A.5). Due to the uniform drawing of piuc (and the security of ρKSMS used to
transmit this function), only the legitimate user can decrypt and learn the access token.
It shares it with the car over a secure and private channel.
SR4 – Confidentiality of Kcar. By virtue of our hybrid argument on the use of
the symmetric-key encryption scheme, EKcar got replaced with picaruo , which itself is a
keyless random encryption scheme. As the key is now absent, it cannot leak.
SR5 – Backward and forward secrecy of AT car. The access token is published
on PL as Cuc of (A.5), encrypted using piuc . Every honest uc generates a uniformly
randomly drawn function piuc for every new evaluation. Therefore, all encryptions
Cuc are independent and reveal nothing of each other. (Note that nothing can be said
about access tokens for malicious users who may deviate from the protocol and reuse
one-time keys.)
SR6 – Non-repudiation of origin of AT car. The car, who is a trusted identity,
verifies the origin through verification of the signature, verify(Pkuo ,MB,σuo). The
consumer uc verifies the origin through the verification of the MAC function, CB
?
=
mac(Kuc2 ,MB). Note that uc does not effectively verify AT car, but rather CB. In either
case, security fails only if the asymmetric signature scheme or the MAC function are
forgeable. The former is already captured by event E1 in (A.6). For the latter, denote
the event that this happens by
E3 : A forges mac(Kuc2 , ·) for some Kuc2 . (A.8)
We thus obtain that a violation of SR6 implies E1∨E3.
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SR7 – Non-repudiation of delivery of AT car. uo can verify correct de-
livery through the verification of the message sent by the car to the him/her,
verify(Pkcar,{MB,T ScarAccess},σcarAccess) at the end of the protocol. Security breaks only if
the signature scheme is forgeable. Denote the event that this happens by
E4 : A forges sign(Skcar, ·) for some Skcar . (A.9)
We thus obtain that a violation of SR7 implies E4.
PR1 – Unlinkability of uc and the car. The only consumer-identifiable data is in
uc’s certificate included in the booking details. Note that these are agreed upon between
uc and uo, so uo learns the identity of uc by default. Beyond that, uc only communicates
with the car, which is supposed to learn uc’s identity so that it can perform proper
access control. uc consults PL over an anonymous channel. The booking details are
transferred to and from the KSMS, but these are encrypted and do not leak by virtue of
their confidentiality (security requirement SR1).
PR2 – Anonymity of uc and the car . The reasoning is identical to that of PR1.
PR3 – Undetectability of AT car operation. Access token generation, update, or
revocation is performed using the same steps and the same type of messages sent to
the KSMS and PL. Hence, outsiders and system entities can not distinguish which
operation has been requested.
PR4 – Forensic evidence provision. In the case of disputes, the information
related to a specific transaction (and only this information) may need to be reconstructed.
This reconstruction can be done only if the KSMS servers collude and reveal their
shares. In our setting, these servers have competing interests, thus they would not
collude unless law authorities enforce them to do so. Due to the properties of threshold
secret sharing, the private inputs can be reconstructed by a majority coalition. This is,
if the KSMS consists of three parties, it suffices two of such parties to reconstruct the
secrets (for semi-honest and malicious cases).
FR1 – Oﬄine authentication. Note that steps 1-3 of the protocol require a network
connection, but step 4, car access, is performed using close range communication and
with no need of a network connection. The decryption and verification of the access
token can be performed by the car offline (it has its picaru0 and uo’s public key Pkuo
stored). Sending the confirmation signature σcarAccess can also be done offline.
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Conclusion. In conclusion, SePCAR operates securely as long as the costs of
(A.1-A.3), together with the probability that one of the events (A.6-A.9) occurs, are
sufficiently small:
Advµc-prfprf (2q, t)+Adv
l-pke
enc (t)+Adv
q+µcar-ske
E (2q, t)+Pr(E1∨E2∨E3∨E4) 1 .
By design, the probability that event E1∨E4 occurs is upper bounded by
Advµo+µcar-eufsign (2q, t), the probability that event E3 occurs is upper bounded by
Advq-macmac (q, t), and the probability that E2 occurs is upper bounded by Advcolhash(t).
We thus obtain
Pr(E1∨E2∨E3∨E4)≤ Advµo+µcar-eufsign (2q, t)+Advq-macmac (q, t)+Advcolhash(t) ,
which completes the proof.
156
APPEN
D
IX
Owner (uo) Car Consumer (uc) Public Ledger (PL) KSMS (trusted)
MB = {hash(Certuc), IDcar,Lcar,CDuc ,ACuc , IDB}
msg{SES_K_GEN_REQ, IDB}
piuc $←− Func(E)
Kuc2 ← $uc
CKSMS← ρKSMS({piuc ,Kuc2 })
σuo ← sign(Skuo ,{MB})
Muc ←{MB,σuo}
msg{SES_K_GEN_ACK, IDB,CKSMS}
msg{AT _GEN_REQ, IDuo ,CKSMS,Muc}
picaruo ← query(IDuo ,DBKSMS)
AT car← picaruo (Muc)
{piuc ,Kuc2 }← (ρKSMS)−1(CKSMS)
Cuc ← piuc({AT car, IDcar})
CB←mac(Kuc2 ,MB)
msg{AT _PUB_REQ,CB,Cuc}
publish(T SPub,CB,Cuc)
msg{M_PUB_ACK,T SPub}
msg{AT _PUB_ACK,T SPub}
msg{AT _PUB_ACK,T SPub} query_an(T SPub)
T SPub CB Cuc
14774098 ersdf3tx0 fwefw234
. . . . . . . . .
msg{CB,Cuc}
if CB ?= mac(Kuc2 ,MB) then
{AT car, IDcar}← (piuc)−1(Cuc)
else
Break
end if
msg{AT car, IDcar,Certuc}
{MB,σuo}← (picaruo )−1(AT car)
verify(Pkuo ,MB,σuo)
Challenge / Response
σcarAccess← sign(Skcar,{MB,T ScarAccess})
msg{σcarAccess,T ScarAccess}
verify(Pkcar,{MB,T ScarAccess},σcarAccess)
Figure A.2: Simplified representation of SePCAR for the proof of Theorem 2.
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